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Abstract 
 
 When nineteenth-century southern nationalists seceded from the Union and 
created a southern nation, they sought to justify their actions by situating the Confederacy 
as one of many aspiring nations seeking membership in the family of nations in the 
middle of the nineteenth century.  To support their argument that the Confederacy 
constituted a legitimate and independent nation, southern nationalists claimed nineteenth 
century European nationalist movements as precedents for their own attempt at nation-
building, using the southern nation’s supposed similarity to, or, at times, differences 
from, these European aspiring nations to legitimize the Confederacy.  Such claims built 
on a long antebellum precedent in which southern opinion-makers analyzed events 
abroad through the lens of their own national values, developing an international 
perspective on issues of nationhood.  As they debated the revolutions of 1848, southern 
commentators used this discourse on nationalism abroad to distinguish between the 
national values that were and were not acceptable to conservative slave-holders, 
clarifying an altered southern definition and vision of liberal nationalism.  When 
southerners turned to creating an independent southern nation, secessionists utilized this 
international understanding of nationalism to claim that because the aspiring southern 
nation followed the model of new and aspiring nations in Europe, particularly Italy, it 
deserved independence.  Such an argument, while popular domestically, failed to 
resonate with Europeans and northerners who understood the contrast between slavery 
and liberal nationalism, forcing Confederates to re-evaluate their claims about the 
 v
international place of southern nationalism.  In response, some Confederates intensified 
their comparisons, further manipulating the ideals and symbols of nationalism to continue 
positioning the Confederacy within the broader trends of nineteenth century nationalism.  
More conservative Confederates rejected comparisons between southern nationalism and 
more liberal European nationalisms, claiming that the Confederacy actually purified 
nationalism through slavery.  From the earliest stirrings of southern nationalism to the 
defeat of the Confederacy, southern analysis of European nationalisms played a critical 
role in shaping southern thought about nationhood.
 vi
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Introduction 
 
When southerners seceded from the Union to form the Confederate States of 
America, they were faced with the immediate necessity of forging a nationalism for their 
new nation, a necessity that led them to look outward as well as inward for inspiration.  
As southern nationalists sought to construct a national narrative that would justify their 
place among the family of nations, they turned to the images and symbols of other 
aspiring nations, drawing comparisons between their nascent nationalism and nationalist 
movements in Europe in order to define and legitimize the southern nation.  These 
comparisons drew on a long antebellum precedent in which southern intellectual elites 
had analyzed foreign nationalism through the lens of their own national values, a process 
that had aided southerners in refining their beliefs about what it meant to be a nation.  
Upon secession, southern nationalists utilized this precedent to claim both similarities 
with and differences from nationalist movements in Europe as a way of explaining, 
legitimizing, and gaining support for the aspiring southern nation.   
Although southern nationalism was in many ways a domestic response to 
American issues such as slavery, southern nationalists also embraced an international 
perspective on their attempt at nation-building, turning to almost a century of nationalist 
thought and activity to help them justify the creation of an independent southern nation. 
Along with slavery, religion, and the American Revolution, nationalist movements in 
Europe stood as an inspiration upon which southern nationalists drew as they sought to 
forge a nationalism that would explain the values and meaning of the new southern 
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nation, as well as to cultivate loyalty amongst and win support for the Confederacy from 
fellow southerners.
1
  
As southern opinion-makers looked abroad, they found much to admire in the 
values exhibited by nationalist movements in Europe.  From the self-determination of the 
Greek people in the 1820s-1830s, to the republicanism of the revolutions of 1848, to the 
fight against tyranny embodied by the Italian Risorgimento, southern intellectuals 
admired the values in these revolutions that they believed echoed their own national 
values.
2
  This support was not unqualified, however; the southern elite was deeply 
conservative and committed to slavery, which left southern analysts wary of European 
nationalists’ cries for freedom and liberty.
3
  Most nationalist movements in Europe were 
                                                 
1
 Some influential analyses of the origins of southern nationalism include Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation 
of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State 
University Press, 1988); John McCardell, The Idea of a Southern Nation:  Southern Nationalists and 
Southern Nationalism:  1830-1860 (New York:  W. W. Norton, 1979); Anne Sarah Rubin, A Shattered 
Nation:  The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861-1868 (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina 
Press, 2005).  Historians including Faust have identified the existence of international influences on 
southern thought about nationhood, but these ideas were largely unexplored until recent work by Paul 
Quigley and Andre Michel Fleche.  Faust, Creation of Confederate Nationalism, 11-13; Quigley, Shifting 
Grounds:  Nationalism and the American South, 1848-1865 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2011); 
Fleche, The Revolution of 1861:  The American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict (Chapel Hill:  
University of North Carolina Press, 2012).  
 
2
 For an overview of the Greek nationalist movement, see Paul Pappas, The United States and the Greek 
War for Independence, 1821-1828 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).  For an overview of the 
revolutions of 1848, see Jonathan Sperber, The European Revolutions, 1848-1851 (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).  For an overview of the Italian Risorgimento, see Denis Mack 
Smith, The Making of Italy, 1796-1866 (New York:  Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1968) and Lucy Riall, 
The Italian Risorgimento:  State, Society, and National Unification (London:  Routledge, 1994). 
 
3
 Paola Gemme, Timothy Roberts, and Andre Michel Fleche have all argued that conservatism limited 
southern support for the revolutions of 1848.  Gemme, Domesticating Foreign Struggles:  The 
Risorgimento and Antebellum American Identity (Athens:  University of Georgia Press, 2005); Roberts, 
Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2009); Fleche, The Revolution of 1861.  Robert E. Bonner, Stephanie McCurry, and 
Manisha Sinha reveal the importance of conservatism to southern politics and the development of southern 
nationalism.  Bonner, Mastering America: Southern Slaveholders and the Crisis of American Nationhood 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); McCurry, Confederate Reckoning:  Power 
and Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2010); Sinha, The 
Counterrevolution of Slavery:  Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina (Chapel Hill:  
University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
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inspired in large part by liberal nationalism, which grew out of Enlightenment ideas such 
as human equality and constitutional rights, and sought not only to achieve independence 
and self-determination for nations, but also to attain the liberal goals of equality and 
natural rights.
4
  The contradiction between a conservative slave society and the liberal 
nationalism that underpinned the movements abroad created tension in southerners’ 
analysis and usage of foreign nationalist movements, helping to shape a southern vision 
of nationalism that was both reactionary and liberal, and that both embraced and, among 
the most conservative of southerners, rejected nationalist movements abroad.  Regardless 
of this tension, however, the southern elite understood their nationalism as connected to 
the larger movement of nationalism in the nineteenth century, and, upon creating a 
southern nation, defined their nation through its context within the larger family of 
nations. 
The tension between southern conservatism and the liberal values highlighted by 
analysis of foreign revolutions played a critical role in the development of southern 
nationalism.  As early as 1848, when the vast majority of southerners were still 
committed to the American nation, conservative fears of unchecked revolution abroad 
guided southerners in developing a southern vision of nationhood.  Southern analysts 
began celebrating the foreign nationalists’ values such as republicanism that they 
believed were positive aspects of nationhood, while rejecting the values such as absolute 
equality and freedom that southerners saw as extremism and as threats to hierarchical 
power and social order.  In doing so, these southern analysts manipulated the idea of 
liberal nationalism.  The altered vision of nationalism that they developed would clarify 
                                                 
4
 For a discussion of the different types of nationalism, see Lloyd Kramer, Nationalism in Europe and 
America:  Politics, Cultures, and Identities since 1775 (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 
2011). 
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southern belief about the proper values of a nation, and would prepare later southern 
nationalists to claim European nationalist movements as a precedent for their own 
attempt at nation-building by teaching southerners to ignore the obvious contradictory 
values. 
As sectional tension became critical throughout the 1850s, southerners used 
analysis of foreign nationalist movements to make sense out of the growing national 
crisis at home.  They compared their fears of what the increasingly influential northern 
abolitionists would do to the South with the oppression suffered by aspiring nations in 
Europe.  Southerners turned to foreign revolutionaries exiled to the United States to 
inform their conversation about the sectionalism of their own nation, using such figures 
as Hungarian patriot Louis Kossuth and Irish nationalist John Mitchel to claim that 
northerners and southerners responded differently to European revolutionaries, and that 
these responses followed differing sectional visions of the national values.  This analysis 
prepared southerners to see themselves as distinct from the North on issues of nation, a 
critical step to conceiving of an independent southern nation. 
When southerners seceded from the United States and began forging their own 
nation, they used their long tradition of understanding issues of nationalism through an 
international lens to help them legitimize a southern nation.  Using the altered southern 
definition of nationalism, they claimed that the supposed similarity between the new 
southern nation and aspiring nations in Europe justified an independent southern nation.  
These international comparisons aided Confederates in defining the Confederacy by 
providing a blueprint of national values for which the Confederacy stood.  Confederates 
also used these comparisons to seek support for the Confederacy, claiming that any aid 
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and legitimacy granted to aspiring nations in Europe, such as the diplomatic recognition 
extended to the newly-united nation of Italy, should likewise be bestowed upon the 
Confederacy. 
While the southern elite seemed remarkably convinced of these comparisons, or at 
least convinced of the comparisons’ ability to gain support and to create a national 
identity for the southern nation, as early as the first year of the Civil War, challenges 
threatened these comparisons.  The contradiction between slavery and liberal nationalism 
that southerners glossed over by manipulating the definition of nationalism proved more 
problematic for the rest of the world, including the very nationalists with whom 
Confederates compared themselves.  The lack of official diplomatic recognition from 
abroad, combined with famous Italian patriot Giuseppe Garibaldi’s support for the North, 
revealed that the rest of the world was not convinced that the Confederacy resembled 
aspiring nations in Europe.  In response, many southern analysts intensified their 
manipulations of the ideals, and now symbols, of nationalism, continuing to claim that 
the Confederacy represented a legitimate attempt at nation-building according to the 
principles established by revolutions abroad.  More conservative southerners, however, 
rejected these comparisons, claiming instead that the Confederacy represented a new and 
improved form of nation, one in which slavery and conservatism purified the excessive 
liberalism that had characterized the European revolutions.  Despite widespread 
ideological manipulations, then, the tension between conservatism and liberal nationalism 
would never be fully reconciled.  Southerners’ attempts to make sense out of nationalism 
through international analysis, however, were critical to the development of southern 
nationalism. 
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Because issues of nationalism were largely determined by the same elite, white, 
educated men who made up the political and intellectual power structure of the South, 
these are the southerners to whom this dissertation refers.  Particularly during and after 
secession, this powerful but small elite, including men who held positions of public 
authority in fields such as government, journalism, business, and academia, tasked 
themselves with constructing a new nationalism.  These elite southerners were well-
versed in international affairs, and were familiar with the actions and ideas of nationalists 
in Europe, enabling them to use international comparisons to define their own 
nationalism.
5
   
These elite opinion-makers recorded and disseminated their ideas and views on 
nationhood through a well-developed print discourse with which they sought to inform 
and persuade their fellow southerners.  Newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and 
published speeches provide a strong record of southern attempts to shape opinion about 
nationalism.  Print discourse plays an influential role in the creation of nationalism, as 
Benedict Anderson has famously revealed in his seminal work Imagined Communities.  
Anderson demonstrates that print culture can play a critical role in allowing strangers to 
imagine themselves as part of a national community, thereby revealing the utility of print 
culture to efforts at creating nationalism.
6
  Corroborating this sense of nationalisms as 
consciously forged, Eric Hobsbawm has revealed that nationalisms can, in fact, be 
                                                 
5
 Michael O’Brien reveals that antebellum southerners, contrary to being isolated reactionaries, were fully 
aware of and engaged in intellectual, cultural, and political trends of their time, and had particular interest 
and even first-hand knowledge of European culture and affairs.  O'Brien, Conjectures of Order: Intellectual 
Life and the American South, 1810-1860 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 
especially pgs 90-161; O’Brien, Rethinking the South:  Essays in Intellectual History (Baltimore:  Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1988). 
 
6
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:  Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London:  Verso, 1991). 
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deliberately shaped by an elite intent on forming a new nation.
7
  Michael T. Bernath has 
applied these insights to the South by analyzing southern nationalists’ attempts to create a 
distinct southern nation through the development of an independent southern cultural and 
intellectual life.
8
  Building off of such understandings of the centrality of print discourse 
to the creation of nationalism, this dissertation utilizes southern print discourse as a 
critical source for analyzing southern nationalists’ attempts to consciously forge a 
southern nationalism.  Because the purpose of placing southern nationalism within an 
international context was to persuade an audience of the proper values for a nation and, 
later, of the legitimacy of southern nationalism, this dissertation focuses on sources 
within the southern print discourse that were designed to inform and influence thought on 
southern nationhood. 
The southerners who contributed to this print discourse, and who sought to shape 
southern opinion of nationalism, included a broad cross section of elite southern society, 
among which were intellectuals, journalists, politicians, and private citizens.  Because of 
the critical role of southern publications in forging a southern nationalism, editors, 
publishers, authors, and journalists constituted a particularly important segment of the 
southerners who attempted to create a southern nation.  Since they determined what 
southerners read and learned about nationalism and the southern cause, these men had 
powerful platforms from which they could shape the discourse and debate within the 
South, allowing them to interpret issues of nation for their audiences.  Politicians and 
other public figures also played a critical role in interpreting issues of nationalism and 
                                                 
7
 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Traditions (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). 
 
8
 Michael T. Bernath, Confederate Minds:  The Struggle for Intellectual Independence in the Civil War 
South (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
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shaping public opinion.  Public speeches provided these men with a common means of 
conveying their ideas to wide southern audience.  Republications of speeches and 
political debates further spread the ideas of the elite to a larger audience.  Beyond 
speeches, pamphlets provided public figures with an extended forum in which to expand 
on their defense of southern rights, especially slavery, and on the supposed northern 
abuses of those rights.  Together, the voices of all these elite southern men, drawn from 
all segments of public life, created a strong and sustained defense of southern nationalism 
that depended upon using comparisons and contrasts with nationalisms in Europe to 
shape southern views on nationhood and to bolster the legitimacy of the Confederacy. 
The audience to which these elite southerners made their national appeals largely 
resembled themselves.  The southern power-brokers who attempted to create a southern 
nationalism found it particularly important to win the support of their fellow elite white 
men, including the planters, businessmen, and officials who made up the formal and 
informal power structure of the South.  While the job of winning the support of foreign 
nations belonged first and foremost to diplomats and other influential southerners abroad, 
southern nationalists at home were also aware of the potential import of their words and 
explanations on public opinion abroad, and, especially during the Civil War, incorporated 
international opinion into their attempts to claim European nationalist movements as a 
precedent for southern nationalism.  
 Southern nationalism has long been a subject of historical inquiry, and historians 
have analyzed the origins of southern nationalism at great length.  Drew Gilpin Faust 
identified slavery, religion, and the heritage of the American Revolution as the primary 
 9
ideological influences on southern nationalism.
9
  Other historians have looked at the 
cultural foundations of southern nationalism, including Bernath, who argues that southern 
nationalists desired to create a self-consciously independent southern culture and 
intellectual life in order to strengthen a southern nation.
10
  My work analyzes an 
additional source of southern nationalism by examining the international dimension of 
southern thought on nations and nationhood as southerners undertook the process of 
forming their own nation.  In doing so, my work draws on both the ideological and 
cultural explanations for southern nationalism, for example applying Faust’s 
understanding of Confederate comparisons with the American Revolution to southern 
comparisons with European revolutions, and utilizing Bernath’s understanding of the 
importance of print culture in creating an independent southern identity by analyzing 
international elements of this print discourse. 
My analysis of the international influences on southern nationalism also responds 
to scholarship on the critical importance of southern conservatism to southern 
nationalism.  The conservative basis of southern politics is well-established, and scholars 
such as Stephanie McCurry continue to expand our understanding of the conservative and 
even anti-democratic nature of southern thought.
11
  My work argues that southerners 
could be both conservative and reactionary, as well as outward looking, at the same time, 
                                                 
9
 Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism. 
 
10
 Bernath, Confederate Minds.  Other historians who present cultural explanations for southern nationalism 
include James M. McPherson, “Was Blood Thicker Than Water?  Ethnic and Civic Nationalism in the 
American Civil War,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 143.1 (1999):  102-108; William 
Robert Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee:  The Old South and American National Character (New York:  G. 
Braziller, 1961).  For more analyses of the origins of southern nationalism, see Rubin, A Shattered Nation; 
Gary W. Gallagher, The Confederate War (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1999). 
 
11
 McCurry, Confederate Reckoning.  See also Sinha, The Counterrevolution of Slavery; Bonner, Mastering 
America. 
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by demonstrating how southern nationalists used an international perspective to attempt 
to reconcile their conservative, anti-democratic tendency with the liberal ideals that had 
long dominated the American, and therefore southern, political tradition, and that were 
gaining influence throughout the world.
12
  Despite their conservative nature, many 
southern nationalists still found the liberal ideals that had long directed the American 
political tradition so compelling that comparisons with movements abroad representing 
these values remained a valuable method of seeking support for their new nation.  
Because of the conservatism of the South, however, these southern nationalists carefully 
edited their portrayal of foreign nationalist movements to fit with their own revised 
understanding of what liberty and equality meant for an overtly slave-holding republic, 
choosing to focus on the anti-imperialist aspect of these movements and largely ignoring 
the social implications of the liberal nationalist cry for equality.  My work thus reveals 
how southern nationalists internationally contextualized their debate between liberalism 
and conservatism, and how they attempted to adapt their conservatism to the international 
trend of liberal nationalism. 
Scholarship on southern nationalism has recently begun to explore the 
international context in which southern nationalism developed.  Paul Quigley, in 
revealing the inward, outward, and backward inspirations for the Confederacy, analyzes 
previous knowledge of European nationalisms as one of the ways in which southerners 
made sense out of their own changing nationalisms.  His emphasis on romantic 
                                                 
12
 Scholars have generally revealed that southerners reconciled their liberal heritage with their slave-based 
conservatism by denying the applicability of liberal ideas such as freedom to slaves.  Scholars have also 
shown that southerners argued that slavery constituted a valuable contribution to the American experiment 
in government.  James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom:  An Interpretation of the Old South (New York:  
Knopf, 1990); Bonner, Mastering America; Lacy K. Ford, Deliver Us From Evil:  The Slavery Question in 
the Old South (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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nationalism in particular reveals southerners’ deep engagement with the trends of the 
time.
13
  Andre Michel Fleche similarly recognizes Confederate awareness of international 
trends of liberalism and nationalism, focusing on the revolutions of 1848 and their legacy 
for Americans’ nationalism, particularly analyzing the impact of European nationalists’ 
immigration to the US, as well as the incompatibility of slavery and liberal nationalism as 
highlighted by the European revolutions’ growing emphasis on issues of labor and 
emancipation.
14
  Don Doyle has also worked to contextualize southern nationalism within 
an era of nationalist movements, particularly by comparing the southern nationalist 
movement and the Italian Risorgimento.
15
   
My dissertation adds to and extends the conversation begun by these scholars by 
providing a more complete understanding of how and why southerners understood issues 
of their nationhood through an international lens, starting with the early antebellum 
period and continuing all the way through the impending failure of the southern 
experiment in nation-building at the end of the Civil War.  Looking at antebellum 
southern analysis of nationalisms abroad is critical to understanding the development of 
southern thought on nationhood, as it reveals how and why southerners developed an 
international perspective on issues of nationalism.  Analyzing the antebellum roots of 
southern thought on nationalism also shows how an international perspective shaped 
southern thought about their nation throughout the antebellum period, including how this 
                                                 
13
 Quigley, Shifting Grounds. 
 
14
 Fleche, The Revolution of 1861. 
 
15
 Don H. Doyle, Nations Divided:  America, Italy, and the Southern Question (Athens:  University of 
Georgia Press, 2002).  Other historians have also begun examining the international context of southern and 
American nationalism, as well as the spread of ideas of nationalism from one nation to another.  For 
examples, see David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence:  A Global History (Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 2007); Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations:  America's Place in World History 
(New York, NY:  Hill and Wang, 2006). 
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perspective helped southerners to clarify their national values and to conceive of the 
South as distinct from the North.  Continuing the story through the Civil War shows how 
the international perspective that developed in the antebellum period later shaped 
southern attempts to build and defend the southern nation, and why southern nationalists 
remained committed to the vision of the South as one of many aspiring nations of the 
nineteenth century, even as events during the war seemed to disprove this stance.  This 
dissertation thus clarifies the international vision of nationalism that dominated southern 
thought as southerners conceived of a southern nation, and shows how that vision 
ultimately shaped southern nationalism.   
Additionally, analyzing the tension between liberal and conservative responses to 
revolutions abroad demonstrates how southern nationalists attempted to place their 
conservatism within an international framework in order to reconcile their liberal political 
tradition with their conservative tendencies.  Such analysis also reveals the critical 
importance of the ideological manipulations that southern nationalists went through in 
order to justify their international contextualization of the Confederacy.  As such, this 
dissertation more fully explains why southerners believed they could use an international 
perspective to legitimize their nation, despite the problems that slavery presented to their 
project in nation-building.  By providing a full-length analysis of the influence of 
European nationalist movements on southern thought on nations and nationalism, then, 
this dissertation expands understanding of the critical issues of why the South seceded, 
why southern nationalists thought they had a case for independent nationhood, and how 
they framed their cause as about rights rather than, or in addition to, slavery. 
 13
Beyond southern history, my work also reveals that nationalist movements can be 
built, in part, by borrowing from ideas of other nationalist movements.  In particular, it 
reveals that an aspiring nation can twist, manipulate, and re-cast the ideas of a foreign 
nationalist movement, making them into something entirely different, yet more suitable 
and useful for the new movement.  This argument thus advances our understanding of 
how nationalist movements are built and how they influence each other.  My work also 
expands the ways in which we think about liberalism and the ascent and fall of liberal 
nationalism in the nineteenth century by complicating the binary between liberal and 
illiberal movements.  Through these contributions, my work enhances understanding of 
both southern nationalism and of nationalism in the Atlantic world in the nineteenth 
century.
 
 14
Chapter One 
Debating Nationalism, 1820-1849 
 
The world in the first half of the nineteenth century seemed full of new 
possibilities for nations around the globe.  Aspiring nationalists spread ideas of 
nationalism from one nationalist movement to another.  Led by the American and French 
Revolutions, and continuing through the wakes of colonialism in the Americas and the 
reactive, post-Napoleonic Congress of Vienna in Europe, an age of revolution saw 
potential nationalities throughout Europe and the Americas rising up and attempting to 
form independent nations.   
Elite, educated antebellum southerners watched these developments closely, as 
did the rest of the world.  European movements in particular caught these southerners’ 
attention.  Beginning with the Greek independence movement in the 1820s and 
continuing through the revolutions of 1848 that spread across Europe, southerners 
followed the advance of the ideals of liberal nationalism and the attempts of the Greeks, 
French, Italians, Hungarians, Poles, and other nationalities to put these ideals into action.  
As they analyzed these events abroad, southern commentators found much to support.  
They recognized their own cherished national values in the aspiring nations they watched 
in Europe, and through analysis of the values exhibited by nationalist movements abroad, 
the southern elite drew connections between the various movements, identifying the 
ideals that created similarity between aspiring nations, and even looking back to their 
own history to connect these revolutions to the American Revolution.  
 15
Despite this support for the revolutions, however, the conservative slave-holding 
elite who dominated southern political and intellectual life also approached the events in 
Europe with wariness.  The fundamental incompatibility between an unequal and 
hierarchal slave system and a form of nationalism premised upon freedom and equality 
challenged southerners’ perceptions of nationalism and complicated their reactions to the 
revolutions abroad.  Even as they celebrated some liberal values, southerners feared the 
radical implications of the revolutions’ call for freedom and liberty.  Thus, even while 
supporting the aspects of these movements that they connected to their own values, 
southerners criticized the aspects of the revolutions that they characterized as extremism.  
This process of analyzing foreign nationalisms, learning to see them as connected, 
and evaluating which aspects of these movements were and were not worthy of support 
taught southerners about their own views of nationhood.  As southerners watched and 
debated the meaning of revolutions in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
they ultimately learned to define what they believed a nation and nationalism should be.  
In doing so, southerners essentially created an altered vision of nationalism that sought to 
reconcile the liberal ideals that underpinned their own American nationalism with the 
conservatism that pervaded southern political thought.  This vision of nationalism that 
southerners developed through analysis of nationalist movements in Europe would 
ultimately guide their sense of their own nationality, just as the subject of their own 
nationalism began to become a critical issue for southerners. 
Antebellum southerners were actively engaged in analysis of nationalist 
movements in Europe, beginning as early as the Greek nationalist movement.
1
  Greece 
                                                 
1
 Michael O’Brien argues that elite southerners were fully engaged in the intellectual trends of their time, 
including a deep interest in classical history.  O’Brien, Conjectures of Order. 
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provided antebellum southern analysts with an early, and sentimentally favored, example 
of a fight for national independence.  In 1821, Greeks rose up under the leadership of 
Alexander Ypsilantis to try to overthrow Ottoman control; although this initial attempt 
failed, Greeks would continue to wage war against the Turks throughout the 1820s, 
eventually gaining independence with the aid of European intervention in 1830.  As 
Greece fought for independence from the Ottoman Empire, American minds turned to the 
glories of the Greece of antiquity, celebrating Greece’s historic role in establishing the 
governmental practices of self-representation and republicanism that nineteenth-century 
Americans so revered.  This enthusiasm for all things Greek, combined with Americans’ 
desire to see their own political institutions and values echoed abroad, created widespread 
American support for the Greek independence movement.
2
 
Southerners joined their fellow Americans in celebrating Greece and the cause of 
Greek independence, using print discourse to spread their enthusiasm.  The vast majority 
of reports in southern periodicals, while often generated abroad or in the North, showed 
whole-hearted support for Greece, guiding the formation of southerners’ opinions.  
Southern audiences read about how citizens in various cities held balls and raised money 
for the Greek cause; government officials asked for support for Greece; and even the 
president, James Monroe, informed Congress that it was natural that the Greeks would 
“produce that great excitement and sympathy in their favor, which have been so signally 
                                                 
2
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displayed throughout the U. States.”
3
  While southern-generated reports were fewer in 
number, they showed equal enthusiasm for the Greek cause.  For example, the Natchez 
State Gazette, a paper owned by colorful Mississippi journalism pioneer Andrew 
Marschalk, synthesized foreign reports to inform readership that the news from Greece 
was hopeful that “the glorious cause of National Independence, will prevail in Greece, 
and she will soon take her station in the rank of nations.”
4
  The Charleston Courier took 
the occasion of Christmas, 1823, to remind its readers that even as they celebrated the 
birth of Christ, Christians in Greece were suffering, and that “Greece, worthy as she is of 
our sympathies… holds a higher claim on our affections.”
5
  Such reports set the tone for 
what southerners learned about the Greek cause. 
 The positive tone that reporters adopted toward Greece was echoed in southern 
action.  Charlestonians were the first Americans to respond to the Greek call for aid.
6
  
Virginia legislators and citizens of Richmond, following in the example of northern pro-
Greek organizations, met in 1824 to pass resolutions expressing sympathy and calling for 
support for the Greek cause.
7
  Similarly, the Louisiana legislature passed an official 
resolution in support of Greece, earning praise from the Milledgeville (GA) Southern 
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Recorder, a states’ rights Whig newspaper.
8
  Southerners continued forming 
organizations to collect aid and encourage sympathy for the Greek cause, and upon the 
successful culmination of Greek independence and the subsequent uncertainty 
surrounding the governance of newly independent Greek, southerners showed concern 
for the future of the Greek nation.
9
  Clearly, Greek independence was a cause that the 
southern elite supported. 
While Greece, revered as the birthplace of democracy, won significant sympathy 
from antebellum Americans, it was far from the only nascent nationalist movement that 
southerners supported in the 1820s and 1830s.  Southerners also turned a sympathetic eye 
toward Ireland’s desire for independence from Great Britain; the various Italian states’ 
struggles for freedom from foreign empires and monarchs perceived to be despotic; 
France’s creation of a constitutional monarchy in 1830; Poland’s fight for freedom from 
Russia and Prussia; and Belgium’s bid for independence from the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands.
10
  As with Greece, this support was publicly displayed in a variety of ways 
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throughout the South.  Hibernian societies and other organizations formed for the support 
of Ireland in southern cities and towns ranging from Savannah and Charleston to 
Annfield, NC, often using St. Patrick’s Day to celebrate the cause of Irish 
independence.
11
  Support for Neopolitan independence exploded in the early 1820s as 
Naples sought independence from Austria, with Leesburg, Virginia’s Genius of Liberty 
characterizing the revolution as “among the singular and wonderful events of the day.”
12
  
France’s struggles to create a more responsive government won widespread support from 
southerners, complete with parades, musical performances (including at least one 
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instance of La Marsellaise), and even an official letter of congratulations from the state 
legislature of Louisiana that declared the support of the people of Louisiana for the 
people of France.
13
  Poland’s revolution, inspired by France’s, also warranted 
southerners’ support, as southerners “look[ed] with feelings of enthusiasm” to “this 
gallant, chivalrous and noble country” according to Whig Samuel Snowden’s Alexandria 
Phenix Gazette.
14
  Meanwhile, the settling of Belgium’s independence was nothing less 
than a “promise for civilization.”
15
  All of these revolutions were a common subject of 
toasts at southern gatherings, as southerners praised nationalist movements abroad.
16
  
Often southerners connected the European nationalist movements in their toasts, as did a 
Mr. Patrick Cantwell, who celebrated “the Parisian heroes of July, 1830 – a bright 
example for the Irish agitators.”
17
  The widespread support and celebrations of 
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southerners for revolutions and nationalists in Greece, Italy, France, and other areas of 
Europe reveals southerners’ positive view of early nationalist movements. 
Southern commentators supported these movements because they believed that 
these aspiring nations in Europe were fighting for the same political values that 
southerners cherished.  Despite the conservatism that dominated southern politics, 
southerners still retained pride in their revolutionary heritage as Americans, and revered 
many of the values upon which the US had been founded.  Antebellum southerners, like 
other Americans, celebrated values that had underpinned the creation of the United 
States, exclaiming, for example, that the US stood as “a splendid example that a 
republican government is best calculated to promote the dignity and happiness of man.”
18
  
The values that southerners praised in revolutions abroad were thus the same ones by 
which they defined their own American nationhood. 
Among these values that southerners celebrated in European nationalist 
movements was the right of the people to direct their own government.
19
  Although such 
a value contradicted the limitation of rights inherent to slavery, southerners nonetheless 
cheered as foreign peoples sought greater national self-determination, contextualizing the 
revolutions in terms of the fall of the principle of the divine right of kings, rather than in 
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terms of extension of individual rights to individual citizens.
20
  For example, Virginia 
congressman, writer, and professor George Tucker, who believed in limited democracy 
within the United States, nonetheless argued in his “Discourse on the Progress and 
Influence of Philosophy” that the fight for the rights of the people against monarchy, as in 
Belgium and Greece, was the key to the progress of mankind.
21
  Other southerners 
likewise celebrated as the people of aspiring nations began to exercise their rights, as 
when Samuel B. T. Caldwell’s Leesburg Genius of Liberty enthused that by demanding 
their desire for independence be heard, the Neapolitans “begin to see that they have 
essential rights to claim.”
22
  Similarly, a committee of citizens of South Carolina resolved 
of Greece that “the mere contemplation of a people rising to assert its rights… excites the 
sensibilities of every friend to liberal principles.”
23
  The liberty of a proposed nation to 
exercise its right to independence was a considerable priority for southerners in their 
evaluation of nationalist movements abroad.
24
  
Because they wanted to ensure the protection of peoples’ right to nationhood, 
southerners also adamantly supported what they saw as battles against despotism and 
tyranny.  Ignoring the fact that as slaveholders, they themselves were accused of tyranny, 
southerners celebrated threats to governments that they perceived as despotic.  Southern 
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analyses reveal that southerners were convinced that aspiring nationalities such as Italy, 
Greece, Poland, and Belgium were the victims of tyrants and despots.
25
  For example, the 
revolution in Naples promised to end “arbitrary and despotic government,” according to 
the Charleston City Gazette.
26
  Likewise, New Orleans’ Courrier de la Louisiane 
exclaimed that the “heroic Greeks” made “such sacrifices to fling off the yoke of their 
tyrants.”
27
  In doing so, they sought “emancipation” from “despotic thralldom.”
28
  Ireland 
was an “oppressed, ravaged, and groaning country.”
29
  The Revolution of 1830 saw 
“illustrious France” rising and “trampling underfoot a hoary headed tyranny,” according 
to French Creole Thomas Theard, editor of the New Orleans Abeille.
30
  Southern hopes 
also abounded that Poland would be “redeemed from the iron grasp of the oppressor,” as 
the Natchez Southern Clarion reported.
31
  Furthermore, despotism had to be ended, 
according to H. J. Groesbeck in the Southern Literary Messenger, as it led to the 
degeneration of the mind, in contrast to free institutions, which led to intellectual and 
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moral development.
32
  Again and again, southern reports decried the despotism and 
tyranny faced by aspiring nations in Europe, lending their sympathy, and, often, aid to 
Europeans’ quests for freedom from oppression. 
Because southerners saw republicanism as the best barrier against tyranny and 
despotism, movements perceived to be republican warranted the most southern support.  
Republicanism was another American and southern value that southerners revered and 
searched for in movements abroad.
33
  As Thomas R. Dew, a pro-slavery writer and a 
professor at the College of William and Mary, explained in an article in the Southern 
Literary Messenger, republicanism was critical to the full development of humanity.
34
  
Other southerners wrote about how republicanism was necessary for the protection of the 
peoples’ rights, as well as their ability to build a functioning society.
35
  Because of the 
importance of republicanism, revolutions that represented republicanism earned 
celebration from southerners.
36
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These values, believed to be shared between the United States and aspiring 
nations in Europe, led antebellum southerners to perceive a bond or connection between 
their nation and would-be European nations.  Discussions of foreign nationalisms 
occurred frequently during celebrations of the United States, such as the Fourth of July, 
revealing the sense of connection between the nations.
37
  Orators often took the occasion 
of celebrations of the United States to survey the advance of American principles abroad.  
For example, the speaker at the Fourth of July, 1830, celebration for the Young Men of 
Alexandria asked his listeners to contemplate the international effects of the American 
Revolution, tracing the “spread of liberal sentiments” in France and Greece.
38
  The 
occasion of the anniversary of Washington’s birthday also led to calls for sympathy with 
Greece and other nations still “striving in a kindred cause.”
39
   
Americans’ own nationalist movement, the American Revolution, constituted a 
major aspect of this connection that southerners saw between their nation and nationalist 
movements abroad.  Southerners argued that the Greeks, Irish, Neapolitans, and other 
nationalists fought for the same cause that had motivated the American Revolution.  For 
example, a committee of South Carolinians solicited aid for the Greeks on the basis that 
the US had “fought and conquered for the same cause for which Greece is now 
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contending.  We therefore can triumph in [Greece’s] victories and commiserate her 
reverses.”
40
  Ireland, according to the bilingual New Orleans paper Courrier de la 
Louisiane, was “fettered and bending under the heavy iron rod of England,” and was thus 
in “the same predicament” as the American colonies before their revolution.
41
  George 
Tucker wrote that the same principles of free government had motivated the American 
Revolution and both French Revolutions, as well as Belgium and Greece’s recent bids for 
independence.
42
  The leader of the American Revolution, George Washington, featured 
prominently in these comparisons, as southerners declared Lafayette the new Washington 
for his role in the French Revolution of 1830, and wished for Washingtons for 
revolutions elsewhere.
43
 
By casting the American Revolution, and the US, as the model of the values 
playing out in revolutions abroad, Americans, and southerners, shaped their perception of 
their own nation by enhancing their sense of the strength and importance of their nation 
and its values.
44
  Southern analysts took pride in their belief that the United States had 
provided the model of the values that had inspired aspiring nations abroad.  For example, 
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the Natchez Ariel claimed the model of the American nation as a foe of tyranny, and 
stated with pride that “kings and oppressors look at the American Republic, as the evil 
genius that is to one day pull down their power, and level them with their subjects.”
45
  
Accordingly, commentators celebrated that the United States and its principles had been 
responsible for inspiring nationalists and spawning revolutions in France, Ireland, 
Greece, and elsewhere.
46
  These comparisons shaped understanding of which values 
allowed the US to be such an example.  As Stephen Edward Rice explained, as “the 
atmosphere of the world [became] contagious with America’s example,” republicanism 
became “epidemic,” and “despots are in arms against despots.”
47
  Such formulations 
pointed out American strengths through praising the appearance of American values 
elsewhere.  Looking abroad allowed antebellum southerners to reflect inward upon the 
positive values and example of their own nation, refining their beliefs about the meaning 
of their nation. 
As they analyzed revolutions abroad, southerners, as did most of their fellow 
Americans, eventually concluded that, despite the admirable example of the US, aspiring 
nations abroad failed to achieve the standards of the American nation, and that the United 
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States still represented a superior form of nationhood.
48
  In a speech celebrating St. 
Patrick’s Day, Stephen Edward Rice claimed that the US “surpassed Europe, and 
marched to the enjoyment of equal rights” without the “painful delays” and “vicissitudes” 
that plagued other aspiring republics.
49
  Similarly, William A. McRea, despite praising 
Greece and other nationalist movements, informed his Alexandria, VA audience that 
“[the United States] is the only free and happy government in the world,” as “we are 
blessed with institutions purely republican; and live under the genial ray of a constitution, 
which declares, in the spirit of freedom, all men to be equal.”
50
  Hugh S. Legare, South 
Carolina politician and journalist, likewise celebrated the superior functionality of the 
American government compared to the bloodshed in Poland and France.
51
  Such 
comparisons bolstered Americans’, and southerners’, sense of what made their nation 
different and therefore what defined their nation. 
Southern analysis of early nationalist movements in Europe not only engendered 
southern support for these movements, but also caused southerners to reflect more deeply 
upon the values of their own nation.  Comparing and contrasting movements abroad with 
the United States refined southerners’ sense of which values led them to support 
nationalist activity in Europe, as well as which values underpinned their own nation.  
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Although southerners in the early antebellum period still conceived of themselves as 
Americans, the sense of international connectedness that southerners developed in the 
1820s and 1830s would play a critical role in later antebellum southerners’ ability to 
conceive of the South as an independent nation.  After secession, this international vision 
of nationhood would also enable Confederates to justify their nation on the basis of its 
supposed place in the international family of nations.  Without an earlier understanding of 
nationalisms as connected, and without the practice of using foreign nationalisms to 
understand one’s own nation, the international contextualization of the Confederacy 
would have been meaningless. 
Although nationalist activity in Europe began to diminish after the wave of 
revolutions inspired by France’s July Revolution of 1830, southern attention to events 
abroad did not end, and European nationalist movements were only temporarily inactive.  
In the spring of 1848, revolutions broke out across Europe as French, Hungarians, 
Germans, Italians, and other peoples sought to overthrow monarchies and empires and 
replace them with more liberal, republican governments.  Within a couple of years these 
revolutions were defeated and the old order largely restored, but despite their defeat, the 
revolutions of 1848 had a significant influence on the people who lived through them, as 
well as on the people who watched them from abroad.   
Americans were among the many people who followed the revolutions of 1848 
closely.  Because of their faith in the importance of United States as a model nation, 
Americans from all regions eagerly watched to see if their model of nationhood would be 
implemented overseas.
52
  Further, although Civil War was far from inevitable, the United 
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States in 1848 was already on its own path toward nationalist conflict due to the divisive 
issue of slavery, and the issues that would eventually lead to war already divided the 
nation between North and South.  While still retaining their American loyalties and 
identities, Americans, including elite southerners, were very aware of the issues 
threatening their own nation at the very same time they watched Europeans attempt to 
create new governments and nations in 1848.  The lessons that southerners learned about 
the meaning of nationalism through their discussion of the events of 1848 would shape 
the form that their southern nationalism would take a little over a decade later. 
The widespread unrest, conflict, and revolutions of 1848 certainly provided 
plentiful nationalism-related news for southerners to digest.  Discontent had been 
growing across the continent as Enlightenment ideas of self-government conflicted with 
the post-Congress of Vienna Europe that saw control of the continent returned to a 
handful of monarchs.  The French Revolution of 1789, although over a half-century 
distant, provided European nationalists with a model of a revolution based on 
Enlightenment ideals, helping disseminate these ideas through the educated classes.
53
  
The spread of liberalism and the ideal of republicanism drove a desire for greater political 
representation and inspired people to fight for equality and freedom.  The rise of 
nationalism, which elevated the idea of the nation and sought the establishment of 
independent nation-states in the place of large, multinational empires, further inspired the 
mid-century revolutions.  Meanwhile, increasingly difficult economic situations primed 
workers and peasants for revolution.  When the philosophical ideas met with real-world 
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issues such as economic crisis or revolutions in neighboring countries, peasants and elites 
alike began to fight for new forms of government, leading to revolution.
54
 
The first widely-publicized revolution occurred in France in February of 1848, 
when revolutionaries pushed for and gained the establishment of a republic, forcing 
Louis-Philippe to abdicate.  After the declaration of the Republic of France, revolution 
swept the continent.  Revolts and mass demonstrations in the Italian peninsula and the 
German states forced monarchs, dukes, and other rulers to grant constitutions.  Austrian 
leader Metternich fled the empire as a result of mass insurrections in March 1848, and 
Hungarians attempted to set up an independent government under Louis Kossuth.  
Peasants, workers, and women all joined the cry for reform and fought for equality, and 
uprisings and demonstrations spread throughout Europe.  The thread tying together these 
revolutions was a common desire for more liberal, representative governments, 
preferably republics, or at least constitutional monarchies, that gave more power to the 
people.
55
 
 Despite widespread support for these movements, however, they were ultimately 
unsuccessful.  The French Republic was dissolved after Louis-Napoleon staged a coup in 
late 1851.  The Italian Kingdom of Sardinia, which had united Italian nationalists to fight 
against Austria, failed to win its war against the Austrian empire, and the short-lived 
Roman Republic fell to the combined forces of the Pope and of Louis-Napoleon’s French 
army.  The Hungarian independence movement was defeated by combined Austrian and 
Russian forces in summer of 1849 after almost a year of fighting.  Although the 
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revolutions gave early indications of success, by 1850, most of them had been defeated 
and monarchies were restored.  The possibility of revolutionary change in Europe had 
been postponed.
56
  The defeat of the movements could not erase the impact that they had 
on the international conversation about nations and nationalism, however.  The 
revolutions of 1848, despite defeat, significantly influenced the thoughts and beliefs, not 
only of the revolutionaries who participated in them, but also of citizens around the 
world, including in the southern United States, where southerners would soon enact their 
own experiment in nationalism. 
 Southerners looking abroad had a variety of reactions as they debated the meaning 
of the revolutions of 1848.  As they had during the earlier revolutions of the 1820s and 
1830s, southern analysts largely supported the revolutions of 1848, praising nationalists 
in Europe for their efforts to establish republics and fight off tyranny.  Elite southerners 
in the late antebellum era, however, faced with the growth of abolitionism at home and 
abroad and fearful for the preservation of slavery, grew increasingly wary of the full 
implications of liberal nationalism.
57
  They still supported republicanism, and still 
opposed tyranny; however, liberty, freedom, and equality became threatening ideas for an 
elite determined to maintain a hierarchical power structure.  These fears were made 
apparent in southern criticism that the revolutions of 1848 were threatening the social and 
political order that was necessary for stability.  The southern debate and discussion over 
the meaning of the revolutions of 1848 would guide the development of southerners’ 
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beliefs about nations and nationalism, as southerners sought a way to reconcile their 
conservatism with their support for certain aspects of liberal nationalism. 
Despite their fears of unchecked revolution, the majority of southerners 
commenting on the revolutions of 1848 found much to praise in the events abroad.
58
  
Turning again to their own values to make sense out of the foreign nationalist 
movements, one of the ideals that southerners supported in the revolutions of 1848 was 
national self-determination.
59
  The will of the people to determine and administer their 
own government was a major ideal that southerners sought in revolutions abroad, and 
southerners consistently praised revolutions that fought for what southern analysts 
believed to be national self-determination.  For example, the pro-Whig Texian Advocate 
of Victoria, TX, asked “will Europe again relapse into a system of despotic governments, 
or will the people of France, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, &c., show to the world 
that they are capable of self-government,” adding that “these we consider great and 
important questions.”
 60
 Hungarians earned accolades from a writer in the Southern 
Literary Messenger for “contending manfully for representation” and “a substantial share 
in the government
 
.”
61
  South Carolina doctor J. F. G. Mittag, who had toured Europe in 
the early 1840s, wrote to the Charleston Courier to praise European nationalists who 
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“seem determined, at the peril of every thing, to resume the power” that monarchs had 
taken from them.
62
  This self-rule sought in Europe was so important to southerners 
because they believed it was nothing less than the same principle that had led to the 
greatness of the United States.
63
  As they analyzed aspiring nations’ right to self-
determination, some southern commentators pointed to history, ethnicity, or culture as the 
basis for the right to independent nationhood.
64
  For example, Maximilian Schele de 
Vere, professor of Anglo-Saxon studies at the University of Virginia, referenced the long-
oppressed pasts of Italy, Poland, and Ireland as justification for their current desire for 
independent nationhood.
65
  Even as antebellum southerners intensified their conservative 
desire for limited democracy at home, and expressed fears of individuals’ rights to 
participate in the political process, they praised self-determination on the national level as 
enacted in the revolutions of 1848.
66
 
One of the reasons why southerners supported bids for self-determination was that 
the aspiring European nations sought to throw off what European nationalists and 
southerners alike agreed were tyrannical regimes.  The harms of tyranny, as with the 
benefits of self-government, remained a southern concern throughout the antebellum 
period.  Italian states were still fighting in 1848 for independence from the Austrian 
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empire and for the unification of the Italian states, and southerners considered the Pope, 
various monarchs, France, and above all Austria to be tyrants oppressing the Italian 
people.
67
  For example, southern writers depicted Austria, the most commonly-identified 
oppressor of Italy, as a brutal despot, contrasting the “tyranny loving Austrians” with the 
“pleasure loving” Italians and claiming that the Italian people were “kept down by the 
iron despotism of Austria.
68
  Hungary, like Italy, fought for freedom from the Austrian 
Empire, earning it southern support similar to that given to Italy.
69
  Hungarian 
nationalists, southerners analyzed, sought only to replace tyranny with a true republican 
government, and subsequently the crushing of the Hungarian revolution caused deep 
regret among southerners.
70
  Still ignoring the fact that as slaveholders, they themselves 
were accused of tyranny, southern analysts strongly praised revolutions that sought to 
overthrow despotism.    
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 As it had during the nationalist events during the 1820s and 1830s, republicanism 
would again provide one of the standards by which southerners would judge the events in 
Europe in 1848.  Southern commentators explicitly referred to republicanism in analyzing 
the revolutions; in fact, the most common language used to describe the revolutions 
referred directly to republicanism, praising anything republican and criticizing monarchy, 
tyranny, despotism, or anything else that stood in the way of the establishment of 
republics.  For example, the Augusta (GA) Daily Chronicle and Sentinel hoped that 
French republicans would succeed in establishing a republican government that would 
win “the respect of all nations.”
71
  After the defeat of the nationalist movement in Venice, 
the New Orleans Daily Picayune lamented the fall of Venice with a sorrow they believed 
was unique to “him who worships freedom with the devotion that only a republican can 
offer.”
72
  Reports on the revolutions described the fervent desire of the world for 
European nations to achieve a republican form of government.
73
   
Southerners were not just interested in republicanism on an abstract level, 
however.  As they debated the revolutions of 1848, southern analysts used their 
evaluation of whether or not a revolution fit their standards of republicanism to determine 
their support for that revolution.  Indeed, the level of republican virtue shown by a nation 
or movement determined its place in southern ranking of movements, with reporters 
claiming, for example, that Hungary’s republican efforts made the Hungarian revolution 
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the most important conflict in Europe.
74
  In contrast, lack of republican virtue was 
sufficient to earn a revolution condemnation.  For example, southerners tolerated 
Sardinian king Charles Albert’s leadership of the Italian independence movement as a 
necessary evil until he failed to secure a united, independent Italy, at which point they 
accused him, and the Risorgimento, of being insufficiently republican from the 
beginning.
75
  Republicanism was therefore the clearest value by which foreign events 
could be evaluated.
76
  According to this value, southerners deemed the majority of the 
revolutions of 1848 republican, at least in intent and in conception, and therefore worthy 
of southern support.
77
   
As they analyzed the meaning of the revolutions of 1848, southerners connected 
their nationalism to nationalisms abroad by comparing the revolutions of 1848 to the 
American Revolution.  Southerners saw the American Revolution as a model for the 
revolutions of 1848, as they had for earlier revolutions.
78
  Newspapers praised nationalist 
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movements for echoing the American Revolution, as the New Orleans Daily Picayune 
did by claiming that the revolutions abroad were “the revolution of ’76 extending itself 
across the seas.”
79
  Southerners read about how the spirit of the leaders of the American 
Revolution, such as Washington, was motivating the European revolutions.
80
  The 
documents of the American Revolution, not just the Revolution itself, corroborated this 
comparison, as southerners read that the founding documents of new governments of 
Germany, France, and Italy were based on the constitution of the United States.
81
  
Additionally, newspapers such as Tallahassee, Florida’s Democratic weekly, the 
Floridian and Journal, urged their readers to sympathy for European revolutions by 
arguing that these revolutions were the same as the American Revolution.
82
  This belief 
in the American Revolution as the model for the revolutions of 1848 seemed confirmed 
when southerners read reports from abroad that held up the American Revolution as the 
desired model for European revolutions.
83
 
Southerners clarified the basis for the connection between the American 
Revolution and the revolutions of 1848 by revealing that they supported certain values 
exhibited by revolutions abroad because these were the same values that the American 
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Revolution had established in their own nation.
84
  For example, one Floridian celebrated 
the Fourth of July in 1849 by informing his fellow southerners that the struggles in 
Europe were advancing the same ideals that the United States represented.
85
  Newspapers 
reported on American demonstrations of support for the European revolutions, revealing 
that these demonstrations occurred because the revolutions represented the same values 
of freedom that America did.
86
  Similarly, journalist George Kendall, who had been a war 
correspondent in the Mexican-American War before moving to France and becoming the 
New Orleans Daily Picayune’s foreign correspondent, expressed pride at the pro-
American spirit that the revolutions had engendered in Europe, writing that he believed 
that nationalists in Europe were trying to achieve the same freedoms and ideals instituted 
in the United States.
87
  Southerners connected the ideals of the American nation with the 
ideals of the revolutions of 1848, using these comparisons to show their support for the 
events in Europe and, in doing so, internationalizing their thinking about their own 
nation.   
Although a majority of southern analyses of the revolutions of 1848 revealed 
support for the nationalist movements abroad, southerners still had reservations about 
these revolutions.  Southern commentators, while largely supportive of the revolutions 
abroad, nonetheless debated the meaning of these movements, and southern evaluation of 
                                                 
84
 Fleche argues that southerners and northerners alike interpreted 1848 through the legacy of the American 
Revolution.  Fleche, The Revolution of 1861. 
 
85
 “Address,” Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, July 21, 1849.  See also “The Fourth of July,” Charleston 
Courier, July 4, 1848; “Ten Regiment Bill - Debate in the Senate,” Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, 
January 18, 1848. 
 
86
 “Civil Liberty in Italy: Demonstration of American Sympathy with Pope Pius IX, in His Efforts,” New 
Orleans Daily Picayune, December 11, 1847; Macon Georgia Telegraph, March 28, 1848. 
 
87
 Kendall, “European Correspondence,” New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 4, 1848. 
 40
the revolutions of 1848 was far from straightforward.  Positive assessments of the 
revolutions were often tempered with criticism, as southerners analyzed flaws and 
weaknesses in the nationalist movements they observed, and as they rejected the fullest 
implications of liberal ideals as threatening to their slave-based conservatism.  Instead of 
embracing the full extent of values such as freedom and equality, southern conservatives 
sought to promote such ideals as limited democracy and a hierarchical social order.  They 
argued that governmental power should be seated in local rather than national 
government, advancing a vision of states’ rights.  Much of this perspective derived from 
the desire to protect and extend the institution of slavery, which obviously made ideals 
such as equality suspect.  As they watched the revolutions of 1848, then, antebellum 
southerners were confronted with the contradiction between the liberal ideals of their 
American heritage, and their conservatism and defense of slavery.
88
 
Guided by their conservatism, southern analysts found plenty of issues to critique 
in the revolutions of 1848.  Much of this criticism echoed southerners’ concern with 
republicanism, as southerners debated whether or not foreign nationalists would be able 
to live up to the republican promise of their movements.  Even as southern commentators 
recognized what they saw as the original republican intent behind the revolutions, they 
feared that the revolutions were failing to live up to their republican inspiration.  Many 
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southern analyses reveal apprehension about whether or not the people of Europe were fit 
for the republican governments they sought to establish.  George W. Kendall, who had 
co-founded the New Orleans Daily Picayune and served as its foreign correspondent 
from his home in Paris between 1849 and the mid 1850s, was particularly vocal in 
revealing his wariness about Europeans’ ability to properly direct their nationalist 
movements.  In fact, Kendall’s lack of faith in foreign revolutionaries helped to shape his 
generally skeptical tone towards the revolutions of 1848.
89
  No less a figure than John C. 
Calhoun also subscribed to concerns about Europeans’ abilities to implement republican 
ideals.  Calhoun believed that revolutionary action in Europe would lead to anarchy, due 
to his opinion that Europeans were ill-prepared to sustain a republic.  He admitted, 
however, that if he were wrong and the revolutions succeeded, then freedom, liberty, and 
republicanism would replace monarchy throughout Europe.
90
  This apprehension about 
the fitness of the European people for a republican government could have possibly been 
a veiled expression of unease with extending rights and equality to larger numbers of 
people, certainly a concern for conservative southerners invested in preserving a 
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hierarchical social structure.
91
  If this was the case, however, southern periodicals do not 
emphasize the connection.  Instead, analysts reveal fears that the inadequacy of the 
European people would prevent the implementation of republicanism.  Southerners may 
have thought that the revolutions were republican in conception and intent, but for many 
southerners, that intent meant little if the people were incapable of implementing it. 
If inadequacy was one concern with the revolutions, extremism was an even 
greater threat in southern minds.  Elite southerners’ desire for hierarchical power led 
many southern analysts to interpret the revolutions of 1848 as threats to political stability, 
rather than as welcomed extensions of rights and liberty.
92
  Even as they embraced some 
aspects of the revolutions, southerners debated whether or not extremism meant that the 
revolutions were more dangerous than potentially beneficial.  While they supported what 
they saw as republican revolutions, many southerners grew uncomfortable with 
revolutions that became too radical, either in action or in philosophy.   
Violence was one path to extremism and radicalism in southern minds.  Southern 
commentators reported negatively on bloodshed, using the tally of deaths or the spilling 
of blood to disparage the revolutions.
93
  As the enactors of such violence, mobs, in 
particular, represented revolutionary excess to southern analysts.  Mobs were obviously 
threatening due to their tendency toward violence.  Just as critically, mobs represented 
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unchecked and dangerous power being wielded by people supposedly incapable of 
exercising democracy or participating in a republic.  Such excess power given to 
supposedly unqualified people was particularly threatening for conservative, anti-
democratic southerners.
94
  To southerners, revolutions that were led by mobs were too 
violent and too egalitarian, and were to be considered radical and dangerous, and 
therefore had no place in the proper process of nation-building. 
Extremism and radicalism of ideology was even more concerning to southern 
commentators than was radicalism of action, as it threatened not only the enactment of 
the revolutions, but also the intent behind them.  The Red Republican Party, a French 
political party that sought, among other goals, redistribution of property, stood as the 
clearest example of the revolutions’ embrace of dangerously liberal ideology to 
conservative southerners.  Elite southerners were too invested in the slave system and in a 
hierarchical power structure that benefitted white slaveholders to favor any ideas that 
promoted equality by granting more power to those at the bottom of the social hierarchy.  
Driven by their desire to maintain strict hierarchy, southerners levied harsh criticism 
against French red republicans for supposedly driving moderates away from 
republicanism.
95
  Further illustrating their concern with the extremism they associated 
with the red republicans, southerners used the term red republican to refer not only to the 
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political party in France, but also to any events, ideas, and leaders that they saw as radical 
or excessively liberal.  Accordingly, southerners often linked red republicans negatively 
to socialists, anarchists, and other political groups that they also believed were too radical 
and liberal and, therefore, were threatening to southerners’ own vision of society, or were 
antithetical to revolutionary success.  For example, William W. Mann, Paris 
correspondent for the Southern Literary Messenger, joined several ideologies together in 
describing what he called the “socialist, terrorist, red Republican Party” to his 
readership.
96
  Kendall, who viewed the revolutions abroad with a mixture of hope and 
contempt, similarly argued that socialism, like red republicanism, destroyed the 
republican roots of the revolutions and redistributed power in dangerous ways.
97
  
Conservative fears of the fullest implications of equality led southern analysts to view red 
republicans and related revolutionaries with great wariness.  Such fear of extremism in 
the revolutions abroad clarified southerners’ belief that radicalism violated the proper 
method of seeking nationhood. 
Underlying southerners’ fear of extremism was their conservative desire for social 
order.  If republicanism was the standard by which positive aspects of revolutions were 
analyzed, social order provided the standard for measuring extremism of nationalist 
movements abroad.  Such a valuation of social order, as with self-determination and 
republicanism, derived from southerners’ beliefs about their own nation.  Social order 
was necessary to preserve a hierarchical, slave-based society.  Further, southerners 
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believed that social order was among the American founding values that the US modeled 
for nations abroad.
98
  Accordingly, “quality of order,” which derived from “conservative 
tendencies,” was the New Orleans Daily Picayune’s standard of good governments, one 
which some southerners believed the revolutions of 1848 lacked.
99
  Concern about mobs 
derived, in part, from this desire for social order, as southerners feared that revolutions 
that fell prey to mob violence would destroy all order.
100
  Kendall was a common 
advocate of social order, fearing as he did that potential anarchy and mobs would be 
harmful to order.
101
  His editors, even while gently chiding him for his pessimism with 
regards to the revolutions in Europe, supported his positive view of social order, praising 
his belief in the “philanthropic and beneficent influences which rational liberty exerts in 
restraining evil passions [and] inculcating a love of order.”
102
  As Kendall and his editors 
reveal, southern analysts did not reach consensus on whether or not the harms of the 
revolutions outweighed their promise.  Most commentators, however, agreed that social 
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order was an important standard by which they could judge the revolutions.  As they 
debated the meaning of the revolutions of 1848, southerners turned to the conservative 
principle of order to make sense out of the revolutions, solidifying southerners’ belief that 
order was necessary for a nation.   
Throughout southern analysis of the revolutions of 1848, praise and criticism co-
existed uneasily.  As they debated the merits, values, and events of foreign nationalist 
movements, southern commentators largely agreed that republicanism, self-
determination, and social order were values that nations should seek, and that extremism 
of both ideology and action should be avoided.  As southerners sought to understand the 
revolutions abroad, they thus clarified their vision of what a nation, and a nationalist 
movement, should and should not be. 
While southern analysis of revolutions abroad led to fairly widespread agreement 
about the desired values a nation should exhibit, southerners never fully agreed as to 
whether or not the dangers of extremism outweighed the potential for good in the 
revolutions.  The debate over this question, and the subsequent mixing of praise and 
criticism in southern analysis of the revolutions of 1848, produced remarkably nuanced 
interpretations of foreign nationalist movements.  As they debated the revolutions abroad, 
southern judgment varied from revolution to revolution.  For example, the Hungarian 
Revolution earned praise for lacking the red republicans and socialists that had plagued 
France’s revolutionary efforts, as well as for its desire for rational liberty and order.
103
  
Kendall, the eternal skeptic, likewise distinguished between the many nationalist efforts 
in the Italian peninsula, criticizing what he saw as the ineffectual Italian monarch Charles 
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Albert, the squabbling Italian people, and the tyrannical King of Naples, even while 
praising the short-lived Venetian republic for holding to the positive standards of the 
revolutions.
104
    
Southerners exhibited this nuance not only in their comparisons between 
revolutions, but also in their analysis of various elements within the same revolution, 
further complicating their final determinations about the positive or negative meaning of 
the revolutions.  Southern analysts frequently pointed to what they saw as differences 
between the various revolutionaries who made up each nationalist movement.  In a 
speech later published in the Charleston Daily Courier, William R. Taber, Jr., one-time 
editor of the Charleston Mercury, distinguished between the people and the leaders of 
various nationalist movements when he blamed the leaders for diverting the people away 
from republicanism, leading him to support the former but not the latter.
105
  Even more 
common were distinctions between the moderates and extremists within the revolutions 
abroad, with southern commentators using extremism as a disqualifier for southern 
support even while maintaining their positive view of more moderate revolutionaries.  
Reports regularly distinguished between red republicans, who were supposedly 
corrupting the revolutions, and the more moderate republicans who upheld the positive 
values of the revolutions.
106
  For example, the Charleston Courier informed readers that 
in France, “there is a burst of indignation in all the organs of the moderate parties, of 
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every shade, against the atrocious conduct of red republicanism.”
107
  Newspapermen like 
Kendall and Taber argued that red republicans led their more moderate counterparts 
astray, pulling them farther from the true republicanism of the revolutions.
108
  Extremism, 
particularly of red republicans, earned condemnation from southerners, but southerners 
nonetheless continued to support the extremists’ more moderate counterparts, allowing 
them to support certain aspects of the revolutions, while rejecting those they found 
threatening. 
Southerners also used their beliefs about what a nation should be to alter their 
support for nations and revolutions over time.  France provides the best example of this 
process by which southern analysts continually revised their opinions based on changing 
circumstances and the changing values represented by a nationalist movement.  France, 
originally lauded for the creation of the French Second Republic, later received 
significant criticism as a formerly republican revolution that betrayed its original values.  
Although the French Revolution of 1848 initially enjoyed support and praise from 
southerners, as the French movement became increasingly radicalized, and as Louis-
Napoleon consolidated his power, southerners became more critical of events in France, 
even while holding out hope for the preservation of a republican government.
109
  After 
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the French army invaded and defeated the Roman Republic, however, southern 
commentators recognized what they saw as the defeat of republicanism in France and 
began to describe France as a despot equal to much-reviled Austria.
110
  Despite their 
criticism of the failed French attempt at republicanism, however, southerners continued 
to support other revolutions in Europe, in particular those that they saw France as 
oppressing.
111
  Such a shift of sympathy demonstrates southerners’ commitment to the 
values of republicanism and self-determination, as well as their consistent rejection of 
extremism and tyranny.  Shifting opinions over time reveal southerners’ reliance on 
certain principles to guide their analysis of revolutions abroad.  Although no consensus 
developed as to whether the revolutions were good or bad, the emergence of clear 
principles by which southerners analyzed the revolutions reveals the importance of these 
values to southerners’ sense of what it meant to be a nation, as well as the importance of 
southerners’ nuanced analysis of foreign nationalisms to the development of southern 
thought on nationhood. 
As southern analysis of nationalist movements in Europe clarified southerners’ 
sense of which values were beneficial for nations, southerners established their own 
criteria for nations and nationalist movements, ultimately crafting a southern vision of 
nationalism.  The southern vision of nationalism depended upon careful selection of 
which values of liberal nationalism southerners believed were important for a nation, and 
which values of liberal nationalism southerners rejected as harmful to the nation.  The 
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values associated with liberal nationalism that southerners retained in their new vision of 
nationalism included republicanism, self-determination, and social order.  As shown 
above, revolutions advancing these ideals earned sympathy and praise from southerners.  
On the other hand, the southern vision of nationalism rejected what conservative 
southerners saw as extremism; even the most republican of revolutions could earn 
criticism for devolving into radicalism, particularly by incorporating ideologies that 
southerners saw as subverting order.  What emerged was a vision of nationalism limited 
to certain principles.  This limited vision of nationalism allowed southerners to claim that 
liberal ideals such as equality were, in fact, extremism that harmed rather than aided 
nations.  To exclude ideals such as freedom and equality from the concept of liberal 
nationalism required significant ideological manipulation, but southerners proved willing 
to do just that in order to attempt to reconcile their respect for certain aspects of liberal 
nationalism with the conservative politics that emerged out of a slave society. 
The New Orleans Daily Picayune offered a clear depiction of the southern vision 
of nationalism that emerged out of the discussions of the revolutions of 1848.  The New 
Orleans paper defined its ideal nationalism by “the law-abiding nature of true liberty, its 
quality of order, its conservative tendencies, its peaceful attributes.”
112
  The paper praised 
Kendall’s analysis of the revolutions, which was characterized by his expression of “a 
profound conviction of the conservative tendencies of true liberty… and devotion to the 
fundamental principles of republican freedom.”
113
  As the editors made these claims, they 
laid out the southern vision of nationalism:  a nationalism that still retained much of the 
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liberal ideals of liberty and republicanism, but tempered these ideas with conservatism 
such as a respect for social order. 
As they watched, analyzed, debated, and evaluated the revolutions of 1848, 
southerners did so through the lens of their own values, which combined conservative 
tendencies with a respect for the liberal ideals upon which the American nation had been 
founded.  Their discussions of the revolutions abroad brought these issues to the forefront 
of the southern mind, revealing, enhancing, and cementing their importance for 
southerners’ sense of nationhood.  Southern analysis of the revolutions of 1848 enabled 
southerners to form a southern vision of nationalism that borrowed from both liberal 
nationalism and conservatism.  This southern vision of nationalism would later prove 
critical to southern nationalists’ conception of their own nation.  The ability to support 
parts of movements abroad while rejecting others would also prove critical to later 
southern nationalists’ ability to draw comparisons between their own conservative, 
slavery-oriented nation and the more liberal aspiring nations abroad. 
While southerners viewed the revolutions of 1848 with nuance that allowed them 
to create a southern vision of nationhood, they also saw these revolutions as connected, 
guiding these southerners to see nationalism as an international movement.  Frequently, 
southern accounts spoke of the revolutionary fervor that grasped all of Europe, grouping 
the revolutions together.
114
  Southerners did not just group the revolutions, however; they 
also believed that the revolutions actively inspired more revolutions.  For example, early 
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on, the French Revolution received support for the positive influence it would have in 
leading other nations to follow in revolution.
115
  This idea that one revolution would 
inspire another ran throughout southern discussion of the revolutions.
116
  Additionally, by 
seeing the American Revolution in revolutions abroad, southerners further learned to put 
themselves into the international conversation that was developing about issues of 
nationalism.
117
  Connecting the revolutions, to each other and to their own nationalism, 
led southerners to see issues of nationhood and nationalism as part of an international 
conversation. 
Just as importantly, southern analysts and commentators encouraged people of 
one nation to support those of another because of their shared ideals.  For example, 
southern analysts commonly expressed their belief that all republicans should support 
other republics and republicans, linking the movements not just through common ideals, 
but through mutual support and sympathy.
118
  Southerners’ own nation was part of this, 
as newspapers played on their readers’ sympathy for European revolutions by claiming 
that these revolutions and the American Revolution shared similar inspirations.
119
  Such 
solicitations taught southerners that claiming common national values was an effective 
strategy that nationalist movements could utilize to gain support, and that aspiring nations 
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could claim legitimacy based on similarity to other nations.  This was a critical step in the 
development of later southern nationalists’ strategy of winning legitimacy for the 
Confederacy through comparisons with foreign nationalisms. 
 Beginning with the Greek independence movement in the early 1820s and 
continuing through the revolutions of 1848, southern commentators and analysts found 
much to praise in nationalist movements abroad, particularly in these movements’ 
expressions of southerners’ own cherished political values.  Conservative southerners, 
however, also had cause to fear the implications of the liberal ideals of liberty, freedom, 
and equality.  The contradiction between conservatism and liberal nationalism led 
southerners to use their analysis of nationalist movements in Europe to clarify their 
beliefs about what a nation and nationalist movement should represent.  Southern 
commentators learned to continue to laud the values of republicanism and self-
determination in the face of tyranny, even as they rejected extremism and the fullest 
implications of foreign revolutions.  The process of evaluating which aspects of the 
movements deserved support and which did not guided southerners in developing a 
southern vision of nationalism that reconciled respect for some liberal values with a 
conservative desire for order.  This vision of nationhood, combined with southerners’ 
new beliefs in the connectedness of nationalist movements, would ultimately allow later 
southern nationalists to claim connections between their own anti-liberal aspiring nation 
and more liberal nations in Europe as a way of defining the Confederacy, according to the 
southern rather than international definition of nationalism.
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Chapter Two 
An Internationalizing South, 1850-1859 
 
 Sectional conflict in the 1850s brought issues of nationalism closer to home for 
southerners.  In response to sectional tension, southern commentators turned to the 
international perspective on nationhood that they had developed through their analysis of 
nationalist movements in Europe, using this international perspective to help them make 
sense out of the problems threatening their own nation.  While still overwhelmingly 
committed to the American nation, the southern elite nonetheless found it useful to 
compare conflict at home to the conflicts that they had followed in Europe.  Rather than 
analyzing events abroad through a domestic lens, southerners now began analyzing their 
own nation through an international lens.  This international contextualization of the 
challenges facing their own nation ultimately helped southerners to conceive of the South 
as distinct from the North on issues of nationhood. 
 The 1850s were a decade largely defined by sectional tension within the United 
States.  The decade opened with a fierce debate over the extension of slavery into the 
territories that the United States had gained from war with Mexico a few years prior.  
Prompted by their desire to continue the expansion of slavery, fire-eating southern 
radicals, particularly from South Carolina, began calling for southern unity and secession.  
Delegates from slave-holding states met twice in Nashville in the summer and fall of 
1850 to discuss the protection of what they saw as southern rights.  In September, 
Congress passed the Compromise of 1850, which, although failing to fully satisfy either 
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section, did temporarily calm the tensions, albeit without solving the underlying sectional 
issues.  However, the spread of abolitionism in the North, and of increasingly radical 
defenses of slavery in the South, including calls for re-opening the African slave trade, 
would keep tensions simmering throughout the decade.  The question of slavery in the 
territories exploded again with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854.  The 
anti-slavery Republican Party, formed by abolitionist former Whigs and free soilers, 
steadily gained in power throughout the second half of the decade.  Amidst this growing 
sectional conflict, Americans from both sections began to question their national mission 
and values, and their place within the nation.  For elite southerners, the events of the 
1850s would lead them to intensify their prioritization of slave interests as among the 
primary southern interests, preparing them to conceive of the South as distinct from the 
North, and from the rest of the United States.
1
 
 As southern journalists, politicians, and other opinion-makers analyzed and 
debated the issues and events of the 1850s, they turned outward as well as inward, using 
their analysis of nationalist movements in Europe to help them understand the issues at 
play in the United States.  The recently-concluded, and failed, revolutions of 1848 were 
still fresh in educated southerners’ minds.  The plight of aspiring nations abroad was 
further emphasized, and brought home, when refugees from the failed revolutions began 
arriving in the United States.  Fleeing persecution after their failed attempts to establish 
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independent nationalities, famous revolutionaries such as Hungarian Louis Kossuth, Irish 
patriots John Mitchel and Thomas Meagher, and Italian general Giuseppe Garibaldi 
arrived in the United States seeking refuge.  The presence of these renowned European 
nationalists in the United States in the early 1850s provided a timely opportunity for 
southerners, and other Americans, to blend their domestic politics with their analysis of 
European nationalisms.   
Although initially the nation joined together in welcoming these celebrated 
nationalists, domestic politics quickly interfered, and both northerners and southerners 
began to discuss the famed revolutionaries in terms of sectional issues.
2
  Abolitionist 
northerners sought to use the arriving nationalists to strengthen their case that freedom 
must be advanced both for nationalities abroad and for slaves at home, which placed the 
foreign revolutionaries at the center of sectional debate.
3
  The pro-slavery orientation of 
Irishman John Mitchel, meanwhile, gave southerners ammunition with which to try to 
negate the abolitionists’ argument.
4
  Beyond the obvious issues of slavery and freedom, 
Americans throughout the nation saw these European nationalists as representatives not 
only of aspiring nations abroad, but also of the values that Americans themselves 
cherished as necessary for a nation.  As northerners’ and southerners’ opinions of the 
foreign revolutionaries diverged, then, European revolutionaries’ presence in the US 
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revealed to southerners what they began to interpret as distinctly southern values, 
differing from those of northerners. 
Hungarian patriot Louis Kossuth was particularly influential in enhancing 
southerners’ perception of the growing distance between their views of national values 
and nationalism and those of the North, as southern commentators interpreted their 
wariness of Kossuth as distinctly southern, and as differing from northerners’ supposedly 
overly-enthusiastic embrace of Kossuth.  By the time he arrived in New York in late 
1851, Kossuth was well-known and widely-embraced throughout the Atlantic world as a 
hero of the cause of Hungarian independence.  The exiled leader of Hungary’s defeated 
1848 bid for independence from the Austrian Empire, Kossuth had already been feted 
during a stay in London.  New York likewise embraced him as a hero, and from New 
York, Kossuth set off on a tour of the United States, including an excursion into the 
South during the spring of 1852.  As he toured the United States, he solicited aid for the 
Hungarian cause from individuals as well as from the federal government, attracting 
much attention, both positive and negative, throughout the nation.
5
   
 When Kossuth first arrived in the United States, he was greeted by praise and 
adulation by most Americans, southerners included.  Most early southern reports on 
Kossuth’s visit emphasized his republican virtue and expressed support for him as a 
representative of an aspiring nationality for which southerners wished independence.  
Newspapers repeatedly avowed their sympathy for Kossuth’s cause, describing Kossuth 
and his traveling companions as brave patriots, and praising Kossuth for fighting against 
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oppression and for his conviction in the universal principles of rights and freedom.
6
  As a 
writer using the penname “Chat” wrote in Natchez’s Democratic Mississippi Free 
Trader, Kossuth would be “honored as the representative of a great idea; he will be 
welcomed for his sacrifices, talents, and services.”
7
  In keeping with this support for the 
ideals Kossuth represented, the New Orleans Daily Picayune informed its readers that the 
lavish preparations for Kossuth’s arrival in America were only befitting the “most 
dangerous foe of European despotism.”
8
  Kossuth’s status as a representative of the cause 
of Hungarian independence gained him praise and sympathy from southerners and other 
Americans. 
While southerners supported the cause of Hungarian independence, however, they 
quickly found the limit to their support of Kossuth, specifically Kossuth’s desire for 
American intervention in the Hungarian cause.  Although Americans initially believed 
that Kossuth was in the US for refuge, they quickly realized that he was attempting not 
only to raise money, but also to gain arms and official American intervention in the cause 
of Hungarian freedom.
9
  Despite the initial enthusiasm for Kossuth and the Hungarian 
cause, and widespread private fundraising, the United States declined to officially 
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intervene.
10
  Kossuth’s call for intervention went against the long-standing principle, 
established in George Washington’s Farewell Address, that the US should not become 
unduly involved in foreign affairs.  Although some southerners desired intervention when 
it meant the possible annexation of nations such as Cuba and Nicaragua, when it came to 
the Hungarian case, the majority of southerners saw intervention as an anti-republican 
action, and considered intervention to be inherently opposed to American values.
11
     
Due to their desire for non-intervention in the case of Hungary, southerners saw 
Kossuth’s requests for aid from the federal government as over-stepping his boundaries 
as an exiled republican revolutionary, and as a nationalist in general.
12
  As George W. 
Kendall, the conservative foreign correspondent for the New Orleans Daily Picayune, 
wrote from his home in France, only non-intervention in the Hungarian cause would 
demonstrate Americans’ commitment to liberty and human freedom.  Many of Kendall’s 
fellow southerners agreed that intervening to aid Kossuth would harm not only 
Hungarian, but also American, republicanism.
13
  This opposition to intervention in 
foreign affairs became increasingly apparent throughout Kossuth’s tour.
14
  Just as 
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southern reports reveal support for Kossuth’s cause because it agreed with their national 
values, they opposed his plea for intervention because they saw it as violating their 
American principles.
15
  Southerners’ reaction to Kossuth through the lens of American 
ideals demonstrates not only the importance that they attached to these ideals, but also the 
extent to which they viewed foreign nationalisms as being in conversation with domestic 
principles.   
Because southerners believed that the United States should not intervene in 
foreign affairs, however sympathetic those affairs may be, they began to criticize Kossuth 
and his pleas for intervention.
16
  As they did so, southern commentators began arguing 
that southerners were distinct from the rest of the nation in the fervency of their desire for 
non-intervention.  Southern newspapers reveal a widespread belief among southern 
journalists, editors, and other opinion-makers that southerners were unique among their 
fellow Americans in the vehemence of their opposition to intervention.  Southern 
commentators celebrated the fact that the South had welcomed Kossuth less warmly than 
had other sections of the nation, describing the South’s less enthusiastic reception as a 
more realistic, pragmatic response to the Hungarian patriot.
17
  Edward William Johnston, 
academic, journalist, and brother of General Joseph E. Johnston, wrote in the Richmond 
Whig under the pen name “Il Segretario” that “I desire to know with what sense… 
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Southern men can for an instant, countenance the Kossuth doctrine,” stating that the best 
way for southerners to show their patriotism was to adhere to non-intervention.
18
  
Similarly, the Daily Alabama Journal of Montgomery, Alabama praised southerners for 
ensuring that “the doctrines of Kossuth” were “combated every where throughout the 
South, and repudiated with almost perfect unanimity” in every southern state that 
Kossuth had visited.
19
  Southerners’ rejection of Kossuth’s pleas was actually a point of 
pride for many in the region.
20
  For example, the New Orleans Daily Picayune’s 
Washington correspondent, writing under the pen name “Le Diable Boiteux,” praised 
southern congressmen for their “cold” reception of Kossuth and commended the fact that 
southerners had given Kossuth a much-needed window into the reality of Americans’ 
willingness – or lack thereof – to aid his cause.
21
  Southern analysts were clear in their 
interpretation that the adamant insistence on non-intervention was a distinctly southern 
value. 
Southern commentators did not just praise their fellow southerners for their 
restraint, however; they criticized northerners for excessive enthusiasm toward Kossuth, 
further increasing their sense of sectionally divergent responses and values.  The Macon 
Georgia Telegraph accused northerners of “fulsome toadyism” in their response to 
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Kossuth.
22
  A writer using the name “Chat” wrote to the Natchez Mississippi Free Trader 
to criticize the “humbuggery” of the northern response to Kossuth, asserting that the 
southern response would be quite different.
23
  Southern reports claimed that not only was 
the South supporting the proper national values, but also that the North was betraying the 
same, leading southerners to begin arguing that the North and South held different 
national values. 
The difference between the southern and the northern reaction to Kossuth’s visit, 
and the sense of sectional distance that it brought, was further increased by the 
introduction of the issues of slavery and abolition to the discussion of foreign nationalists.  
Through the southern press, elite southerners were aware that northerners expected 
Kossuth to support abolitionism and to speak out against slavery.  They knew that many 
northerners believed that abolition was part of the same international cause of freedom as 
the revolutions of 1848.
24
  Elite southerners, however, dedicated to the preservation of 
slavery and guided by the limited definition of nationalism they had developed through 
their analysis of the revolutions of 1848, claimed to see no connection between 
Hungarian freedom and anti-slavery.
25
  Although Kossuth himself tried to remain 
outwardly neutral on the slavery issue, southerners were clear that they interpreted the 
meaning of freedom as it related to Hungary and to slavery very differently than did 
                                                 
22
 “Kossuth and Lopez,” Macon Georgia Telegraph, February 10, 1852. 
 
23
 Chat, “Letter X,” Natchez Mississippi Free Trader, January 14, 1852; “The Kossuth Failure,” New 
Orleans Daily Picayune, May 2, 1852. 
 
24
 “The Kossuth Excitement and the Slavery Question,” Savannah Daily Republican, December 29, 1851; 
Le Diable Boiteux, “Washington Correspondence,” New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 9, 1852. 
 
25
 Le Diable Boiteux, “Washington Correspondence,” New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 9, 1852; 
“Blown Sky-High!”  Richmond Enquirer, July 23, 1852; “Kossuth in a Slave State,” Natchez Mississippi 
Free Trader, March 24, 1852; “Mazzini an Abolitionist,” New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 14, 1853.   
 63
northerners.
26
  Southerners’ awareness of these very different interpretations allowed 
them to continue distinguishing between what they were beginning to see as differing 
northern and southern national values.   
Kossuth’s presence in the United States led southerners to begin discussing 
domestic issues as in conversation with foreign nationalisms, helping them to 
internationalize their sense of their own nationhood.  Just as critically, southern discourse 
about Kossuth helped to create the sense among southern opinion-makers that the North 
and South held different national values.  Through identifying the differing reactions of 
the two sections to Kossuth, his pleas for intervention, and his stance on slavery and 
freedom, southern opinion-makers began to develop the sense of national values, such as 
non-intervention, that they believed were specifically southern in nature.  As they did so, 
they enhanced their perception that the North and South were fundamentally different on 
issues of nationhood.  Further, because southerners believed that their non-intervention 
was tied to American principles such as republicanism, analysis of Kossuth began 
building the idea among southerners that the South represented the purest iteration of the 
ideals of the American Revolution, and that southerners adhered more closely to the 
principles of the American republic than did their fellow Americans.  This idea of 
southerners as different from, and superior to, northerners in their national values, and of 
southern national values as in conversation with international principles of nationalism, 
opened up the possibility of considering the South as an independent nation.  Kossuth’s 
visit thus prepared southerners to later conceive of a potential southern nation. 
 Kossuth was not the only revolutionary whose presence and ideology led 
southerners to distinguish themselves from northerners on issues of nationalism.  Irish 
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nationalist John Mitchel, an avowed advocate of slavery, also played an important role in 
highlighting the differing values of the North and South.  Mitchel, an outspoken 
supporter of Irish independence who fled Ireland after being arrested by the British for 
treason, subsequently became internationally recognized as a hero of the Irish 
independence movement.  He arrived in the United States in 1853 and used his talents as 
a writer and journalist to continue advocating for Irish independence, while also engaging 
with American issues.  Unlike most foreign nationalists, Mitchel was adamantly pro-
slavery, and would come to sympathize and identify with the South.
27
  He used his 
platform as the editor of newspapers including the Citizen, published in New York, and 
later the Southern Citizen, published in Knoxville, to spread his views, earning him the 
support and favor of the slave-holding South.  Most famously, Mitchel declared in 1853 
in the Citizen that “we deny that it is a crime, or a wrong, or even a peccadillo, to hold 
slaves, to buy slaves, to sell slaves, to keep slaves to their work by flogging or other 
needful coercion,” adding that “we wish that we had a good plantation well stocked with 
healthy Negroes in Alabama.”
28
  By embracing the southern, rather than northern, 
interpretation of slavery, the place of slavery within nationalism, and the meaning of Irish 
nationalism for American sectional politics, Mitchel became another international figure 
who represented the growing divide between North and South, not just on slavery, but 
also on the place of slavery within the ideals of nationalism. 
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Due to his pro-slavery politics, southern analysts embraced Mitchel.  Southern 
newspapers such as the New Orleans Daily True Delta, a Democratic paper founded by 
M. G. Davis, were aware of Mitchel’s strong pro-South sentiment, and took care to 
inform their audience of Mitchel’s southern sympathies.
29
  Southern journalists 
celebrated Mitchel’s arrival in the South, republished his speeches, and encouraged 
fellow southerners to subscribe to the pro-slavery newspaper that Mitchel began in 
Knoxville, TN.
30
  So strong was southern support for the Irish nationalist that South 
Carolina Congressman Lawrence M. Keitt even used Mitchel to support his pro-
immigration stance, arguing that people like Mitchel should be allowed to enter and 
enrich the nation.
31
   
 This support derived in no small part from the fact that Mitchel’s views on slavery 
and nationalism closely resembled the limited vision of nationalism favored by many 
elite southerners.  Particularly during the revolutions of 1848, southern opinion-makers 
had analyzed European nationalist movements through the lens of their desire to preserve 
slavery and a hierarchical social and political order; as they did so, they had developed a 
more limited, conservative definition of nationalism that embraced values such as 
republicanism while rejecting values such as equality.  Mitchel’s views seemed to 
validate this limited southern vision of nationalism.  For Mitchel, like southern slave-
holders, slavery was compatible with nationalist values such as republicanism.  Such a 
stance was made possible by the fact that Mitchel also shared the southern elite’s belief in 
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limited freedom, in which nations, rather than individuals, deserved liberty.
32
  Further, 
Mitchel was clear that his sympathies were not just with slavery, but also with the South 
and what he saw as the southern vision of the nation.  The South’s agricultural nature, 
racial hierarchy, and opposition to change appealed to his sense of romantic nationalism.  
Critically, Mitchel also saw similarities between the oppression of the Irish at the hands 
of the British, and what he perceived to be the growing oppression of slaveholders at the 
hands of northern abolitionists.
33
   
 Southern commentators appreciated that, unlike many European revolutionaries, 
Mitchel’s vision of nationalism more closely resembled their own.  As Louisiana 
politician Frank H. Hatch explained, slavery was all too often a casualty of overly 
enthusiastic nationalists, as “men who have been engaged in national struggles for 
freedom throughout the civilized world, have too frequently abandoned their reason, to 
the guidance of their feelings, and in their zeal for the distraction of political oppression, 
have often blindly included useful and necessary social institutions.”
34
  Demonstrating 
recognition that Mitchel, unlike most foreign nationalists, did not interpret nationalism 
and abolitionism as inherently linked, the Democratic Baton Rouge Daily Advocate cited 
Mitchel as proof that “the bold assumption that foreigners are Abolitionists” was nothing 
more than, as the title of the article put it, “a stupid fallacy.”
35
  Mitchel’s pro-slavery 
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beliefs opened up the possibility in southern minds that their limited definition of 
nationalism, that rejected concepts such as individual freedom and equality, was a 
legitimate interpretation of the nationalist movements they followed abroad. 
 Southern analysis of Mitchel helped not only to confirm southern views of nation, 
but also to highlight the differences between the North and South.  Northerners’ growing 
commitment to abolition, and southerners’ intensifying defense of slavery, seemed to be 
creating differing sectional beliefs about the proper values of the nation, and Mitchel’s 
views provided a clear illustration of this separation.  Mitchel’s pro-slavery beliefs 
confounded northern abolitionists, who wanted Mitchel – as with Kossuth and the other 
‘48ers – to support the cause of freedom from slavery due to its similarity to the 
nationalists’ fight for national freedom.  Southern journalists were aware of northern 
expectations, and made a point to report on northerners’ reaction to Mitchel’s pro-slavery 
beliefs.  The Charleston Mercury’s Boston correspondent, for example, informed his 
readers of northerners’ confusion at the idea that a man could be an “apostle of Irish 
Freedom” and still support slavery.  The correspondent made it clear, however, where his 
own sympathies lay, praising Mitchel for holding strong to his pro-slavery beliefs.
36
  This 
confusion pleased southern slave-holders; as the Richmond Whig gleefully reported, 
northern abolitionists were quite incorrect in their initial expectations that Mitchel would 
support the cause of emancipation.
37
  Mitchel’s beliefs clearly revealed the growing 
distance between northern and southern interpretations of nationalism and of the proper 
values of a nation. 
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Mitchel’s pro-slavery views had significant ramifications for northern and 
southern views of nation.  By challenging abolitionists’ definition of freedom, Mitchel’s 
views seemed to allow for the possibility that the more limited, conservative southern 
definitions of national values could be accepted as a legitimate part of the international 
discussion of the meaning of nationalism.  Mitchel seemed to prove to southerners that it 
was, in fact, possible, and consistent with the principles of nationalism as interpreted by 
foreign nationalists, to support both national freedom and slavery.
38
  John Mitchel and his 
unusual combination of liberal nationalism and pro-slavery beliefs represented an 
alternative vision of nationalism to that expressed by northern abolitionists, and one that 
was far more acceptable to the South.  As southerners discussed Mitchel, then, they 
began to develop a sense of their views of nationalism as distinct from those of 
northerners, but as worthy of discussion within the international framework of 
nationalism, preparing southerners to conceive of an independent southern nation 
premised upon a limited definition of nationalism. 
 Foreign nationalists such as Kossuth and Mitchel brought the issues of 
nationalism home for the southern elite, right in the middle of the domestic American 
sectional tension.  As northerners and southerners both analyzed these figures, and sought 
to use them to their own ends, they increasingly developed different views, not only of 
these European nationalists, but also of the ideals of nationalism.  Kossuth’s pleas for 
intervention led southerners to celebrate the value of non-intervention that they believed 
the South alone still defended, creating the perception of differing southern and northern 
national values.  Similarly, Mitchel’s pro-slavery views confounded northerners’ belief in 
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national freedom and freedom of slaves as related, leading southerners to recognize again 
the differing values, and visions of nation, developing in the two sections.  Through 
discussing international figures of nationalism, southerners increasingly defined their 
own views of nationalism as in opposition to those of the North. 
 Revolutionaries who traveled to the US were not the only aspect of European 
nationalist movements that led antebellum southerners to use an international perspective 
to analyze and understand the sectional tension in their nation in the 1850s.  While the 
European revolutionaries were useful in helping southerners to develop a southern vision 
of nationalism, broader general analysis of aspiring nations in Europe helped southerners 
to express their fears about the sectional tension in the United States.  The revolutions of 
1848 that southerners had supported as examples of positive enactments of nationhood 
now, in defeat, provided examples of the kind of dynamic that southerners feared was 
developing in their own nation.  Southerners were concerned that the North was growing 
more powerful and that the South was losing its political influence within the union, and 
they turned to comparisons with defeated nationalities in Europe to help them express 
these anxieties.  In doing so, they further clarified their sense of the South’s national 
values, its place within the nation, and the possibility of an independent southern nation. 
 Southern slave-holders felt threatened by the growing abolitionist movement in 
the North in the 1850s.  Antebellum southerners were apprehensive that efforts to restrict 
slavery in the western territories, the growth of abolitionism, and, later, the rise of the 
anti-slavery Republican Party, indicated northern attempts to end what slave-holders saw 
as their right to own, buy, and sell slaves.  Furthermore, states’ rights southerners feared 
that northerners were increasingly consolidating power within the federal government, 
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which would limit slave states’ ability to protect slavery.  The slave-holding elite 
prioritized slavery as the critical southern value, and therefore they interpreted attempts 
to end slavery as efforts to limit the ability of the South to advance and to protect its 
interests within national politics.  This southern elite thus feared what they believed to be 
an impending southern oppression at northern hands.  Such concerns about oppression 
were greatly exaggerated, and premised, for the most part, upon anticipated rather than 
actual developments.  The slave-holding elite nonetheless feared that the South was 
losing its influence to an ever-more-powerful North that was increasingly opposed to 
southern interests, and that this loss of influence would open the door for the North to 
oppress the South.
39
 
The oppression of the aspiring nationalities in Europe that southerners had 
supported a few years prior provided antebellum southerners with a language for 
expressing these anxieties about being oppressed at the hands of the growing anti-slavery 
forces in the North.  Southern commentators largely interpreted failed aspiring nations 
abroad as small states fighting, and losing, against the power of large, centralized 
governments.  They likewise believed that the defeat of the revolutions amounted to the 
oppression of the failed nationalities at the hands of the victorious, and tyrannical, 
monarchs and empires.  The defeat of revolutions in Hungary, Italy, and elsewhere in 
Europe thus stood as sharp examples in southern minds of the dangers that could result 
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when national power was abused, and therefore of the dangers that the South faced if the 
North was able to consolidate power and pursue its anti-slavery agenda.  As Mississippi 
Congressman A. G. Brown declared at a states’ rights meeting described as “glorious” by 
the Natchez Mississippi Free Trader, the South “wanted no political association like that 
of Ireland to England, Hungary to Austria, or Poland to Russia.”
40
  The partitions of 
Poland likewise furnished an example of a region supposedly destroyed by the over-
assertion of external power.  For example, a Charleston Mercury journalist using the pen 
name “Brutus” wrote that an “unscrupulous” North would do to an unprotected South 
what Europe had done to Poland.
41
  These defeats stood in southerners’ minds as clear 
examples of the victory of oppression and tyranny.  Because southerners feared what they 
saw as the looming oppression of the South at the hands of a centralizing North, they 
drew comparisons between the oppression that they observed in Europe and the 
oppression that they were afraid they would face at home.
42
   
The comparisons that southerners drew between the defeat of aspiring nations in 
Europe, and the oppression that they feared at the hands of the North, were exaggerated, 
and more rhetorical than realistic in nature.  Through most of the 1850s, southerners did 
not yet conceive of the South as an aspiring nation, which complicated the comparisons.  
The fact that the oppression they feared was largely anticipatory further challenged these 
comparisons.  Regardless, these comparisons were remarkably widespread throughout 
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southern discourse in the 1850s.  Southern opinion-makers found comparisons between 
oppression in Europe and the supposed oppression of the South to be a compelling way 
strengthen their case for the protection and advancement of slavery.  As Virginia 
politician Charles James Faulkner said in an address to the National Democratic 
Convention, “it was [abolitionists’] purpose to inaugurate the North as the dominant 
section.  The subjugation of Ireland by force, division, and bribery, was to be reproduced 
on this continent, and the Southern States were to be reduced to a mere provincial 
appendage.”
43
  Such comparisons allowed southern opinion-makers to dramatize the 
stakes at risk in what they saw as a battle to preserve slavery, and to vividly convey to 
their audiences what they perceived as the severity of the situation.
44
  In addition to 
providing a convenient rhetorical device, the widespread usage of these comparisons 
reveals that southerners, particularly radical southerners, were beginning to understand 
sectional tensions through an international lens, and were beginning to see the South as a 
unit that could be compared to aspiring nations – as a possible potential nation, rather 
than as a section of nation. 
 Although many of these comparisons were relatively vague as to how, exactly, the 
North was oppressing the South, southern commentators did sometimes spell out the 
causes of their concerns over growing northern power.  States’ rights, and the North’s 
supposed violation thereof, was one of these concerns that southerners processed through 
an international lens, helping them to clarify not only their fears of northern power, but 
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also the southern values that would best forestall northern abuses.  In particular, 
southerners often expressed the belief that states’ rights would prevent the South from 
facing the oppression suffered by aspiring nations in Europe.  According to Georgia 
politicians John Bailey and Zachariah Harman, states’ rights were the South’s only hope 
to hold out against free soilers and to escape a doom worse than Poland or Hungary.
45
  
States’ rights was no less than a main goal of southern politics; a private citizen, seeking 
to hold his Congressmen accountable, wrote to the Macon Weekly Georgia Telegraph 
that southern senators were elected to promote the rights of the South, and that for them 
to do otherwise would be the same as if Garibaldi, the renowned Italian nationalist, joined 
his enemies the Austrians.
46
  For the North to violate states’ rights, southerners argued, 
was for the North to recreate the subjugation of aspiring nationalities in Europe.  States’ 
rights, therefore, were the South’s best defense against similar oppression.  
 While states’ rights was important to southerners’ defense against what they 
feared would be European-style oppression by the North, slavery, of course, was their 
central concern.  Slavery was at the heart of the sectional tensions that dominated the 
nation in 1850, and was thus central to southerners’ explanations of how they felt the 
North was oppressing, or would oppress, the South.  Northern attempts to restrict slavery 
were the most common cause southerners gave to explain why and how the North was 
oppressing the South. 
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 Southerners used comparisons between the supposed plight of the slaveholding 
South and that of defeated nations in Europe to criticize abolitionists for seeking to limit 
the power and therefore the supposed rights of the slaveholding states.  At the Nashville 
Convention of 1850, James Lyons of Virginia argued that in tampering with and seeking 
to restrict slavery, the North was replicating the most despotic government on earth and 
behaving worse than Austria did toward Hungary.
47
  Such comparisons were also 
common at the end of the 1850s, as sectional tensions would eventually reach the 
breaking point.  For example, William McWillie, governor of Mississippi, informed the 
legislature of his state that if an abolitionist were elected president in 1860, such an event 
would make the South into Ireland or Poland.
48
  Threatening the institution of slavery, 
according to these southerners, created the possibility for serious abuse of the South. 
 While these comparisons were used throughout the 1850s, they were most 
common during discussions of the territorial expansion of slavery.  Southern power-
holders feared that if Congress was able to limit slavery in the territories, the balance of 
power between slave and free states would begin to favor free states, enabling Congress 
to end slavery altogether.  Although a series of compromises kept the balance largely 
equal, northerners did, in fact, attempt to limit slavery in the territories through efforts, 
albeit often failed, efforts such as the Wilmot Proviso.  Despite being fairly unsuccessful 
at restricting slavery, the attempts by northern politicians to restrict slavery in the 
territories represented, in many southern minds, an attempt by northerners to seize power 
from the South, which was particularly concerning as this power would then be used to 
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end slavery.  Debates over slavery in the territories were thus key targets of southern cries 
of oppression.   
 In particular, the debate surrounding the eventual Compromise of 1850, which 
temporarily settled the issue of territorial slavery, saw frequent references by southern 
opinion-makers to oppressed nationalities in Europe.  During this time of crisis, 
comparing the supposed oppression of the South with the oppression of aspiring nations 
in Europe helped southerners to express their concerns about the sectional dynamic in the 
US.  Most commonly, these comparisons took the form of claiming that by restricting 
slavery in the territories, the North was going to render the South as oppressed as a 
defeated nationality in Europe.  For example, as early as 1849, a journalist calling himself 
“Sylvias” was expressing concern in the Macon Georgia Telegraph that the North would 
reduce the South to the condition of long-oppressed Ireland.
49
  As a citizen of Claiborne 
wrote to the Natchez Mississippi Free Trader, the South had no more protections from 
the North than Ireland had from Great Britain.
50
  The Macon Georgia Telegraph critiqued 
Henry Clay, who helped author the Compromise, as being as detrimental to his 
countrymen as was the betrayal of Artur Gorgey, a Hungarian revolutionary who was 
accused of treason and therefore of helping defeat the cause of Hungarian freedom.
51
  
This same paper later implored its readers to take warning from Ireland, asserting that if 
the South submitted to the restriction of slavery now, there would be no limit to the 
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northern crusade against slavery.
52
  To southern commentators, if a compromise was not 
reached that allowed for the expansion of slavery into the territories, the South would be 
doomed at the hands of the North, and crushed, just like aspiring nations in Europe.  
Private citizens and journalists making these comparisons followed the lead of 
southern politicians, who frequently compared the oppression of limiting territorial 
slavery with the oppression of failed nationalities in Europe in their speeches and in 
official debates.  Albert G. Brown, Democratic politician and former governor of 
Mississippi, made frequent usage of international comparisons to dramatize his fears of 
the limitation of slavery.  During the crisis of 1850, he implored his fellow congressmen 
to “picture to yourselves Hungary, resisting the powers of Austria and Russia” to best 
approximate the sentiment and fears of “southrons.”
53
  Whig Henry W. Hilliard of 
Alabama agreed that “if we submit, we have examples before our eyes of the condition to 
which we shall be reduced.  Ireland – luxuriant, fertile, degraded, starving Ireland – is a 
picture of what we should be.”
54
  At an 1850 political meeting in Macon, Representative 
William H. Stiles of Georgia, former chargé d’affaires to Austria, stated that the North’s 
strategy on the issue of territorial expansion was the same as that adopted by tyrannies 
such as Austria when it conquered Hungary.
55
  Other politicians including Senator Robert 
M. T. Hunter of Virginia, the future Confederate secretary of state, and James Henry 
Hammond, outspoken defender of slavery and states’ rights, concurred that giving the 
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Union into the hands of anti-slavery advocates would replicate the oppression of Ireland, 
Poland, and Hungary.
56
  These southern politicians used their platform and visibility to 
advance the idea that the restriction of slavery in the territories would be similar to the 
oppression of aspiring nations of Europe at the hands of European tyrants, helping them 
to dramatize their defense of slavery.  These international comparisons gave these 
southerners a language for expressing their fears and for enhancing their defense of 
slavery, while also internationalizing southerners’ sense of their own nationhood. 
 To southerners, the expansion of slavery was necessary to protect the rights of the 
South.  Any attempts by the North to limit slavery, then, were oppressive.  By turning to 
comparisons with defeated nationalities in Europe, southerners sought to portray the 
extent of the oppression the South faced, or feared it would face, at the hands of the 
North.  In doing so, southerners used an international lens to shape their sense of their 
place within their own nation, and of the values and institutions that were necessary to the 
preservation of that nation. 
 These international comparisons tapped in to an important element of southern 
thought on nationalism, and began to prepare influential southerners to see the South as a 
potential player in the international conversation about nationhood.  Accordingly, as 
antebellum southerners began to debate secession, they utilized international comparisons 
to explore the possibility of an independent southern nation, using an international 
context to highlight both the benefits and drawbacks of secession as a course of action.   
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The connection between aspiring nations in Europe and a potential southern 
nation, independent of the rest of the United States, first arose at the many southern 
conventions held throughout the South in the 1850s in order to deal with the sectional 
crisis.  Although these meetings were far from unanimous in their debates over the 
possibility of secession, and, in fact, most of the delegates still advised loyalty to the 
Union, comparisons between the South and defeated nations of Europe nonetheless 
proliferated at these events as southerners explored the place of the South within the 
nation.  For example, at the Nashville Convention, held with the purpose of uniting the 
South to protect southern interests, Felix Huston, ardent secessionist and former general 
of the Army of the Republic of Texas, informed his fellow delegates that southern states 
must cultivate independence, lest they “sink below the miserable state of Ireland.”
57
  
Southern conventions brought southerners together to discuss the South’s place within 
the nation, to determine the best way to protect southern interests, and even to explore the 
idea of secession.  As southerners explicitly contemplated the South’s place within the 
Union, southerners turned to European examples to help them understand what was at 
stake in this conflict. 
Outside of the conventions, comparisons between the South and aspiring nations 
in Europe helped southerners to weigh the potential consequences and possibilities of 
secession, playing a critical role in shaping antebellum southern opinion on secession.  
Many southern commentators used comparisons to help them understand various 
hypothetical situations in which their state may or may not want to secede.  For example, 
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the Macon Georgia Telegraph explored the options available to the state of Georgia in 
case South Carolina should secede, concluding that for Georgia to join the Union in a war 
against a seceded South Carolina would be the equivalent of an Irishman being forced to 
fight with the English against Ireland.
58
  Other southerners used international 
comparisons to ponder the likely consequences of a war between a seceding South and a 
North that fought to keep the South in the Union.  A. G. Brown of Mississippi often 
utilized this type of comparison, and to him, these comparisons showed that secession 
could and should be embraced if necessary.  Brown stated that if the North threatened 
slavery, the South should immediately dissolve the Union, and that the North should then 
look to the passion with which Hungary fought against Austria to see how hard the South 
would fight.
59
  Many southerners concurred that the South would actually fight harder 
against the North than Hungary, Ireland, and other defeated nations had fought against 
their foes, which would ensure southern victory.
60
  Southerners also suggested that such a 
war would have potentially negative consequences for the Union; for example, the 
Macon Georgia Telegraph believed that no less than the whole world would be watching 
such a war, lest the North recreate the defeat of Poland or Hungary in the South.
61
  Such 
comparisons bolstered southerners’ belief that secession could be a viable course of 
action.  Although stopping short of calling for secession, these international analyses 
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helped southerners shape their sense of the potential benefits that might occur should the 
South secede. 
 If international comparisons were useful for understanding the possible 
consequences of southern secession, more radical early secessionists also found them 
helpful in making their case that secession would not only be possible, but also would 
eventually be necessary.  Georgia politicians Bailey and Harman, for example, asserted 
that, in order to prevent the South from suffering the much-feared fate of becoming 
another Poland or Hungary, southern secession may be necessary.
62
  An invitee to a mass 
meeting to discuss slavery in the territories concurred that secession may be necessary, as 
the current union between the North and South was that of Russia to Hungary.
63
  A 
journalist for the Macon Georgia Telegraph warned as early as 1849 that the North’s 
aggressions would either reduce the South to Ireland, or force disunion.
64
  These 
southerners agreed that, if the nation continued on its path, the South would eventually be 
forced to take action to protect its rights, or it would face similar oppressions as defeated 
nationalities in Europe.  The southerners who deployed these comparisons used them to 
bolster their case that secession was, or would be, necessary, making international 
comparisons an important part of the early debate over secession.   
 While international comparisons helped early secessionists make their case, 
secessionists were not the only southerners who used international comparisons to bolster 
their side in the debate over secession.  Just as secessionists believed international 
comparisons pointed to the potential favorability of secession, anti-secessionist 
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southerners believed that comparisons proved that secession was the incorrect course of 
action, and they used international comparisons to oppose secession.  In a direct rebuttal 
to the secessionists, William John Grayson, a states’ rights, proslavery, anti-secessionist 
South Carolina politician and journalist writing in the Charleston Courier under the pen 
name “Curtius,” argued that the South should not secede, as the section had yet to face 
the oppression suffered by Hungary and Poland, and therefore secession would not be 
justified.  Grayson revealed that in his opinion, the equation of the South with defeated 
nationalities in Europe was “midsummer nights dreams and nothing more – words 
merely, without any meaning.”  Showing unusual insight, Grayson then recognized that 
repetition, even false, has an impact, and that the secessionists had repeated their belief 
that the South was like Hungary or Poland often enough that they were wearing people 
down and convincing them there must be an issue.
65
  As Grayson reveals, even though 
the comparisons were false and not all southerners supported them, they nonetheless were 
having an impact on southern thought on issues of nationalism.  His comments also 
demonstrate that southerners on both sides of the secession debate used international 
comparisons to make their case. 
 Other southerners, also taking an anti-secession stance, looked to Europe as an 
example of the harms that would befall the South should the South secede, rather than 
should the South remain in the union.  In particular, these critiques focused on the 
problems that came with dividing a nation.  The Whig newspaper the Victoria Texian 
Advocate warned readers to look to the harms that had befallen a divided Poland to 
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understand the dangerous consequences of a national division.
66
  On a similar note, a 
citizen writing to William E. Woodruff’s Little Rock Arkansas State Gazette and 
Democrat declared that “let the Union be destroyed” and “we plant a fresh dagger in the 
bosoms of the Mazzinis, the Garibaldis, and the Kossuths of Italy and Hungary.”
67
  For 
some southerners, defeated nations in Europe furnished examples of the harms, rather 
than benefits, of secession.  Antebellum southerners on both sides of the secession 
debate, then, looked to comparisons with Europe to support their arguments, revealing 
the centrality of international perspective to southerners’ sense of their own nationhood. 
As fire-eaters called for secession and southerners contemplated this idea, 
international comparisons helped them to process possible outcomes.  Southerners on 
both sides of the issue used comparisons to support their cases.  The international lens 
through which southerners were analyzing domestic concerns was thus important in 
shaping the debate surrounding secession, as well as to helping guide southerners in 
considering the South as potentially separate from the rest of the American nation. 
 The majority of antebellum comparisons between the South and defeated nations 
in Europe reveal a largely positive interpretation of revolutions abroad, but not all 
southerners agreed that the South was, or would be, similar to foreign aspiring nations.  
Anti-secessionists were among the southerners who viewed events in Europe through a 
negative, rather than positive, lens, but this negative interpretation was not limited to the 
secession debate.  Because the liberal ideals of freedom and equality that were embodied 
in foreign revolutions threatened not only slavery, but also southern values of social 
order, conservative southerners feared the liberal nationalism emerging in Europe.
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 Although most international comparisons praised the aspiring nations in Europe 
and held them up as equivalents for the South, some southerners saw more similarities 
between European politics and northern politics.  Previewing the conservative arguments 
that would emerge during the Civil War, some antebellum southerners criticized 
European-style nationalisms, blaming European ideology for the problems in the North.  
For example, the speaker at a Whig convention asserted that the reason why the North 
had betrayed the previously peaceful union between the sections was that it had been 
poisoned by “wild political theories” such as communism and red republicanism from 
France, Italy, and Germany.
68
  Similarly, a reviewer for the Southern Quarterly Review 
noted with approval that Edward J. Pringle, author of The People, had “detected in this 
country symptoms of disease kindred to the fatal maladies which have infected 
Europe.”
69
  Getting more specific about who, exactly, was being infected by these 
dangerous doctrines, a self-proclaimed “Lynchburg Virginian” wrote that the northern-
dominated Congress was trying to create European-style radicalism.
70
  Because of the 
threat that liberal European political ideals posed to southern conservatism, for some 
southerners the northern threat was best illustrated through comparisons between the 
North and Europe, not the South and Europe.  Whether praising or criticizing aspiring 
European nations, then, southerners found comparisons with European nationalism useful 
for exploring the sectional tensions between the North and the South. 
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 International comparisons were helpful to southern commentators seeking to 
dramatize sectional issues, but southerners also turned to international comparisons to 
understand domestic issues that were not overtly sectional, revealing the extent to which 
they were increasingly understanding their own concerns, sectional or not, within an 
international framework.  In the debate over annexation of foreign territories, southerners 
who both supported and opposed annexation used international comparisons to make 
their cases, utilizing analysis of foreign nationalisms to explore the concept of the 
boundaries and actions of their own nation.  For some southerners, this meant that 
aspiring nations in Europe revealed the benefits of a more territorially limited nation, as 
annexation restricted the self-determination of the annexed territory.  The Richmond 
Whig, for example, was an outspoken opponent of annexation, and frequently compared 
American annexation of Texas and Mexican territories to the division of Poland by 
European powers.  In fact, the Whig declared such annexation to be nothing less than the 
“most enormous public crime, which had been perpetuated since the first partition of 
Poland.”
71
  The Alexandria Gazette concurred as to the harms of annexation, declaring 
that the United States should not annex Cuba as doing so would be an act of despotism, 
and the dire fates of Poland and Hungary show what despotism brings.
72
  For some 
southerners, Europe’s defeated nations furnished examples of the harms of annexation. 
 For others, however, these comparisons were absolutely false, and annexation, as 
shown by events in Europe, was a beneficial way to enhance the nation.  The Daily 
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Richmond Examiner denounced the Whig’s comparison, calling it “madness” to say that 
in annexing Texas, the American people were “equally guilty with the Holy Alliance in 
their detestable partition of Poland, and with the ruthless and savage Cossacks, who have 
crushed Hungary.”
73
  For the Examiner, the case studies of Hungary and Poland revealed 
only what the annexation of Texas was not.  The editors of the Examiner were not the 
only southerners to believe that European history supported the idea of annexation; the 
New Orleans Daily Picayune wrote that Cuba was to the United States what Lombardy 
was to Sardinia, implying that both were parts of a larger whole that should be united.
74
  
The fact that southerners across the political spectrum were using comparisons with 
nationalist movements in Europe to advance their beliefs about the appropriate actions 
and borders of their nation shows the extent to which this international lens had become 
critical to southern understanding of domestic events and of their own nationality. 
 In the years following the revolutions of 1848, southerners increasingly turned to 
comparisons with defeated and aspiring nations in Europe to help them understand their 
own domestic affairs.  On issues such as secession and annexation, southerners from both 
ends of the spectrum used international comparisons to make their point.  This rich 
debate, incorporating the issues of European nationalisms on both sides, reveals the 
importance of international comparisons to southerners’ developing sense of the 
boundaries and limits of their own nation, including the South’s place within that nation. 
 The 1850s were a decade of sectional tension and turmoil in which southerners 
increasingly saw the South and its values as distinct from the rest of the nation.  
Particularly in times of greatest conflict, southerners began to analyze domestic issues 
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within an international context to help them understand the issues and prove their 
arguments.  Instead of using American values to analyze nationalisms abroad, 
southerners were now using analyses of nationalist movements in Europe to clarify and 
shape their own national values, preparing them to ultimately use an international lens to 
help them shape a southern nation. 
 Analysis of the arrival of foreign revolutionaries in the US, and the creation of 
comparisons between the oppression of aspiring nationalities abroad and the oppression 
that southerners feared at the hands of the North, helped southerners to clarify their 
position on sectional and national issues and to make sense out of the place of their 
region within the nation.  Debate over the famous nationalists led southern commentators 
to believe that the South took a distinctly southern perspective on issues of nationalism.  
Comparisons of oppression, real and feared, helped southerners express their fears, not 
only about slavery, but also of the place of the South within the nation.  As debate over 
secession intensified, southerners on both sides of the issue used international 
comparisons to seek support for their position.  The widespread nature of international 
comparisons, appearing at all points of the southern political spectrum, reveals the extent 
to which southerners were using an international lens to shape their beliefs about their 
own nation in the 1850s.   
Southern commentators’ international analysis of sectional issues throughout the 
1850s prepared southerners to think of the South as an individual player on issues of 
nationhood.  These debates clarified southerners’ beliefs about the desired values of 
nationhood, and intensified their growing sense that the North and South had different 
national values.  In a decade of conflict and division, European nationalisms provided 
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southerners with a model of nationalism that they could debate and utilize at will to help 
them understand their own national issues.  This international contextualization of 
domestic issues, and this growing sense of differing northern and southern values, would 
be critical to preparing southerners to consider secession in 1860. 
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Chapter Three 
Internationalizing Secession, 1860-1861 
 
 In December of 1860, South Carolina seceded from the United States.  
Throughout the winter of 1860-1861 and the spring of 1861, ten more slave states would 
follow and would form the Confederate States of America.  As these states left the Union 
and created a southern nation, secessionists and southern nationalists faced the necessity 
of explaining the causes of their secession and defining the national mission of the new 
southern nation.  Legitimizing and justifying secession and crafting a clear national 
identity were necessary to win support both from fellow southerners, as well as, ideally, 
from an international audience.  Accordingly, even before they seceded, secessionists 
began the process of laying out their case for secession and for an independent southern 
nation, developing a variety of arguments with which they defended the necessity of 
southern independence.   
 As they made their case for secession and for an independent southern nation, 
southern nationalists turned to their antebellum tradition of looking abroad and using 
analysis of nationalist movements in Europe to refine their opinions about the appropriate 
forms of nationhood.  In the winter of secession and the early months of the Confederacy, 
when the necessity of creating a justification for the southern nation was most critical, 
prominent southern nationalists began crafting comparisons between the aspiring 
southern nation and aspiring nations in Europe in order to claim a precedent for their 
actions.  Southern print discourse reveals that secessionists argued that their actions 
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followed the models presented by aspiring European nations in seceding from empires; 
they claimed that the same values of anti-tyranny and self-government motivated both 
southern nationalists and nationalists in Europe; and they asserted that the success of the 
Italian Risorgimento heralded similar success for the South, particularly focusing on 
international diplomatic recognition.  These international comparisons provided 
secessionists with a means of justifying secession and of positioning their nationalist 
movement as one of many seeking support in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
 As southern nationalists seceded from the United States and began the process of 
creating their own nation, they were very aware of the need to present their new nation, 
and its reason for existence, in a positive way, both to fellow southerners as well as to the 
international community.  They developed a variety of arguments through which they 
sought to justify and explain secession, and therefore to defend the need for a southern 
nation.  One of the most widespread southern arguments for secession was that secession 
was a legitimate action undertaken to protect the rights of southerners against abuse by 
the North.  Secessionists argued that secession was a peaceful redress for harms that the 
North had perpetrated, and would perpetrate, against the South, particularly citing 
attempts to limit slavery as evidence of this expected harm.  Further, they claimed that 
independent states had voluntarily entered into a compact when the United States was 
created, and that these states could thus leave the union at any time.
1
  Such arguments 
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underlay the claims that the South deserved independence due to the European-style 
tyranny it faced at the hands of the North. 
A related argument was the claim that southern states were following the example 
of their revolutionary forebears by asserting the sovereignty of the people.  Southern 
secessionists argued that they seceded to protect their rights just as the colonists had 
declared independence from Great Britain in order to protect their rights.
2
  Indeed, 
Confederates styled themselves as heirs to the American Revolution, arguing that they 
were the true protectors of the ideals upon which the United States had been founded, 
while the North had drifted away from the original concept of the union.
3
  Comparing 
their actions to those of the revered founders of the United States, while on the surface 
paradoxical for a people breaking away from that same nation, bolstered southerners’ 
claims that their secession resembled a widely-recognized precedent of nation formation.   
Although secessionists cloaked their movement in language of rights, ultimately, 
the protection of slavery was the primary motivation for creating the Confederacy.  
Because human equality and freedom played such a large role in liberal nationalism, 
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however, slavery created a challenge for Confederates who attempted to present a 
sanitized argument for secession.  Nonetheless, for many secessionists, slavery was at the 
heart of the southern cause, and the need to defend slavery was the key impetus for 
secession.
4
   
 While slavery and rights-based arguments were among the most prominent ways 
in which southerners justified and defined their new nation, southern nationalists also 
envisioned an international context to their nation that they argued legitimized their 
efforts to create a new nation.  Southern opinion-makers sought to justify secession by 
contextualizing their attempt at nation-building within an international framework of 
nineteenth century nationalist movements in Europe.  Secessionists and early 
Confederates argued that their attempt to create a new nation was part of a larger global 
spread of nationalism, and that the Confederacy was thus one of many aspiring nations 
deserving independence.
5
   
Claiming equivalence between the southern attempt at nation-building and 
European nationalist movements required significant manipulation of both facts and 
ideals.  The aspiring southern nation was fundamentally premised upon the defense of 
slavery, and therefore differed significantly in its ideology and principles from the more 
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liberal revolutions with which southerners claimed similarity.  Southern analysts, 
however, proved willing to ignore the differences between southern nationalism and 
nationalisms in Europe.  They used the limited vision of nationalism that they had 
developed through analysis of the revolutions of 1848 in order to avoid discussion of the 
liberal values of aspiring nations abroad that conflicted with a conservative desire for 
hierarchical power and social structure.  They also built upon the anticipatory 
comparisons of the 1850s to argue that slavery was compatible with liberal nationalism 
by claiming that the North’s attempts to end the supposed right to slavery in the South 
were the equivalent of tyrannical actions undertaken by European despots.  Through 
these manipulations, secessionists and southern nationalists used international 
comparisons to legitimize secession and the southern nation, despite the contradictions 
between slavery and the prevailing mid-nineteenth century views of nationhood.   
The most common international comparisons used by southern commentators 
focused on the values, causes, goals, and ideals supposedly shared by aspiring nations 
abroad and by the aspiring southern nation.  As they built these comparisons, 
secessionists turned to the limited vision of nationalism they had clarified through 
analysis of the revolutions of 1848, which aided them in rejecting ideals such as equality 
that contradicted slavery, and in re-defining values such as liberty and self-government to 
exclude the rights of slaves.  Using this limited vision of nationalism, southern 
nationalists claimed that the aspiring southern nation shared values such as self-
government and the fight against tyranny with aspiring nations in Europe, and thus that 
the aspiring southern nation was seeking the same noble causes as those represented by 
more popular nationalist movements abroad.   
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Southern nationalists were particularly fervent in arguing that the South was 
seceding in order to be free of northern tyranny, which they claimed was similar to the 
tyranny that had led to nationalist movements throughout Europe.  The fight against 
tyranny had been one of the national ideals that antebellum southerners had identified as 
appropriate for an aspiring nation through antebellum analysis of the revolutions of 1848, 
and thus was one of the values to which they now turned in their own nation-building 
efforts.  As they had observed nationalist movements in Europe, southern analysts had 
largely concurred that aspiring nations in Europe had fought against despotism, and that 
this was a worthy fight.  The newly united and independent Italian nation stood as the 
clearest example in southern minds of a nation that had triumphed despite long suffering 
at the hands of despotic powers and tyrants; time and again, various southern writers 
contrasted the despotism of Austria with the Italian desire for freedom and 
independence.
6
  Although by far the most successful example, Italy was not the only 
aspiring nation that southerners believed had faced tyranny and despotism.  Southern 
journalists, politicians, and other opinion-makers had long favored Hungary’s fight 
against despotic Austria; blamed Great Britain for perpetuating similar tyranny against 
Ireland that it had once wielded against the American colonists; and lamented that Poland 
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was “degraded” by “odious despotism.”
7
  This long understanding of Italy and other 
aspiring nations as oppressed by despotism provided secessionists with a natural point of 
comparison when they began to argue that they were also held down by tyranny.  This 
strategy of comparing tyrannies was appealing not only on the basis of its perceived 
ability to situate the aspiring southern nation within an international context, but also 
because it fit so closely with southern nationalists’ efforts to claim that the South seceded 
in order to preserve its rights.  
Building from the antebellum understanding of aspiring nations abroad as seeking 
to overthrow despotism, as well as from antebellum equation of abolitionism with 
European tyranny, southern commentators compared the actions of the North to those of 
European despots, claiming that northern actions toward the South constituted similar 
oppression as that faced by aspiring, and defeated, nations in Europe.
8
  In order to bolster 
their claim that secession was necessary in order to protect southern rights, southern 
nationalists equated the North with the military despotism of Russia and argued that an 
unchecked North would perpetrate abuses worse than those suffered in defeated 
nationalist movements in Venice and Poland.
9
  James L. Bowen, a Virginian of northern 
origin, wrote to his fellow Virginians that the Union was acting as a despot of the South, 
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just like Great Britain was a despot of Ireland.
10
  The Richmond Daily Dispatch, one of 
Richmond’s most circulated newspapers, edited by conservative James A. Cowardin, 
claimed that northern tyranny was worse than that perpetrated against Italy by the 
dreaded “King Bomba,” or Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies.
11
  This idea was apparent in 
the official political arena as well.  Speaking to the Alabama secession convention, 
delegate James S. Clark argued that the South was “oppressed to the earth by a system… 
more intolerable than that of despotic Austria, and impelled likewise.”
12
  Secessionists 
believed that claiming that northerners acted like despots such as Austria and Russia, 
while arguing that the South, like Italy, Ireland, Hungary, and Poland, merely desired 
freedom from oppression, bolstered their claims that secession was necessary to protect 
the South from abuses by the North.   
The North did not just act like a European despot, according to southern 
nationalists, however; southern opinion-makers also frequently analyzed the supposed 
ideological kinship that informed the actions of both the tyrannical North as well as 
tyrannical powers in Europe.  The New Orleans Daily Picayune explained the Union 
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government’s confidence that the North would receive support from Austria and Russia 
by declaring that “such empires as Russia and Austria have a natural affinity for the 
principles of government developed at Washington,” adding that the emperors “recognize 
coarse imitations of themselves in Abraham Lincoln.”
13
  Similarly, a sermon preached in 
Jefferson County, Georgia, proclaimed that the actions of the North against the South 
would cause despots to celebrate, and Italy and Hungary to shriek, hinting at an affinity 
between the North and European despots, and the South and aspiring European nations.
14
  
Highlighting the supposed shared values and good will between the Union government 
and despotic governments in Europe aided southern nationalists in drawing a connection 
between the abuses of European tyrants and the supposed abuses of the North, allowing 
them to justify their action of secession.   
Following from their despotic actions and values, northerners’ tyranny over the 
South supposedly created grave harm for southerners in the form of suppressed liberty 
and self-government.  One of the reasons why northern tyranny was so fearful according 
to southern nationalists was that it limited southern liberty, just as European despots had 
restricted the liberty of aspiring nations in Europe.  As the New Orleans Daily Picayune 
wrote, the North’s opposition to southern secession was supposedly equally harmful to 
liberty as Austria’s refusal to grant independence to Italy.
15
  John Tyler, Jr., son of the 
president, and later the Confederate secretary of war, wrote that the triumph of 
abolitionist politics in the North would signal the defeat of constitutional liberty, ushering 
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in chaos similar to that following the French Revolution.
16
  Richmond’s Daily Dispatch 
turned to American history and values to highlight the severity of the loss of liberty faced 
by the South; the editors wrote that Lincoln’s abuses against  the cause of liberty were not 
only equal to those perpetrated in Europe, but were even worse, since they occurred in a 
land consecrated to liberty.
17
  To secessionists, secession was necessary to ensure that 
liberty in the South would not be crushed as it had been in Europe. 
To claim liberty as a goal of the southern nation required slave-holding southern 
nationalists to limit the definition of liberty to national, rather than individual, liberty.  
Southern commentators did just that.  For example, a citizen by the initials P. R. G wrote 
to the Richmond Whig, distinguishing between the benefits of what he called 
constitutional liberty and the drawbacks of what he considered to be social liberty.
18
  
Although comparisons of liberty required conservative southerners to ignore both the 
fullest implications of liberty, as well as the contradictions between liberty and slavery, 
southern nationalists nonetheless claimed that the aspiring southern nation, like aspiring 
nations in Europe, was motivated by a desire for liberty, and therefore was justified in 
seceding. 
If northern despotism was harmful in part due to the limitations it placed on 
liberty, southern commentators argued, its harms against self-government and self-
determination were perhaps even worse.  Self-determination, like the fight against 
tyranny, was another value that southerners had confirmed as suitable for an aspiring 
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nation through their analysis of the revolutions of 1848.
19
  Throughout the antebellum 
period, revolutions that were seen as fighting for national self-determination had won the 
support and praise of southern analysts.
20
  In contrast, revolutions that appeared imposed 
on a people or nation received criticism.
21
  Utilizing a limited definition of self-
government that focused on national self-determination rather than on individual rights to 
have a voice in government, secessionists claimed that a southern nation was necessary 
because northerners were preventing southern exercise of self-government.  Secessionists 
argued that northern politics, particularly the rise of abolitionism and the Republican 
Party, had altered the original form of American government to the point that southern 
voices were no longer being heard.  Southern nationalists thus argued that secession was 
necessary to protect self-government, just as it had been for aspiring nations abroad.  For 
example, the Macon Daily Telegraph accused the North of such severe harms to self-
government that even Europe would react in disgust.
22
  In a report on the Louisiana 
secession convention, the New Orleans Daily Picayune urged that Louisiana must follow 
aspiring nations in Europe, who, though defeated, kept pushing for “the principle that 
communities have the indestructible right to create their own governments, and to throw 
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off those which they find to be intolerable.”
23
  Even Jefferson Davis claimed in an 1861 
speech in Congress that southerners had the same right to “abrogate and modify their 
form of Government whenever it did not answer the ends for which it had been 
established” that had been enacted in the American Revolution, and that foreign subjects 
of Austria had called upon in their bids for independence.
24
  Comparisons of the self-
determination supposedly denied to the South and to aspiring nations in Europe, then, 
revealed the harms that northern tyranny would create, thus supposedly justifying 
secession. 
Interestingly, foreigners living in the South were among the loudest voices 
popularizing comparisons of self-government in the South and in their native countries, 
perhaps because they were familiar with this language from their countries of origins.  
Comparisons crafted by foreigners living in the South provided their fellow southerners 
with what appeared to be proof of the validity of the comparisons between southerners’ 
and foreign nationalists’ desires for self-determination.  The Charleston Mercury’s 
foreign correspondent John Mitchel, an Irish nationalist, southern sympathizer, and 
fervent supporter of slavery, frequently drew comparisons between the oppression faced 
by the South and by Ireland.  For example, Mitchel reported that the force that the North 
deployed against the South was typical of that seen in Europe, and was equally harmful 
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against the principle of self-government, citing Russia’s oppression of Poland and Great 
Britain’s oppression of Ireland as illustrations.
25
  Similarly, a former Italian claiming 
Confederate affiliation wrote to the Richmond Daily Dispatch that Italy had succeeded in 
its fight for “the principle that every nation has a natural right of choosing her own 
government,” the same fight that the South now undertook, asking readers “has not this 
very war taken place for a long time between Italy and her tyrants? Is not the principle on 
which Italy has struggled entirely the same as that which the South has adopted in 
America?”
26
  O. A. Lochrane, an Irishman living in the South, likewise argued that the 
South represented the same principle for which the Irish fought, namely the “right of a 
people to select their own rulers – the right of a people to change their own 
Government.”
27
  To many southerners, both native- and foreign-born, then, the new 
southern nation shared a common goal of self-determination with the nationalist 
movements of Europe.  A fight for self-determination, similar to that in Italy and 
elsewhere, was a fight for a value that had long been established as a main principle of 
nineteenth century nationalism.  Although claiming self-government as a value of the 
southern nation required an alternative vision of this value that allowed for the 
elimination of slaves’ rights, southern nationalists nonetheless compared their desire for 
self-government with European nationalist movements’ desire for self-government, 
allowing them to claim that southern secession fit within the mainstream of nineteenth 
century international politics.   
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The idea that the North was a tyrannical power, oppressing the South and 
stripping southerners’ ability to achieve self-government, depended in part upon the 
perception that the North and South were different peoples, and that the North was thus 
an illegitimate foreign power imposing its will upon the South.  While the primary 
arguments with which southern nationalists justified secession dealt with the language of 
rights, ethnic nationalism, or the idea that a people deserved nationhood based on cultural 
and historical distinctiveness, also shaped southern thought about nationhood.
28
  This 
language of distinctiveness influenced southern discourse about the South’s place relative 
to other nations.
29
  One southerner who spoke of the South’s distinctiveness from the 
North, comparing it to that of aspiring European nations’ differences from their 
oppressors, was James M. Mason, Virginia congressman and later diplomat for the 
Confederacy.  Mason justified his desire for Virginia to hold a secession convention by 
arguing that “the people of the North… have separated themselves from the people of the 
South, and the government they thus inaugurate will be to us the government of a foreign 
power. We shall stand to such powers as Italy to Austria, and Poland to Russia. It will be 
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one people governed by another people.”
30
  The Richmond Daily Dispatch agreed, 
writing upon Lincoln’s inauguration that “this day the South comes under a dominion 
which has been forced upon her by the North; this day she begins a servitude as 
involuntary as that of Italy to Austria; this day inaugurates a foreign rule as distinct and 
complete as if we had been conquered by European bayonets,” adding a few days later 
that the struggle of the South against the North “is the struggle of Italy against Austria; of 
a Confederation of independent States, occupied by a homogeneous people, against 
foreign oppressors, who have violated the common league into which they have 
entered.”
31
  Southern nationalists claimed that the North and South were distinct, and that 
the North thus constituted an illegitimate foreign power, imposing its own agenda on the 
South and thereby stripping southerners of their right to self-government.  Deriving from 
this view, they claimed that through secession, the South sought only to establish self-
government that would free southerners from any northern tyranny. 
As southerners discussed the supposed tyranny perpetrated by the North, and the 
harms that this tyranny of a supposedly foreign power caused for southern liberty and 
self-government, newly-elected president Abraham Lincoln played a central role in their 
international comparisons, featuring prominently as the worst of tyrants and despots, 
equal to or surpassing any European despot.  Even before the election of 1860, the 
Charleston Mercury, a secessionist paper owned by Robert Barnwell Rhett, reported that 
Lincoln’s election would create a situation similar to those in much-oppressed Ireland 
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and Poland, and in Italy before Italy gained independence.
32
  Lincoln’s inauguration only 
increased this vitriol, with the Richmond Daily Dispatch claiming that Lincoln’s 
inauguration marked the conquering of the South, as complete as if the South had been 
“annexed to the throne of some continental despot.”
33
 
Popular as justifications for secession, these accusations that Lincoln was a despot 
also continued throughout the early war, as southern nationalists continued to define their 
actions and their nation through comparisons with European despotism.  In the summer 
of 1861, the Charleston Mercury informed its readers that “the cruelty and despotism of 
the Lincoln government have not been exceeded in late times – not even in Austria.”
34
  
Indeed, even the “foreign despotism” faced by Italy was “not as base and contemptible as 
the Lincoln despotism” according to the Richmond Daily Dispatch.
 35
  By comparing 
Lincoln to the supposed despots of Italy, such as the Austrian empire, Confederates 
furthered their argument that the southern states seceded because of tyrannical 
oppression, the same foe that Italy and other aspiring European nations fought in their 
struggles for independent nationhood. 
Comparisons of northern and European tyranny, and the of the right to self-
government sought by the southern nation and aspiring European nations, constituted an 
important part of secessionists’ efforts to justify secession, as they used these 
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comparisons to claim a place for the South within the larger mainstream of nineteenth 
century nationalism.   Despite southern nationalists’ claims, however, the aspiring 
southern nation was not premised upon the same goals and values as aspiring nations in 
Europe.  Ultimately, the defense of slavery was southern nationalists’ main concern.  A 
slave-holding society, based upon inequality and hierarchical power structures, differed 
drastically in ideology from nationalist movements inspired by ideas of equality, 
freedom, and democracy, undermining the validity of southerners’ comparisons.   
Further complicating the comparisons was the reality that the South was not 
actually oppressed by the North.  Any oppression was more anticipated than actual, and 
was, once again, based upon supposed harms against slavery.  To southern nationalists’ 
international audience, northern attempts to restrict slavery did not equal the oppression 
of defeated nations abroad, an issue with which later Confederates would have to deal.  
For many elite southerners, however, northern abolitionism represented a legitimate 
abuse – or potential abuse – of what they saw as the South’s right to own slaves.  Since 
the 1850s, southerners had been using comparisons between oppression in Europe, and 
the oppression they feared the limitation of slavery would bring to the South, in order to 
dramatize their defense of slavery.  As they undertook the process of secession and 
nation-formation, they expanded these comparisons to justify secession on the basis that 
northern attempts to limit slavery constituted despotism equivalent to that found in 
Europe. 
Comparisons of tyranny thus required significant ideological manipulation on the 
part of secessionists, as slave-holders ignored the actual lack of oppression, as well as the 
vast gulf between nationalist movements motivated by ideals of freedom and equality and 
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a nationalist movement motivated by conservatism and slavery.  International 
comparisons proved so compelling to southerners, however, in part because of these 
inconsistencies.  Southern nationalists used comparisons to center their slave-based 
nation as one of many other aspiring nations in order to claim that, despite the 
contradictions between slavery and liberal nationalism, the aspiring slave-holding 
southern nation was still a part of the larger movement of nationalism.   
Southern analysts were explicit in connecting attempts to end slavery with 
European-style tyranny, making it clear that they believed that offenses against slavery 
still qualified as offenses against legitimate national rights, and that the South was 
therefore justified in seeking independence under the guise of liberal nationalism.  For 
example, a citizen by the initials P. R. G. wrote a letter to the editor of the Richmond 
Whig arguing that Italy, while under Austrian rule, was the best example of a nation 
lacking political liberty, which he defined as distinct from social liberty, such as freedom 
from slavery, with the latter kind of liberty being undesirable.  He then suggested that if 
the South threw off northern rule, it would enjoy the same right of political liberty that 
Italy, now free of Austria, enjoyed.
36
  To P. R. G., by freeing themselves of northern 
abolitionists, the South could achieve the same freedom as a nation like Italy, and do so 
while still preserving slavery.  Similarly, Clement Clay, a politician from Alabama, 
warned that if the North succeeded in dictating the national conversation about slavery 
and the territories, the South would be “doomed to worse shame, subjugation and 
vassalage, than Ireland or Hungary now endures,” urging that southerners must take care 
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not to allow this to happen.
37
  As early as March of 1860, John Tyler, Jr. wrote in 
DeBow’s Review under the penname “Python” that the triumph of Black Republicanism 
would lead to the fall of property rights, pointing to revolutionary France as an example 
of the chaos that would follow.
38
  Of course, slavery was the primary property right with 
which most elite southerners were concerned.  These comparisons make it clear that the 
oppression that secessionists feared was the elimination of slavery, and that they believed 
that arguing that such an elimination of slavery equaled tyranny would help them 
legitimize secession. 
Claiming that their desire to preserve slavery was equivalent to European nations’ 
desire to be free of political oppression allowed southern nationalists to attempt to 
legitimize their creation of a slave-holding nation.  Despite the contradictions between 
slavery and liberal nationalism, southern nationalists embraced international comparisons 
that helped them cloak their desire to preserve slavery in the language of nationalism, and 
to situate the preservation of slavery as an equivalent national goal with those pursued by 
aspiring nations abroad.  Even though these claims were inaccurate, southern nationalists 
sought to use these international comparisons to help them make their case that the 
southern nation deserved membership in the international family of nations. 
The importance of international comparisons of tyranny, and one of the reasons 
why secessionists utilized these comparisons despite the ideological inconsistencies 
inherent to them, can be seen in southern opinion-makers’ efforts to not only use said 
comparisons to justify secession, but also to use them to gain the support of their fellow 
southerners.  Southern nationalists used comparisons of tyranny as a rallying cry and call 
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to arms for their audiences.  As secessionists sought support for their agenda, they urged 
their fellow southerners to fight against the northern despotism or risk a similar or worse 
fate than that of the aspiring nationalities that southerners had followed in Europe.  The 
Charleston Mercury reported with approval, for example, that Mr. Charles O’Conor, an 
Irishman in New York, had given a speech declaring that without action, “the people of 
the Southern States will submit to insults and outrages, and to become subject provinces, 
precisely as… Ireland has long been to Britain, as many other nations have been subject 
to tyrannical and monarchical States.”
39
  Similarly, a self-identified southern Democrat 
wrote to the Baton Rouge Daily Advocate that the South must follow the example of Italy 
in throwing off tyranny and monarchy, lest the South face the fruits of old world 
tyranny.
40
  Threatening that if they allowed northern dominance to continue, southerners 
would suffer the fate of oppressed nations of Europe aided secessionists not only in 
defining their cause, but also in soliciting the support of fellow southerners.  When faced 
with the necessity of gaining supporters for the causes of secession and then southern 
nationalism, as well as with the necessity of justifying secession, southern nationalists 
turned to comparisons with European despotism in order to situate the aspiring southern 
nation within the larger international movement of nationalism. 
Comparisons of the challenges faced and values shared by southern nationalism 
and nationalisms in Europe were important to secessionists’ efforts to justify secession 
and to internationalize the southern cause.  International comparisons defined the 
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Confederacy according to the values that southerners supposedly shared with these 
European nationalists.  These comparisons also highlighted the harms that the South 
would supposedly face if it remained in the Union, harms that were similar to those faced 
by failed nationalities abroad.  Through claiming similarity with aspiring nations in 
Europe, southern nationalists placed their efforts at nation-building within the larger 
context of the spread of nationalism.  Doing so was particularly critical for southern 
nationalists’ efforts to claim legitimacy despite the problems that their defense of slavery 
created for their claims to nationhood.  By relying on limited definitions of key concepts, 
and focusing on those values that they claimed they shared with aspiring nations abroad, 
secessionists used international comparisons to legitimize southern efforts at nation-
building.   
International comparisons proved beneficial in helping southern nationalists claim 
legitimacy for their attempt at nation building, not only through bolstering claims that the 
southern nation represented widely recognized values of nationhood, but also by 
providing a precedent for secession in southern minds.  Secessionists believed that if they 
could claim that not only their values and their cause, but also their methods, followed 
the model of nation-building presented by foreign nationalisms, such an argument would 
further strengthen their case for nationhood.  Accordingly, secessionists looked abroad to 
find an aspiring nation that they could claim had been formed through secession.   
Italy, which, unlike the many defeated nationalities of the revolutions of 1848, 
had recently succeeded in gaining unity and independence, proved particularly critical to 
these comparisons.  The Risorgimento, Italy’s nationalist movement, had begun in the 
early part of the nineteenth century as various Italian states had sought Italian unity as 
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well as independence from foreign empires such as Austria.  Despite many failures 
through the decades, by 1860, the majority of the Italian peninsula was successfully 
united under Piedmont control as the Kingdom of Italy.  The success that Italy had 
enjoyed in its nation-building efforts made it a particularly attractive model for southern 
secessionists.  Additionally, Italy enjoyed widespread international sympathy and 
support, further enhancing its appeal as a model of nation building.
41
 
Because Italy provided such an attractive model of the process of claiming 
nationhood, secessionists sought to draw parallels between their actions and those of 
Italian nationalists in order to justify their own secession.  In the winter and spring of 
1861, as the southern states debated and began the process of secession, southern 
opinion-makers advanced the argument that Italy, like the aspiring southern nation, had 
been formed through secession.  Southern reports frequently claimed that the Italian 
states had seceded from the Austrian Empire, and thus the Risorgimento had been a 
secession movement.
42
  Southern nationalists were so invested in the idea that Italy had 
been formed through secession that they argued that Italian secession inspired not only 
southern secession, but also other separation movements, such as Ireland’s struggle for 
independence from Great Britain.
43
  Southern nationalists’ belief in the Italian states’ 
supposed secession from their foreign rulers helped to establish the South’s right to 
secede in southerners’ minds by seemingly proving that secession could be used to form a 
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successful nation.
44
  While southern commentators did also speak of the Risorgimento as 
a unification movement, the idea that Italy had gained independence at least in part 
through secession was nonetheless widespread among southern analysis, and widely used 
as a tactic to legitimize southern secession.
45
   
These claims of similarity with Italy on the basis of secession once again required 
significant manipulation on the part of southerners.  Most contemporaries understood that 
the southern states’ secession from the Union on the basis of slavery was not the same 
action as Italian nationalists’ struggles for unity and independence, and that secession and 
unification were not similar methods of nation-building.  Nonetheless, many southern 
nationalists chose to interpret the actions of Italian nationalists in a way that bolstered 
southerners’ international comparisons.  Characterizing the Risorgimento as a secession 
movement rather than as a unification movement allowed southern nationalists to claim 
Italy as an example of a new nation based upon secession, bolstering their argument that 
southern secession was a legitimate method of nation-building, and was part of the 
mainstream of nineteenth century nationalism. 
If Italy provided a model of a nation supposedly built through secession, it also 
seemed to provide proof that such an attempt at nation-building would ultimately be 
successful, according to secessionists.  As they undertook the extreme actions of seceding 
from the Union and building a new nation, secessionists sought reassurance as to the 
advisability of their actions.  Turning once again to international comparisons, southern 
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nationalists argued that their secession and that the Confederacy would be as successful 
as the Risorgimento and Italy had been.  International comparisons thus not only proved 
secession to be legitimate in secessionists’ minds; they also proved secession to be the 
correct course of action and all but guaranteed success, at least according to southern 
analyses.  When the future of the South seemed uncertain, southern nationalists turned to 
international comparisons for reassurance. 
 In the winter of the secession crisis, southern nationalists looked to Italy for 
guarantees that the actions they were considering would be successful.  In particular, 
advocates of secession used comparisons with Italy to strengthen their case for secession, 
using international comparisons as a way to encourage other southern states to secede and 
join the new southern nation.  These secessionists argued that Italy’s successful 
unification predicted that, if the southern states united together, they would be equally 
successful.  This was an ironic stance for many reasons, not only because these same 
southerners interpreted the Risorgimento as a secession movement, but also because 
secession constituted disunion, not unity, and was widely recognized as such.  
Nonetheless, a reporter for the New Orleans Daily Picayune directed readers to consider 
the success that Italy had gained upon uniting, arguing that if southern states united 
together against the Union, they could gain equal strength.
46
  Similarly, an Italian 
correspondent wrote in the Fayetteville Observer, an originally Unionist paper that began 
publishing pro-Confederate articles during the Civil War, that having witnessed the 
Italian revolution first-hand, he believed that the only way for secession to succeed was 
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for seceding southern states to unite, as the Italian states had done.
47
  Despite all evidence 
and arguments to the contrary, the unity of Italy seemed to promise success to 
secessionists if they followed Italy’s example in uniting the southern states.  This 
argument is an excellent example of southern nationalists’ tendency to manipulate the 
ideals and facts in order to support their international comparisons; as such, it also reveals 
the importance of these international comparisons to southern nationalists’ efforts to 
define, legitimize, and ensure the success of the southern nation. 
While unity provided perhaps a dubious guarantee of success, the official 
diplomatic recognition of the new Italian nation by European powers proved much more 
promising for secessionists seeking indications that their actions would lead to success.  
Italy gained recognition from European powers including Great Britain and France, as 
well as from the United States, in the spring of 1861, just as southern nationalists were 
excited about the possibilities of the new Confederacy.  Southern reports eagerly 
anticipated that once Italy achieved official diplomatic recognition from other nations, the 
Confederacy was sure to quickly attain the same, revealing the fervency of Confederates’ 
belief that their nation belonged alongside Italy as one of the new nations of the 
nineteenth century, and would be successful in achieving that status.  In a typical 
expression of these beliefs, the Richmond Daily Dispatch wrote that “we are happy to see 
it announced that the French Government will soon recognize the independence of Italy, 
to be followed, it is predicted, by a speedy recognition of the Confederate States. Both of 
these Governments have been brought into existence by the popular voice, and both have 
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bravely established in the field their claims to independence.”
48
  As the secession crisis 
gave way to nation formation in the spring of 1861, southern nationalists utilized 
comparisons of claims to diplomatic recognition as an additional way of bolstering the 
perceived legitimacy of the new southern nation. 
Even as they were beginning the process of creating a nation, Confederates 
immediately recognized the importance of gaining diplomatic recognition.  The 
Confederacy quickly established formal diplomatic efforts in order to win recognition 
and support from the major powers of Europe.  Gaining the recognition of France and 
especially Great Britain, a major trading partner of the USA and the would-be CSA, 
would have benefitted the Confederacy immensely, through both public opinion as well 
as actual aid.
49
  Accordingly, in fall of 1861, the new Confederate government sent James 
M. Mason to London and John Slidell to Paris, charged with the mission of winning 
foreign support for the new southern nation.  Initially, southerners were confident that 
these efforts would quickly bear fruit.  Although Confederates were fully aware of the 
benefits that diplomatic relations could bring them, however, and despite some European 
pro-Confederacy sentiment that encouraged southern hopes, Confederates never 
succeeded in gaining recognition from foreign nations, in part due to the pro-slavery 
orientation of the Confederacy.
50
  Later Confederates would be forced to deal with the 
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lack of foreign recognition, but in the spring of 1861, hopes of recognition still flourished 
throughout the South. 
As new Confederates sought diplomatic recognition, they turned once again to 
international comparisons to bolster their case that they were an independent nation and 
deserved to be recognized as such.  Although Confederate politicians and diplomats and 
their European targets spent little time debating comparisons between the Confederacy 
and Italy, domestic discourse on the new southern nation’s place in the international 
community of nations devoted much attention to arguing that the Confederacy deserved 
the same international diplomatic recognition given to Italy.
51
  This argument built on the 
previously-discussed claims that southern secession was a similar action to Italy’s fight 
for independence from Austria; that the North was tyrannical despot oppressing the 
South, like Austria had been a tyrannical despot oppressing Italy; and that the South, like 
Italy, represented the values of self-government and liberty.  If Italy deserved 
recognition, then, so too did the Confederacy, at least in the minds of many southern 
nationalists.  As early as November of 1860, foreign correspondent John Mitchel was 
speculating in the Charleston Mercury that Europeans would perceive the secession of 
South Carolina to signal the creation of a new power in the Americas, similar to the 
recent creation of a new power in Europe with the formation of Italy.
52
  Like the 
comparisons of national values, then, comparisons of claims for official international 
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recognition aided southern nationalists in legitimizing their nation, further proving that 
secession would be a success. 
Comparisons of claims to diplomatic recognition proved particularly prophetic of 
success, at least in southern minds, once Italy received recognition.  When Italy gained 
official recognition from European powers in spring of 1861, southern nationalists 
celebrated that their own recognition would soon be forthcoming.  In particular, France’s 
recognition of the Kingdom of Italy sparked excitement among southerners.  In July of 
1861, the Richmond Daily Dispatch reported that France’s impending recognition of Italy 
boded well for the Confederacy, as Italy and the Confederacy were “both creatures of the 
same god” and therefore to recognize one was to recognize the other.
53
  An anonymous 
southerner called “Gamma,” writing from Europe, reminded readers that recognition of 
the Confederacy was linked to that of Italy, and as France had recognized Italy, 
recognition of the Confederacy was assured.
54
   
One of the reasons why France’s recognition of Italy was so encouraging for 
southerners was that French officials had long been hinting at support for the 
Confederacy by drawing the same comparisons between Italy and the Confederacy that 
southern nationalists themselves did.  Early in 1861, French diplomats declared that the 
South had the same right to secede from the North that Italian states had to secede from 
Austria.
55
  As recognition of Italy became more likely, French officials mixed 
comparisons between Italy and the Confederacy into these declarations of support.  In 
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spring of 1861, Edouard Thouvenel, French minister of foreign affairs, urged southerners 
not to give up hope for recognition by France, as France had not yet recognized Italy, and 
recognition of both would surely be forthcoming.
56
  No less a person than Napoleon III, 
emperor of France, proclaimed that the Confederacy “has the same claims for its 
acknowledgment as a new kingdom that Italy had,” thus bolstering Confederates’ own 
estimation of their equivalence to Italy, and to Italian nationalism.
57
  Such a statement by 
the leader of a major nation seemed to prove to southern nationalists that their 
comparisons were correct. 
Southern nationalists were equally excited about what they perceived to be their 
impending recognition by Great Britain after that nation extended recognition to Italy.  
According to southern reporters, Great Britain could not fail to soon recognize the 
Confederacy as an independent nation after granting such recognition to Italy.  The 
Charleston Mercury took the liberty of telling its readers they “have only to substitute the 
word ‘South’ for ‘Italy’… to see how complete is the application” of Lord John Russell’s 
speech supporting recognition of Italy, to the recognition of the Confederacy.
58
  
According to Paris correspondent John Mitchel, Great Britain, like France, was actually 
“eager” to recognize the Confederacy after recognizing Italy.
59
  As with French 
politicians, some British commentators bolstered these hopes.  Upon British recognition 
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of Italy, the London Press reported that even as Great Britain recognized Italy, another 
aspiring state, the Confederacy, sent commissioners who were confident of receiving 
recognition.  This confidence, according to the Press, was “well founded.”
60
  Because 
Great Britain formed the major target of Confederate diplomacy, British recognition of 
the Confederacy, like that granted to Italy, would be a major victory for southern 
nationalists, one that southern nationalists believed would prove the rightness of their 
actions and legitimacy of their nation, thereby promising success for their experiment in 
nation-building. 
Recognition, along with the legitimization that recognition would grant to 
southern nationalists’ international comparisons, proved elusive.  The hopeful reports of 
diplomatic efforts through spring and summer of 1861, however, reveal the desire that 
Confederates had to use similarities with Italy to place their own nation within a larger 
international context of aspiring nations seeking independence.  They also reveal the 
importance of international comparisons to southern nationalists’ attempts to define and 
legitimize their secession and their new nation.  Although southern commentators failed 
to convince the international community that if Italy deserved recognition, so too did the 
Confederacy, a problem with which later Confederates would be forced to deal, many 
Confederates themselves nonetheless clearly endorsed this similarity.  The widespread 
and complex nature of this comparison demonstrates that Confederates argued that Italy 
and the Confederacy were fighting the same battle, using this claim to legitimize their 
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nation by connecting their own nationalist movement to the more widely-supported 
movements of Italy and other European nations.  If foreign powers would only recognize 
the similarities between the Confederacy and Italy, Confederates argued, and grant the 
Confederacy the same diplomatic recognition granted to Italy, then the southern nation 
would be recognized as legitimate, and would be a success. 
Through international comparisons, southern nationalists sought to justify their 
actions, define their values and identity, and guarantee the success of their experiment in 
nation-building.  Claiming European nationalist movements as a precedent for their own 
attempt at nation-building aided secessionists in arguing that the South deserved the same 
independence as aspiring European nations, as well as in placing the aspiring southern 
nation within the mainstream of nineteenth century nationalism.  These comparisons also 
helped secessionists and southern nationalists deal with the problem that slavery created 
for their claim to nationhood by focusing attention on the similarities that they 
supposedly shared with more widely supported nationalist movements in Europe while 
seeking to obscure the differences.  International comparisons were central to southern 
efforts to place southern secession and the Confederacy within the mainstream of 
nineteenth century nationalism in order to claim legitimacy for an independent southern 
nation.  These comparisons thus played a critical role in the ways in which secessionists 
and southern nationalists justified and legitimized secession, defined the southern nation, 
and sought support for the Confederacy during the winter of secession and the spring of 
nation-building.
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Chapter Four 
Defending International Comparisons, 1861-1865 
 
Building on an antebellum tradition of understanding issues of nationalism 
through an international lens, secessionists had sought to legitimize their actions by 
claiming aspiring nations in Europe as precedents for a southern nationalist movement.  
These international comparisons that secessionists had used to justify secession continued 
to resonate with many Confederates during the war.  Claiming that the North’s actions 
against the South resembled the tyranny found in Europe and that the South represented 
the cherished values of liberal nationalism appealed to Confederates seeking to 
legitimize, define, and gain support for their nation, just as it had for secessionists 
seeking to defend secession.   
While these ideas continued to be echoed throughout the South during the war, 
growing indications that southerners were alone in their belief that the Confederacy 
resembled new nations such as Italy, and aspiring nations such as Hungary, Poland, and 
Ireland, increasingly challenged Confederates’ international self-perception.  The 
problems inherent in southerners’ claim that a slave-holding nation represented liberal 
values were apparent to northerners and Europeans alike, and the lack of support for the 
Confederacy from abroad increasingly emphasized the reality that the Confederacy did 
not, in fact, represent the same liberal tradition that had helped to inform many of the new 
and aspiring nations in Europe.  
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The failure of foreign powers to treat the Confederacy as the legitimate nation it 
aspired to be forced the Confederates who believed in their new nation’s similarity to 
nations abroad to respond.  More conservative southerners did so by positing an 
alternative interpretation of the relationship of the Confederacy to other new and aspiring 
nations, but the southerners who remained committed to the American tradition of liberal 
nationalism continued making the case that the Confederacy, like more popular new and 
aspiring nations abroad, represented liberal nationalist values and therefore deserved 
independence.  Despite the fact that the Confederacy’s illiberal emphasis on slavery and 
limited democracy was ideologically dissimilar from liberal nationalism’s emphasis on 
natural rights, liberty, and freedom, for these Confederates, the vision of the Confederacy 
as an equal among the family of nations, one of many aspiring nations to seek 
independence in the middle of the nineteenth century, was a key part of their new 
national identity.  In order to preserve this sense of the Confederacy as part of a larger 
trend of liberal nationalism, however, Confederates were forced to manipulate not only 
the definition of liberal nationalism, as they had proven willing to do since their analysis 
of the revolutions of 1848, but also the contemporary symbols and ideals that represented 
liberal nationalism to both domestic and foreign audiences during the years of the Civil 
War.  In the face of opposition, instead of changing tactics, Confederates manipulated the 
ideals and symbols of nationalism in order to preserve their international comparisons 
and their vision of the Confederacy as the newest member of the international community 
of nations.  
 Confederates throughout the war continued attempting to place supposed northern 
threats and southern values within an international context, shifting from using these 
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comparisons to justify secession to using them to defend the southern nation.
1
  The idea 
that the North was as tyrannical as European despots was so well-known by 1864 that 
even the Confederate Congress could assume that these comparisons were understood, as 
when they informed their citizens that “the past, or foreign countries, need not be sought 
unto to furnish illustrations” of the tyranny that would result should the Union prevail.
2
 
If the tyrannical North was the antithesis of what a nation should be, Confederates 
argued, the Confederacy represented the ideal nation.  Similarities to the admired aspiring 
European nations, particularly similar national values, provided supposed proof of the 
Confederacy’s national legitimacy and strength.  As during secession, these values were 
the ones that antebellum southerners had identified as the values of liberal nationalism 
that were not so liberal as to threaten the institution of slavery.  Liberty – narrowly 
defined to avoid the implications of radical liberty for a slave society – was among these 
values that Confederates claimed that they, like aspiring European nations, represented; if 
the South won independence, the Richmond Daily Dispatch reported, it would be 
“enshrined in the sympathies and respect of all lovers of liberty and national 
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independence by the side of chivalric Hungary and heroic Poland.”
3
  A desire for self-
government, as with liberty, provided another point of comparison between the 
Confederacy and aspiring nationalities in Europe.
4
  Republicanism, long a southern and 
American value, was another supposedly mutual goal shared by the Confederacy and 
aspiring nations such as Ireland and Poland.
5
  By comparing southern national values 
with those represented by aspiring nations in Europe, these Confederates claimed that the 
Confederacy deserved independence, not only because it fought against a European-style 
despot, but also because it exhibited the same values of liberty, self-government, and 
republicanism admired in new and aspiring European nations.   
 Although many Confederates were convinced that their project in nation-building 
followed the model presented by nationalist movements in Europe, the rest of the world 
had different assessments of the place of the Confederacy within the international 
community of nations.  Southern politics was conservative and centered on slavery, 
which inherently contradicted ideals such as democracy and equality.
6
  International 
events throughout the period of the Civil War increasingly made clear that Confederates 
were alone in comparing a nation premised upon slavery with aspiring nations motivated 
by liberal principles.  Foreign nationalists’ assessment that the Confederacy did not 
constitute a legitimate nation forced Confederates to re-evaluate and defend their 
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international comparisons, as they continued to attempt to convince their fellow 
southerners, if not an international audience, of the merits of a southern nation. 
Giuseppe Garibaldi, famous hero of the Italian Risorgimento, was one of the most 
important foreign observers who questioned the Confederacy’s right to nationhood.  Italy, 
united in nationhood in 1860 after a long struggle for unity and independence, had always 
been central to southern nationalists’ international comparisons, as the best and most 
recent example of a nation that had successfully parlayed the principles of nationalism 
into independence.  Garibaldi, the “hero of two worlds” who had risen to prominence in 
nationalist conflicts in South America and gone on to a storied military career in the 
Italian Risorgimento, stood as a powerful representative of Italy and of liberal 
nationalism to observers worldwide.   
Throughout the antebellum period, Garibaldi had received much praise and 
sympathy from southerners for his role in advancing the cause of nationalism and the 
Italian nation.  In addition to leading the charge for Italian unity, southerners believed 
that Garibaldi represented critical political virtues such as “popular rights,” 
republicanism, liberty, independence, the right to nationality, the fight against tyranny, 
and freedom.
7
  In one clear illustration of support for Garibaldi, as well as of the 
perceived connection between Garibaldi’s nationalism and their own nationalism, on the 
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eve of secession southern periodicals published a satirical advertisement seeking a 
president of the United States who would possess, among other qualifications, the “spirit 
and determination of… Garibaldi.”
8
  Southerners were not alone in their high regard of 
Garibaldi; by 1860, Garibaldi was already a well-recognized international symbol of 
nationalism.  Southerners, like the rest of the world, saw Garibaldi as a representative of 
the Italian nation, and of the best qualities of nationalism.
9
 
Despite widespread antebellum southern support for Garibaldi, however, 
southerners’ positive view of Garibaldi, and their self-comparisons with Italy, was 
challenged when Garibaldi repeatedly expressed sympathy not only for the Union, but 
also for values associated with the North, such as abolition.  Garibaldi’s support for the 
Union forced Confederates to re-think their view of the renowned Italian nationalist, as 
well as their claims that the Confederacy followed the example and values of Garibaldi’s 
Italy. 
The crisis for southern nationalists’ support for Garibaldi, and therefore their self-
comparison with Italy and with liberal nationalism, initially came in the summer of 1861, 
when, reacting to an idea proposed by one of Garibaldi’s officers and by the US consul in 
Antwerp, the Union government, via Secretary of State William Seward, invited 
Garibaldi to fight for the Union.  When news of this invitation broke, Confederates were 
shocked and angered by Garibaldi’s response, which, while not an outright yes, was 
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nonetheless a criticism of the South’s claims to legitimate independent nationhood.  
Garibaldi replied that if he was not needed in Italy he would indeed come fight for the 
Union, but only on the condition that he was appointed commander in chief and granted 
power to emancipate the slaves.  The emancipation in particular would prove to Garibaldi 
that, as the US consul who met with Garibaldi phrased Garibaldi’s opinion, the Civil War 
was not merely “a civil war in which the world at large could have little interest or 
sympathy,” but a war against slavery, thereby elevating the war to Garibaldi’s standards 
of a nationalist conflict and making it worth his while to fight.
10
  Although this deal never 
came to pass, Garibaldi’s expressed support for the Confederacy’s sworn enemy angered 
many southerners.  Even more problematic was Garibaldi’s statement that, unless the 
North fought to free the slaves, the war was merely a localized civil war.  This made it 
clear that to the renowned symbol of nationalism, the centrality of slavery to the 
Confederacy meant that the Confederacy’s bid for nationhood had no similarities to the 
nationalist struggles that Garibaldi himself supported and represented.  If southerners 
were to accept Garibaldi’s stance that the Civil War was unlike Europe’s nationalist 
conflicts, then Confederates’ comparisons between their nation and aspiring nations in 
Europe were not valid and therefore of no use in legitimizing the southern nation. 
Instead of accepting Garibaldi’s interpretation of the issues of the Civil War, as 
Confederates confronted the problems that Garibaldi’s support for the Union raised for 
their international comparisons, they developed a variety of strategies for dealing with 
Garibaldi’s implicit rejection of these comparisons.  Critically, these responses would 
have to deal with the issue of slavery and its incompatibility with the ideals of 
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nationalism represented by Garibaldi.  Although Confederates cloaked their movement in 
the language of rights, a global community that had largely rejected slavery understood 
the inherent contradiction between the language of liberal nationalism and the reality of 
slavery.  Southern nationalists had previously attempted to side-step this contradiction by 
manufacturing their own, more limited, definition of liberal nationalism, allowing them to 
embrace national self-determination and republicanism while rejecting the implications 
of full-scale liberty and equality.  Garibaldi’s support for the Union, however, proved that 
while southerners themselves may accept their limited definition of nationalism, the 
international community still embraced a fuller vision of nationalism.  In order to defend 
their argument that the Confederacy deserved independence because it emulated the 
nationalist values represented by the Risorgimento and other nationalist movements in 
Europe, Confederates extended their earlier manipulation of the definition of liberal 
nationalism to now manipulate the image of Garibaldi as a symbol of nationalism. 
As rumors that Garibaldi might fight for the Union first broke in spring of 1861, 
southern analysts initially took an aggressive stance, seeking to forestall the rumor’s 
momentum from the beginning.  They asserted that what they assumed was southern 
dominance and superiority over Garibaldi and the North would render neutral any threat 
that Garibaldi’s support for the Union could pose to the South.  Adopting this tactic, the 
Charleston Mercury essentially warned Garibaldi, and the world, that if Garibaldi would 
be foolish enough to come fight for the Union, the South would easily and resoundingly 
defeat him.  Calling on the memory of southern heroes of the American Revolution, one 
reporter wrote that “[the South has] not lost the guerilla breed; and the sons of Sumter… 
are ready to teach him the swamp fox and game cock lessons such as he could never learn 
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at the hands of Neopolitans and Austrians.”
11
  A month later, John Mitchel, Irish 
nationalist and Confederate sympathizer, writing from Paris as the foreign correspondent 
for the Charleston Mercury, beseeched South Carolinians to exercise restraint in dealing 
with Garibaldi should Garibaldi join the Union, “beg[ging] for [Garibaldi’s] life – for the 
sake of what he has done elsewhere.”  Mitchel envisioned that if Garibaldi did arrive in 
the South, he would end up “locked up in a southern calaboose… or summarily lynched 
by Carolinian citizens,” and he subsequently asked that Carolinians instead merely give 
Garibaldi “four dozen” and “send him back.”
12
  By claiming southern superiority over 
Garibaldi, southern nationalists sought to minimize Garibaldi’s stature, and therefore the 
power of his potential support for the Union.  If Garibaldi did not have the strength to 
defeat the South, these Confederates assured their audience, then his support for the 
Union was of little consequence.   
A less colorful but equally pervasive early response to the Union’s invitation to 
Garibaldi was to argue that Garibaldi did not and would not initiate such an invitation, 
and that the North had instead imposed its own desires on an unwilling Garibaldi.  
Through the spring and summer of 1861, before Garibaldi’s reply was published 
internationally, disbelief filled southern analysis of the Union’s offer to Garibaldi as 
Confederates refused to accept that the great hero of liberty would involve himself in the 
fight against southern independence.  The earliest of such reports stated that Garibaldi 
was so pre-occupied in Italy that he could not come to the aid of the Union.
13
  Other 
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Confederate commentators pointed out that the Union, not Garibaldi, had made the offer, 
allowing for the possibility that Garibaldi would join southerners in scoffing at a 
misguided attempt to pull Garibaldi away from his own values.
14
  Denying Garibaldi’s 
involvement in the invitation aided southerners, at least temporarily, in ignoring the 
ideological issues that would lead Garibaldi to support the Union. 
As spring turned to summer and fall and rumors still circulated about Garibaldi 
and the Union, many southern analysts turned to simply denying that there could possibly 
be any truth to the rumor.  The Daily Columbus Enquirer of Columbus, Georgia 
dismissed the rumor of the exchange between the Union and Garibaldi as “amusing” and 
nothing more, refusing to give weight to the idea that Garibaldi could support the North.
15
  
In keeping with this response, the Richmond Daily Dispatch called the New York 
Tribune’s report of the invitation “a joke on the gullibility of its readers,” and furthered 
the next day that “there is no authenticated statement in regard to Garibaldi's offer of his 
services to the Federal Government. It is probably a canard.”
16
  Laughing at the idea that 
Garibaldi would possibly fight for the Union preserved comparisons with Garibaldi by 
claiming that reports of his potential support for the Union were incorrect, and therefore 
the Confederacy could and did, in fact, still stand for the same values as Garibaldi.  
While dismissive scoffing was common in early reports, other early responses to 
the invitation engaged the issue of the potential connection between Garibaldi’s cause 
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and that of the North more deeply.  Alongside reports that mocked the rumors and 
threatened Garibaldi’s safety, some southern reports argued that the very reason why 
Garibaldi would never fight for the North was that the Union’s values were contrary to 
Garibaldi’s own.  Adopting this strategy, the New Orleans Daily Picayune reassured its 
readers that Garibaldi could never “espouse a cause” such as the northern one “for which 
he can entertain no degree of sympathy.”
 17
  A reporter for the Macon Daily Telegraph of 
Macon, Georgia mocked the idea of Garibaldi fighting for the Union, exclaiming “as if 
[Garibaldi] would come here to overthrow what he was seeking to establish in his own 
land.”
18
  Claiming that Garibaldi’s values would lead him to deny, not support, the Union 
aided Confederates in preserving the supposed connection between their ideals and those 
of Garibaldi, even in the face of Garibaldi’s potential support for their enemy.  If 
Garibaldi’s cause was not that of the Union, it stood to reason, it must be more closely 
related to that of the Confederacy, and therefore southerners’ international comparisons 
would be secure. 
When Garibaldi’s reply to the Union, declaring his support for the northern cause 
and for abolition, was published in southern and international newspapers in the early fall 
of 1861, southerners were forced to abandon their strategies of denial and to deal directly 
with Garibaldi’s allegiance to the North and his belief that emancipation was a critical 
value of liberal nationalism.  Confederates were confronted with the contradiction 
between their claims as to what their nation represented and what the rest of the world 
recognized the Confederacy as representing, and they responded by manipulating the 
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symbol of Garibaldi as they continued to convince themselves that the Confederacy did 
follow the model of Italy. 
Confederates initially responded to Garibaldi’s reply to the Union by discrediting 
Garibaldi and the North in an attempt to render harmless Garibaldi’s opinions.  
Throughout the fall of 1861, southern commentators joined together in using the Union’s 
invitation to Garibaldi to belittle the North for extending such an invitation.  Ignoring 
Garibaldi’s anti-slavery beliefs and focusing instead on the relatively less-threatening 
relationship between Garibaldi and the Union, these Confederates claimed that the 
invitation had more to do with northern desperation and weakness than with any 
compatibility between Garibaldi’s ideology and nationalism and that of the Union.  For 
example, the Richmond Daily Dispatch wrote that this proposal was “mortifying” to 
northern officers, “who cannot fail to see in such stuff an imputation upon their own 
intelligence and efficiency,” adding that “if the world can show a more disgusting want 
of chivalry and courage, we know not where it can be found.”
19
  Mississippian H. C. 
Clarke wrote in his published diary that “the Federal government despairs of finding able 
Generals and officers at home, to engage in its unholy war against the South” and that the 
North “makes overtures to all the broken down Generals and officers of European nations 
to come and assist them,” emphasizing the theme of northern weakness.
20
  Reports in 
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English and French newspapers that similarly ridiculed northerners’ supposed 
dependence on outside aid seemed to support Confederates’ claim that the invitation was 
about lack of northern strength rather than similarity between the Union’s ideals and 
Garibaldi’s own ideals.
21
  The strategy of mocking the North for reaching out to 
Garibaldi neatly avoided the issues of ideology that fueled Garibaldi’s pro-northern 
sentiment, allowing southern nationalists to preserve their sense of connection to the 
Italian ideals that Garibaldi represented.   
Once Garibaldi’s pro-Union leanings were made public, Garibaldi himself also 
came in for criticism as Confederates sought to prove that they did, in fact, represent the 
values for which Garibaldi enjoyed international renown.  Southern commentators 
calculated that if they could prove that Garibaldi did not deserve his status as an 
international symbol of nationalism, his support for the Union, and his belief that 
emancipation fit with liberal nationalism, would be less problematic.  Beginning in the 
fall of 1861 and continuing throughout 1862, the Richmond Daily Dispatch was a 
particularly vocal advocate of this idea, claiming that Garibaldi himself had nothing to do 
with his own victories, and arguing that circumstances outside of Garibaldi’s control, 
rather than his reliance on the positive values of nationalism, were what had led to his 
success in Italy.  To make this argument, southern reporters informed their readers that 
Garibaldi himself had contributed little to the success of the Italian Risorgimento.  The 
Richmond Daily Dispatch claimed that it was Garibaldi’s volunteer soldiers, rather than 
Garibaldi himself, who had led Italian forces to victory.
22
  This same newspaper joined 
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praise for the South with criticism of Garibaldi by claiming that the only reason why 
Garibaldi’s armies had succeeded was that his soldiers had resembled those who would 
later fight for the Confederacy.
23
  The Richmond Daily Dispatch repeated this 
juxtaposition a few months later, now arguing that it was Garibaldi’s cause – which 
resembled that of the South – that led to his victories.
24
  By separating Garibaldi from the 
success that had made him famous, and therefore undermining his appeal as a 
representative of the strengths of nationalism, southern nationalists sought to claim that 
Garibaldi should not be a symbol of nationalism.  As they attempted to protect their 
image of the Confederacy as an aspiring nation similar to Garibaldi’s own Italy, 
Confederates manipulated the image of the main international figurehead of this 
nationalism, displaying their commitment to the international comparisons they used to 
legitimize the southern nation.  
While most responses to the relationship between Garibaldi and the Union 
glossed over the ideological implications of Garibaldi’s response, southern commentators 
did occasionally engage with the political dimensions of the issue.  Taking their 
manipulation of the image of Garibaldi one step further, southern commentators argued 
that in supporting the Union it was Garibaldi, not the Confederacy, who was betraying 
the values of Italy and of liberal nationalism.  Continuing to deny the incompatibility 
between liberal nationalism and slavery, in late fall of 1861, southern reporters began 
calling Garibaldi a hypocrite for supporting the Union’s cause.  To prove that Garibaldi’s 
support for emancipation and the North was hypocritical in light of his embrace of Italian 
nationalism, the Richmond Daily Dispatch argued that if Garibaldi fought for the North, 
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he would be “in opposition to the very principles for which he contended in Italy.”
25
  As 
George N. Sanders, a former US diplomat and political radical who was working abroad 
to further the cause of the Confederacy, wrote in a letter to Hungarian patriot Louis 
Kossuth, for Garibaldi to aid the Union “would be a burning and devouring lie to all of 
his eventful and hitherto glorious career.”
26
  In embracing abolition, Confederates argued, 
Garibaldi turned his back on the very principles for which he fought in Italy.  Through 
this manipulation, Garibaldi, not the Confederacy, was mistaken as to the compatibility 
of slavery and liberal nationalism, and, further, if Garibaldi was a hypocrite, he could no 
longer be considered a symbol of nationalistic virtue, leaving the nation he had rejected – 
the Confederacy – as the new exemplar of these values.   
Responses to the Union’s offer to Garibaldi became less frequent in the winter of 
1861-1862, as other matters preoccupied southerners.  The issue of Garibaldi’s support 
for the Union once again captured Confederates’ attention, however, when the invitation 
to fight for the Union appeared to be renewed in the fall of 1862.  After Garibaldi’s 
campaign to secure Rome for the Italian nation failed due to his defeat and arrest at 
Aspromonte, Thomas Canisius, the US consul in Vienna, took it upon himself to renew 
negotiations with Garibaldi.  This time, Garibaldi was willing, but the Union government 
was no longer interested.  Because Canisius forwarded their correspondence to the press, 
however, Garibaldi’s interest in fighting for the Union was well-known.
27
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Southerners utilized all the strategies they had developed in order to respond to 
the first invitation to deal with this second show of support by Garibaldi for the Union.  
Perhaps due in part to their earlier manipulations of Garibaldi, Confederate reporters had 
already been critical of Garibaldi for what they saw as rash and wild behavior leading to 
his failure at Aspromonte, and they transitioned easily from criticizing Garibaldi’s 
leadership and military strategy to once again mocking and discrediting him.
28
  As 
southerners had after the first invitation, the Richmond Daily Dispatch mocked the 
North’s desperation and denigrated Garibaldi’s success, claiming that “the Federalists 
must be hard run for military leaders when they have to apply to that defeated, wounded, 
captured, played-out European brigand.”
29
  In response to a rumor that Garibaldi’s 
veterans would come fight for the Union that appeared simultaneously in the southern 
newspapers with news of Garibaldi’s desire to lead the northern army, the Daily 
Columbus Enquirer echoed the aggression that had characterized the first responses to 
news of the invitation, claiming that if Garibaldi’s veterans did come to fight for the 
Union, they would be “mere land pirates, and deserving as such to be shot or hung.”
30
  
This same paper implied that Garibaldi had been immaterial to the formation of the 
Italian nation, calling him the “hero of everybody else’s business, except his own.”
31
  
Going even further, the New Orleans Daily True Delta wrote that Garibaldi was “a poor 
                                                 
28
 For examples of criticism of Garibaldi’s actions, see “Garibaldi and Victor Emanuel,” New Orleans 
Daily Picayune, September 2, 1862; Alexandria Gazette, September 9, 1862; New Orleans Daily Delta, 
September 12, 1862; “Garibaldi’s Fail,” New Orleans Daily Delta, September 27, 1862; “Garibaldi,” 
Macon Daily Telegraph, September 30, 1862. 
 
29
 “Garibaldi,” Richmond Daily Dispatch, October 10, 1862. 
 
30
 “Garibaldi and His Mercenaries,” Daily Columbus Enquirer, October 17, 1862.  See also “Letter from 
Mobile,” Houston Tri-Weekly Telegraph, January 12, 1863. 
 
31
 “Garibaldi on the South,” Daily Columbus Enquirer, November 1, 1862. 
 
 135
and disloyal citizen of his own country” and was, in fact, “detrimental to the cause of 
liberty” in Italy; in this view, Garibaldi had not only failed to accomplish the goals of 
Italian nationalism, but also was harmful to the pursuit of those goals, and therefore was 
certainly not a worthy representative of the ideals of Italian nationalism.
32
  The reaction 
to the supposed second invitation utilized the same strategies created in response to the 
first.
33
  Confederates were secure in their negative portrayal of Garibaldi; a simple 
reminder to southerners of the previously-developed reasons why Garibaldi’s support for 
the Union did not disprove Confederate comparisons with Italy was sufficient by late 
1862. 
The final event in the on-going challenge that Garibaldi’s support for the Union 
presented for Confederate comparisons with Italy came with a widely-published August 
1863 letter from Garibaldi to Lincoln.  Responding to the Emancipation Proclamation, 
Garibaldi praised Lincoln as the “true heir of the teaching given us by Christ and John 
Brown,” and enthused that “if an entire race of human beings… has been restored to 
human dignity… this is by your doing.”
34
  Since Confederates frequently equated Lincoln 
with the terrible despots who had fought against Garibaldi and Italian nationalists, this 
exchange highlighted the reality that, despite the comparisons Confederates had created 
between their cause and that of Garibaldi and other foreign nationalists, they were not, in 
fact, fighting the same fight.  As with the rumors of a second invitation for Garibaldi to 
fight for the Union, responses to this letter followed the pattern of initial responses.  The 
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Daily Richmond Enquirer mocked Garibaldi as “the biggest fool in the world.”
35
  
Southern reporters referred to the letter as “blasphemous” and “monstrous.”
36
  Southern 
Punch, a short-lived Confederate humor magazine established by John Wilford Overall in 
Richmond in 1863, followed the strategy of attempting to discredit Garibaldi’s 
contributions to his own success, claiming that Garibaldi had “achieved fame on the basis 
of brute courage alone” rather than due to any particular virtue or adherence to principles 
of nationalism.
37
  Additional strategies and analyses were not necessary, however.  The 
symbol of Garibaldi had already been remade within the Confederacy.  Southern 
manipulation of Garibaldi as a nationalist hero had already discredited him in southern 
minds, and comparisons between the Confederacy and Italy were secure. 
Through several distinct expressions of support for the Union by Garibaldi, 
Confederates continued to manipulate the image of Garibaldi as a nationalist hero, 
claiming that he was anything but that in order to maintain their self-comparison with 
Italy.  This southern manipulation of the symbol of Garibaldi extended beyond criticism 
of Garibaldi himself.  Just as in the antebellum period Garibaldi had served as a yardstick 
by which other nationalists’ qualifications and character could be measured, during the 
war, Confederates continued to use a now-rejected image of Garibaldi as a lens through 
which they could evaluate and judge other nationalists.  Following from their image of 
Garibaldi as a hypocrite, southern nationalists began to use Garibaldi as a symbol of a 
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failed nationalist, and, further, they began to claim that anyone associated with Garibaldi 
was therefore also a failure as a representative of the values of nationalism.   
The debate over the Garibaldi Guard, or 39
th
 New York Volunteers, provides the 
best example of southern usage of Garibaldi to discredit those associated with him.  
Southern writers latched on to any evidence that the Garibaldi Guard was failing, 
attributing this failure to its namesake’s supposedly weak ideals.  For example, a former 
Italian citizen who was naturalized as a citizen of the Confederacy wrote that he fervently 
hoped that no Italian would enlist in the Garibaldi Guard as doing so would mean 
fighting against the very ideals for Italy had fought.
38
  Southern analysts frequently 
referred to the members of the Garibaldi Guard, as well as other immigrants enlisted in 
the Union army, as refugees, adventurers, and other such terms that mitigated these 
soldiers’ commitment to the Union cause, sometimes even outright claiming that these 
foreign soldiers were duped by false northern claims of nationalistic virtue.
39
  
Resignations from the Garibaldi Guard, and, especially, desertions from the Garibaldi 
Guard to the Confederate Army, further proved to Confederates that Garibaldi was not a 
legitimate inspiration of nationalism.
40
  Instead of using Garibaldi to attribute glory to 
others, Confederates now used the Garibaldi Guard’s association with its namesake to 
discredit the unit.  In doing so, Confederates turned Garibaldi’s rejection of the 
Confederacy around to serve their own purpose of identifying themselves, and their cause 
of nationhood, with Italy.   
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By portraying Garibaldi’s support for the Union as in opposition to the values he 
supported in Italy, Confederates sought, contrary to reality, to prove that such a powerful 
symbol of liberty and nationalism could never belong to the Union, helping them to 
sustain their comparison and subsequent claim to the virtues that Garibaldi represented.  
As they attempted to limit the association of Garibaldi with the desired ideals of 
nationalism, southerners once again strove to alter the discourse about, and understanding 
of, nationalism and its symbols in order to reconcile southern slavery with liberal 
nationalism.  As they wrestled with this contradiction, Confederates re-committed 
themselves to their own, limited definition of nationalism and to the idea that this 
nationalism represented a legitimate attempt at nation-building.   
 Garibaldi’s support for the Union presented an early and sustained symbolic 
challenge to Confederates’ self-equation with Italy.  Garibaldi was not the only foreigner 
to point out the contradictions between slavery and liberal nationalism, however, and his 
support for the Union was not the only challenge to Confederate self-comparisons with 
aspiring nations in Europe.  Confederates’ international comparisons also faced very 
pragmatic challenges as well.  In particular, the much-hoped-for official diplomatic 
recognition that Confederate officials had sought from the beginning of the war failed to 
materialize, casting serious doubt on southern analysts’ vision of the Confederacy as an 
equal member of the community of nations.  Southern opinion-makers who shaped 
domestic discourse about the place of the Confederacy in the world were aware of 
Confederate diplomatic efforts and failures, and throughout the war, used their analysis of 
the Confederacy’s supposed claims to diplomatic recognition to bolster their efforts to 
legitimize and defend the southern nation through international contextualization. 
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The international contextualization of the South’s claims to national independence 
led Confederate officials and citizens alike to argue that, as an aspiring nation adhering to 
the popular nineteenth century principles of nationalism, the Confederacy deserved 
diplomatic recognition.
41
  Confederate officials began pursuing diplomatic recognition as 
soon as the Confederacy was established, hoping that aid from abroad would help lead to 
southern victory.
42
  Although international comparisons played only a minor role in 
official diplomatic efforts to win support for the Confederacy, diplomats were aware of 
these comparisons, and Robert M. T. Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State, instructed 
diplomat James M. Mason to inform the British government of the supposed similarities 
between the Confederacy and Italy, which Great Britain had recognized.
43
  The main 
diplomatic strategies of the Confederacy, however, rested predominantly on the idea that 
European demand for southern cotton would win support for the South.
44
  King Cotton, 
and Confederate diplomacy in general, proved less compelling than Confederates had 
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hoped.
45
  Many Europeans did feel sympathy for the Confederacy, and even used private 
channels to raise support for the southern nation.
46
  Due to a combination of European 
nations’ domestic concerns, fears of becoming entangled in war, and distaste for slavery, 
however, official recognition and aid never came.
47
 
 Through 1861 and in to 1862, Confederates who analyzed foreign opinion 
remained convinced that their recognition would be forthcoming, especially due to their 
claims of similarity with Italy, a new nation that had been recognized by major powers 
including Great Britain, France, and the United States in late spring of 1861.
48
  As the 
                                                 
45
 King Cotton failed to win official recognition for the Confederacy for a variety of reasons, including the 
fact that it reflected Confederate rather than European interests.  Hubbard, Burden of Confederate 
Diplomacy, 19, 27.   
 
46
 Some support for the Confederacy did exist within Europe.  For much of the war, most Europeans 
believed that the Confederacy would win.  British formed pro-Confederate organizations and undertook 
actions to express support for the South, although this support was relatively limited and unorganized.  
Especially among conservatives who feared excess democracy, the Confederate cause found adherents 
abroad.  Hubbard, The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy, 20, 36; Dean B. Mahin, The Blessed Place of 
Freedom:  Europeans in Civil War America (Washington, DC:  Brassey’s, 2002), 170; George M. 
Blackburn, French Newspaper Opinion on the American Civil War (Westport, Conn:  Greenwood Press, 
1997), x-xi; Howard Jones, Blue and Gray Diplomacy:  A History of Union and Confederate Foreign 
Relations (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 1; Duncan Andrew Campbell, 
English Public Opinion and the American Civil War (Suffolk and Rochester, NY:  The Royal Historical 
Society; The Boydell Press, 2003), 163-193; R. J. M. Blackett, Divided Hearts:  Britain and the American 
Civil War (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 7, 61-75. 
 
47
 Great Britain came close to recognizing the Confederacy at times from 1861-1862, and did, perhaps 
inadvertently, grant the Confederacy the status of an official belligerent.  Hubbard, The Burden of 
Confederate Diplomacy, 48, 54, 114; Mahin, The Blessed Place of Freedom, 167-8.  Ultimately, however, 
the Confederacy was not recognized for a variety of reasons, including weak diplomatic strategy and poor 
choice of diplomats by the Confederacy, the failure of king cotton, European hatred of slavery, European 
desire to avoid war, a lack of Confederate understanding of the realities of international alliances and 
history, and the fact that Great Britain’s interests largely lay in their own continent.  Hubbard, The Burden 
of Confederate Diplomacy, 17-32, 41, 55, 123; Campbell, English Public Opinion, 11, 18-20; Alfred Grant, 
The American Civil War and the British Press (Jefferson, NC and London:  McFarland & Company, 2000), 
8; Blackett, Divided Hearts, 24-26. 
 
48
 Especially in the summer of 1861, Confederate hopes were bolstered by British and French claims of the 
southern nation’s similarity to Italy, which Britain and France had officially recognized.  Napoleon III 
stated that France would soon recognize the Confederacy, as it had Italy.  See “French Recognition of the 
Confederate States of America,” Richmond Daily Dispatch, July 3, 1861.  At times, some English papers 
also claimed that the Confederacy deserved recognition.  See “English Opinion of American Affairs,” 
Richmond Daily Dispatch, September 7, 1861; “The American Secession,” Macon Daily Telegraph, 
September 16, 1861; “American Affairs in England,” New Orleans Daily True Delta, June 29, 1861; “The 
 141
Charleston Mercury exclaimed, “upon every principle of the laws of nations, [the 
Confederate States] have a right to be recognized as one of the nations of the world,” just 
as with the new nation of Italy.
49
  The Confederacy had done its duty in proving that it 
met the requirements for nationhood, according to southern analysts.
50
  The belief that the 
Confederacy deserved recognition strengthened Confederate conviction that the southern 
nation was equal to nations such as Italy.  Despite this confidence, however, recognition 
never came. 
Although international comparisons were only a small portion of official 
diplomatic efforts to gain recognition, domestic analysis of diplomacy played a critical 
role in southern commentators’ efforts to claim a place for the southern nation within the 
international community of nations.  In order to reconcile the lack of diplomatic 
recognition with their belief that the Confederacy had equal claims to national legitimacy 
as Italy, Confederates began developing explanations as to why European powers would 
not recognize the Confederacy, despite the apparent similarity between the Confederacy 
and recognized nations in Europe.  These explanations reveal less about the actual 
reasons for the lack of recognition than they do about the importance of the international 
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perspective from which Confederates viewed their nation, as well as these Confederates’ 
commitment to their international comparisons.  To southern commentators during the 
Civil War, international comparisons proved that diplomatic recognition should be 
forthcoming; when recognition was never granted, these commentators thus sought to 
explain the failure in terms of these same international comparisons. 
One of the first southern responses to lack of recognition was to claim that 
European powers were always slow to recognize new nations.  This argument began as 
early as the spring of 1861 before Great Britain and France had extended recognition to 
Italy.  Reporters and analysts pointed out that although France and Great Britain had not 
yet recognized the Confederacy, they also had yet to recognize Italy, and therefore the 
Confederacy should not be concerned.  The fact that Italy had yet to be recognized 
seemed to excuse the fact that the Confederacy was also unrecognized.
51
  Lack of 
recognition, these Confederates claimed, was due to European patterns of action, and not 
due to any failings on the part of the Confederacy to meet international requirements for 
nationhood. 
While this initial strategy of claiming that the lack of recognition had nothing to 
do with the Confederacy and its national values allowed Confederates to ignore slavery 
and its incompatibility with liberal nationalism, domestic discussions of the lack of 
recognition did frequently engage the issue of slavery.  Slavery had been a critical part of 
southerners’ international comparisons as early as the 1850s, when southerners compared 
the North’s attempts to limit slavery with European tyranny.  In late 1861 and early 1862, 
while southerners still hoped for recognition, some Confederates began to address the 
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problems that slavery caused for the Confederacy’s case for international recognition.  
Instead of admitting to the burden that slavery imposed on a nation seeking independence 
on the basis of adherence to the principles of liberal nationalism, however, southern 
commentators argued that Europeans were incorrect in seeing slavery as inconsistent with 
the standards of nationalism that Confederates sought to claim, and that slavery should 
therefore not prevent recognition.  Europeans, southerners claimed, were simply ignorant 
of the truth of the South, slavery, and the relationship between the North and South.  John 
Mitchel explained this supposed ignorance by pointing out that the northern press 
dominated the news that Europe got from America, and therefore skewed European 
views of American affairs.
52
  This served as a call to arms for fellow southerners, as when 
the Macon Daily Telegraph suggested that the Confederacy should use the occasion of 
the 1862 London World’s Fair to educate Europe about the reality of the South, or when 
the Charleston Daily Courier encouraged its readers to send more southern journals 
abroad to eliminate the bias toward the North.
53
  In southern minds, shaped by a limited 
vision of the key tenets of nationalism that excluded the full implications of liberty and 
equality, slavery was compatible with the principles of nationalism exhibited by aspiring 
nations abroad.  Still hopeful of foreign aid, southern commentators remained committed 
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to their narrow vision of nationalism, claiming that Europeans would support the South 
when they realized that the issues of slavery and abolition were more complicated than 
Europeans believed and that the Civil War was about nationality as well as slavery, and 
thus slavery did not preclude a legitimate claim to nationhood.
54
  Ignorance, southerners 
argued, not ideology, prevented Europe from recognizing the South. 
While the idea that Europeans were simply misinformed about slavery and the 
Confederacy had its roots in the early days of the Confederacy, the idea became 
popularized around 1863 when Edward Pollard, ardent secessionist and influential 
journalist, advocated this belief in his analyses of the Confederacy and the war.  Pollard 
had been one of the more outspoken advocates of secession, and would go on to play a 
critical role in the formation of the Lost Cause.  During the war, he used his considerable 
platform as editor of the Daily Richmond Examiner, along with his authorship of several 
pamphlets, to spread his views.  Moving beyond early-war declarations that the 
Confederacy would gain recognition alongside Italy and that Europeans simply did not 
know enough about the South to fairly evaluate slavery, Pollard asserted that the 
increased exposure to the South that Europe had gained during the early years of the Civil 
War would actually reverse Europeans’ opinion of slavery.  He claimed that over time, 
the wartime abuses committed by northern abolitionists had caused European sympathy 
for those abolitionists to wane, and that “the war had also given occasion to intelligent 
persons in all parts of the world for a more thorough, a more interested and a more 
practical study of slavery in the South,” one that caused stories of “fiendish masters” to 
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become “objects of skepticism or derision in Europe.”
55
  Because Europe now understood 
that the North actually had no love for the slave, and that southern slavery was not as 
harmful and immoral as they had believed, Europe would soon realize that slavery was 
not incompatible with the principles of nationalism, and Europeans would thus soon 
support the South.
56
   
Pollard was the most outspoken and prominent advocate of this position, but he 
was not alone.  Other Confederates echoed this belief, arguing that as the war educated 
Europeans on the benign nature of slavery, Europeans would support the Confederacy.
57
  
If Europe was simply misinformed, about America, the Civil War, and slavery, then lack 
of recognition was not a fault of the national values of the Confederacy.  If slavery was 
benign, Pollard and others argued, it did not prevent the Confederacy from meeting 
international requirements for nationhood, and southern nationalists’ international 
comparisons were secure.  Of course, this argument depended upon southern 
manipulations of the ideals of liberal nationalism; only in southerners’ minds could 
slavery be compatible with liberal nationalism.  Nonetheless, the argument that erosion of 
European ignorance of slavery would lead to support from European powers allowed 
Confederates to retain their sense that the South, like aspiring European nationalities, 
deserved national independence. 
Although Confederate reports did frequently deal with the issues of slavery and 
recognition, another strategy that emerged by the midpoint of the war, as Confederate 
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recognition no longer seemed tied to that of Italy and as defeat began to seem possible, 
was for Confederates to turn to defeated, and thus unrecognized, aspiring nations in 
Europe as a means of explaining the lack of recognition granted to the southern nation.  
By 1863, in order to protect their self-identity as one of many deserving nations seeking 
independence, southern nationalists rejected Italy as a point of comparison and instead 
began comparing themselves to aspiring nations in Europe that had not received the 
recognition that Confederates believed they deserved.  In this formulation, the 
Confederacy was just one of many hopeful nations to be unjustly excluded from the 
family of nations.  The Daily Richmond Examiner pointed out, for example, that 
European powers had not cared about the sufferings of Hungary, Poland, and Ireland any 
more than they did those of the Confederacy.
58
  Southern Punch argued that if Europe 
was willing to stand by and tolerate the extreme suffering of Poland, it was unlikely that 
Europe would intervene to aid the South.
59
  Rev. Stephen Elliot, the Presiding Bishop of 
the Episcopal Church of the Confederacy, also espoused this idea, arguing that the great 
powers of Europe had always feared and therefore opposed revolution, as in Hungary and 
Poland and even in Italy and Belgium, and they would be no more well-disposed toward 
revolution in America.
60
  If European powers failed to recognize the Confederacy, 
southern nationalists argued, they had equally failed to recognize supposedly legitimate 
and suffering nations in Europe.  The Confederacy was not alone in its lack of 
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recognition, and therefore could still be portrayed as following the precedent of aspiring 
European nations.   
Some Confederates even began to point to the harm that had befallen nations that 
had received recognition as proof that the Confederacy did not actually want recognition 
after all.  Greece, as William Graham Swan, Confederate Congressman from Tennessee, 
informed his fellow congressmen, had been rendered no more independent than a puppet 
after receiving recognition from Great Britain and its allies, and Portugal had become a 
servant as a result of European intervention.
61
  Foreign comparisons not only revealed 
that the lack of recognition was not the fault of the Confederacy; indeed, southerners 
utilizing these comparisons also endeavored to show that the lack of recognition was not 
a problem, period. 
Emerging out of this sense that the lack of diplomatic recognition was due to 
European, rather than Confederate, failings, southern commentators during the middle 
and late periods of the war began accusing other nations of being hypocritical in refusing 
to recognize the Confederacy.  Southern analysts believed that the Confederacy – which 
had now successfully sustained itself and waged war for two years – was stronger than 
other nations that had been recognized, and they questioned why, in light of this national 
strength, recognition of the Confederacy continued to be withheld.  The Southern 
Illustrated News, a Confederate-era weekly out of Richmond, declared (contrary to the 
ample evidence of the many failed aspiring nations in Europe) that “the Confederate 
States are the only new power [Great Britain] has refused to recognise, and yet they have 
manifested a degree of strength greater than all those we have enumerated put together. 
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We have, under these circumstances, we think, some right to be indignant.”
62
  Fueling 
this sense of indignation, even some London newspapers began to question why Great 
Britain would recognize Italy and Greece, among others, but not the Confederacy.
63
  The 
lack of recognition of the Confederacy, southern nationalists argued, was due to the 
hypocrisy of foreign powers.  This argument enhanced Confederate belief in the 
endurance of a southern nation that had survived years at war, even as it allowed southern 
nationalists to avoid the issue of why the Confederacy failed to meet standards of liberal 
nationhood by shifting the blame to other parties.   
The lack of recognition, while primarily an issue for Confederate diplomats in 
Europe, nonetheless resonated with domestic commentators and opinion-makers.  These 
Confederates at home had to either confront the reality that the lack of recognition, while 
largely due to issues unrelated to the Confederacy’s similarities or lack thereof to aspiring 
European nations, nonetheless suggested the failure of their international comparisons, 
or, alternatively, find a way to claim that, even in the face of failure in the international 
court of opinion, the Confederacy was a legitimate aspiring nation.  Through claiming 
that slavery was only a problem due to European ignorance, that lack of recognition was 
a European pattern rather than a response to the Confederacy, and that European powers 
were hypocrites for recognizing other aspiring nations but not the Confederacy, 
Confederates defended their sense of the Confederacy as part of a larger trend of 
nationalist movements that sought independence for aspiring nations. 
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 Although lack of diplomatic recognition and official aid was the greatest failure of 
Confederate diplomatic efforts abroad, the failure to win more widespread and enduring 
support among the general populations in Europe also contributed to Confederate 
difficulties abroad.  While many British and other Europeans did support the 
Confederacy, Confederates were aware that this support and sympathy was not as 
widespread or enthusiastic as the support and sympathy given to various nationalist 
movements in Europe.
64
  Southerners had watched carefully as Europeans and Americans 
alike had exploded in sympathy for nationalist movements from the Greek independence 
movement, to the revolutions of 1848, to the Italian Risorgimento.  Now that southerners 
were undertaking their own experiment in nation-building – one they claimed followed 
the precedent of those earlier and much-celebrated movements – they wondered where 
their support and praise was.  Extending their claims of hypocrisy due to lack of 
recognition, southern nationalists argued that the lack of support given to the 
Confederacy in general was hypocritical when contrasted with the outpouring of 
sympathy shown for other nationalist movements.  Such a formulation once again 
required the manipulation of the ideals of liberal nationalism, as the true ideological 
incompatibility was the South’s; nonetheless, Confederates cried hypocrisy to sustain 
their international defense of the southern nation. 
Early accusations of hypocrisy targeted Europeans who fought for the Union 
army.  To many Confederates, these foreign born soldiers were fighting against the 
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principles for which their nations in Europe stood.  Richmond’s Daily Dispatch withdrew 
any sympathy the South had given to foreign nationalists on the basis that “the Europeans 
whom we have been sympathizing with so universally compose the vast bulk of the army 
which is invading our country,” adding that “the great motive urged upon them for 
enlistment is, that if this ‘rebellion’ is not put down, the cause of freedom Abroad will 
suffer! So that freedom in America must perish in order that freedom in Europe may be 
established.”
65
  John Mitchel praised Irishmen fighting for the South and mocked the idea 
of Irish soldiers in the North taking up arms against the southern rebellion, scoffing “as if 
the very idea of rebels and rebellion were the thought most abhorrent in Irish nature.”
66
  
Similarly, the Augusta (GA) Daily Constitutionalist wondered how Thomas Francis 
Meagher, a leading Irish nationalist who joined the Union army and recruited his fellow 
Irishmen to fight for the North, could aid the subjugation of the South when the South 
was the true hope for the principles Irishmen held dear.
67
  The Confederacy, southern 
commentators argued, fought for the same cause as did Ireland and other aspiring nations 
in Europe, and therefore to support the aspiring European nations while seeking to defeat 
the Confederacy was an act of absolute hypocrisy.  The lack of foreign support for the 
Confederacy, then, was not about the Confederacy’s failures to qualify for national 
independence, but instead, was due to the hypocrisy of the Confederacy’s international 
observers. 
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By 1862 and 1863, driven by the growing enmity toward the North that wartime 
sufferings engendered, accusations of hypocrisy shifted from foreign born soldiers 
fighting for the Union to criticism of the northern nation itself.  Southern analysts began 
expressing disbelief that the North refused to acknowledge the connection between the 
ideals of the nationalist movements that northerners had supported in Europe and the 
ideals of the Confederacy.  The Richmond Daily Dispatch was one of the main supporters 
of this argument, crying that “whether it was Irish rebels against England, Greeks against 
Turkey, Frenchmen and Germans against their kings, or Italy against the Austrians, the 
North boiled over with enthusiasm in their cause,” only “attach[ing] any opprobrium to 
the name of rebel; a name which has always heretofore been with them a synonym for all 
that is praise worthy and glorious” when the South itself “threw off the chains of 
vassalage and determined to be free.”
68
   
The sense that northerners were acting as hypocrites for denying self-
determination in the South while supporting it in Europe was common among southern 
intellectuals and power-brokers.  Robert Barnwell Rhett, fire-eating secessionist and 
Confederate congressman, concurred with this conclusion, informing a convention of the 
state of South Carolina that the North demonstrated a disregard for freedom of which 
“history had no record,” as the North declared “with a hypocrisy only possible with an 
unparalleled depravity” that they “are contending for the liberties of the earth” while truly 
setting back the cause of “free government” for “centuries.”
69
 Similarly, in a clear 
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condemnation of the North, pamphleteer T. W. MacMahon wrote that northerners, 
“accustomed to weep over the fate of Greece, Poland, and Hungary – accustomed to 
espouse the cause of Lombardy and Venetia against Austria, the cause of the Papal States 
against the Pope – they have voted thousands, reckoned by hundreds, of men, and 
millions of money, to support a despotism, compared with which, those of King Bomba 
and Francis Joseph were balm.”
70
  John L. O’Sullivan, the journalist who originated the 
term “Manifest Destiny,” also embraced this idea.  Despite long being entrenched in 
antebellum northern politics, O’Sullivan supported the Confederacy after the outbreak of 
war.  He utilized his war-time residency in Lisbon and London and his background as a 
journalist to publish pro-Confederate pamphlets in London in an effort to spread southern 
propaganda throughout Europe.  O’Sullivan, already disillusioned with the North for 
waging war instead of letting the South secede peacefully, embraced the idea of northern 
hypocrisy, accusing the North of replicating Russia’s oppression of Poland by 
perpetuating war against the southern states, as well as of betraying the American 
Revolution.
71
  As the reality of war pervaded the South, elite southerners explained 
southern suffering to their fellow countrymen by claiming that the hypocritical North 
actively fought to limit in the South the same principles that it had praised abroad. 
Despite the fact that the North fought a war against southern nationalism, 
Confederates still managed to be offended that northerners did not celebrate the South’s 
claim to nationhood in the ways that they had those of other aspiring nations, proving the 
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importance of this comparison to southerners’ perception of the South as an independent 
nation.  The South, like Poland, Italy, and other aspiring nations of Europe, Confederates 
argued, fought for liberty and against tyranny.  Any nation that supported these causes in 
Europe, then, must support them in America, too, or else be a hypocrite.  Certainly these 
arguments ignored the real hypocrisy of claiming to support slavery and the ideals of 
liberalism at the same time.  Confederates had proved willing, however, to manipulate 
ideals and symbols in order to preserve their own sense of their nation as part of a century 
of nationalism.  By pointing out what they perceived to be an inconsistency in the 
Union’s reaction to new nations, Confederates sought to maintain their own position as a 
legitimate new nation, similar to those in Europe. 
 Confederates did not easily accept that the Confederacy was not, in fact, similar to 
the new and aspiring nations in Europe that they used to claim legitimacy.  They denied 
that the Confederacy’s failure to live up to international standards for nationhood had 
anything to do with the lack of diplomatic recognition they received; they called foreign 
nations hypocrites for showing sympathy and support for new and aspiring nations in 
Europe but not for the Confederacy; and they attempted to remake the image of 
Garibaldi, the international symbol of nationalism, to protect their international 
comparisons even in the face of Garibaldi’s support for the Union cause.  These 
responses to the international failure of southern nationalists’ comparisons reveal just 
how committed southern nationalists were to proving that the Confederacy was one of 
many new nations aspiring to membership in the international community of nations in 
the middle of the nineteenth century.  These responses also reveal the extent to which 
Confederates were willing and able to ignore the ideological problems that plagued these 
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comparisons, rejecting the reality that slavery opposed the same liberal ideals that 
southern nationalists tried to claim through international comparisons. 
Southern commitment to these international comparisons proved so strong that, as 
military defeat loomed, Confederates turned once again to these international 
comparisons, now utilizing comparisons to help them understand and process the 
possibility of defeat.  Looking now at defeated nationalities, and acknowledging that so 
many of the aspiring nations that they admired had not succeeded in establishing 
independent nationhood, southern nationalists drew comparisons between the plight of 
these unfortunate nations and the situation that they believed that southerners would face 
if the North were victorious.  They used these comparisons to spur their fellow 
southerners to continue fighting, as well as to understand the meaning of defeat. 
 Many of these comparisons of the doom of defeat centered on the idea that the 
South needed to strengthen its efforts in order to avoid the fate suffered by failed 
nationalist movements in Europe.  As the Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel warned 
as early as 1863, nations are responsible for their own fate, and the Confederacy, “the 
newest born of nations, having before it so marked a warning,” should “heed the 
warnings of history” lest it suffer the same fate as Poland, “blotted from the map.”
72
  This 
type of rhetoric increased in 1864 and 1865, as military success seemed less likely.  No 
less an authority than the Congress of the Confederacy warned its citizens that “the fate 
of Ireland at the period of its conquest, and of Poland, distinctly foreshadows what would 
await us” if the Confederacy fell to the Union.
73
  Similarly, the Richmond Whig 
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expounded at length upon the similarities between Ireland’s subjugation to England and 
the subjugation that the South could expect upon re-entering the Union, highlighting the 
lack of representation and political power it anticipated.
74
  Confederate Senator Benjamin 
Hill asserted that if the South gave in to Lincoln, it would become the Hungary, Poland, 
and Ireland of America, and make those oppressed nations feel like a “paradise.”
75
  
International comparisons provided southern nationalists with a way to understand what 
was at stake as defeat loomed, as well as with a way to continue encouraging their fellow 
southerners to help stave off that defeat.  Even when the end of the Confederacy seemed 
nigh, southern nationalists continued to turn to international comparisons as a way of 
explaining the Confederacy and the necessity of its independence.    
Although Confederate responses to the failure of their international comparisons 
most often denied the contradiction between slavery and liberal nationalism, very rarely, 
a few Confederates did show glimmers of understanding that the Confederacy did not 
fully follow the precedent of aspiring nations abroad.  John Mitchel, who typically 
vehemently defended the southern nation and its similarity to aspiring European nations, 
did at one point admit that the oppression the South faced simply was not enough to 
justify intervention on the part of European powers.
76
  Mitchel’s newspaper, the 
Charleston Mercury, likewise admitted that Europeans recognized that the South had not 
suffered the way aspiring nations like Poland had.
77
  Even some of the most vocal 
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proponents of the idea of the South as following the precedent of aspiring nations in 
Europe did occasionally temper their arguments with the recognition that, despite claims 
to the contrary, the Confederacy failed to meet the ideological standard of the liberal 
nationalist movements to which southern nationalists compared their own. 
As the end of the war drew near, the Richmond Whig, in an article republished 
widely in other southern journals, had the clearest statement of understanding of the 
problems that threatened Confederates’ self-comparisons with aspiring nations in Europe.  
The editor of the Whig admitted that if the international audience believed southern 
claims that the Confederacy was motivated by the spirit of the Greeks and the Dutch, 
southern victory would be assured – and yet, victory seemed to be slipping away.  The 
Whig explained that although southerners flattered themselves that they held the qualities 
that had won these other nationalities respect and recognition, in truth southerners had yet 
to reach that standard.
78
  For at least this one Confederate, impending defeat brought with 
it recognition that the comparisons with which Confederates had sought to legitimize 
their nation throughout secession and the war were, in fact, rhetorical inventions.  The 
Confederacy was not like new and aspiring nations in Europe, and did not have similar 
legitimacy on the basis of shared liberal nationalist principles. 
 Despite Confederates’ assertions that their nation deserved legitimacy, and that 
foreign recognition and independence would quickly be forthcoming, the Confederacy 
failed to secure national independence.  The international comparisons that resonated so 
widely throughout the Confederacy were built upon false premises, as, despite 
Confederate insistence to the contrary, a slave-holding nation could never live up to the 
standards of nationalism that prevailed in the climate of mid-nineteenth century liberal 
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nationalism.  The international community rejected the Confederacy from the family of 
nations, most pointedly by refusing diplomatic recognition.  Giuseppe Garibaldi, 
international symbol of nationalism, revealed some of the reasons behind this lack of 
support and recognition when he repeatedly expressed his sympathy for the Union.  If the 
Confederates’ comparisons had resonated internationally, these dual rejections would not 
have occurred. 
 Even as international events highlighted the differences between the Confederacy 
and aspiring nations in Europe, many Confederates remained committed to their vision of 
their nation as one of many aspiring nations legitimately seeking independence.  Instead 
of switching strategies, southern analysts spent their energies developing ways to defend 
their comparisons, even in the face of an international climate that discredited the 
supposed similarity between the Confederacy and aspiring European nations.  They 
manipulated the ideas of nationalism, and the reality of international politics, to support 
their own beliefs.  These Confederates claimed that the lack of diplomatic recognition 
was due to European policy rather than Confederate failings; they called foreigners and 
foreign powers hypocrites for supporting other nationalist revolutions but not the 
Confederacy; and they sought to re-make the symbol of Garibaldi, detaching him from 
the principles of nationalism with which he was so closely associated in order to mitigate 
the harm that his support for the Union did to Confederate comparisons with Italy.  When 
defeat seemed assured, they then turned to these comparisons once again to help them 
make sense out of their failure.  Throughout the war, evidence continually mounted that 
disproved Confederates’ comparisons with aspiring nations abroad.  Despite this 
evidence, however, many Confederates remained committed to their vision of the 
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Confederacy as one of many nations aspiring to membership in the family of nations in 
the middle of the nineteenth century.
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Chapter Five 
Crafting Conservative Comparisons, 1861-1865 
 
International influences proved critical to southern nationalists’ efforts to define 
and defend the southern nation, and this held true across the political spectrum.  While 
the most common southern usage of international comparisons was to claim that the 
southern nation followed in the ideological footsteps of liberal nationalist movements in 
Europe, to the most conservative of southerners, the southern nation held a very different 
place within the family of nations.  More conservative southern analysts developed an 
alternative interpretation of the meaning of European nationalisms for the southern 
nation, one that claimed that the southern nation was an exception among new nations, 
and that the conservative Confederacy represented an improvement upon the model of 
nation-building presented in Europe. 
To the more conservative southerners who debated and analyzed issues of 
nationhood, southern nationalism was premised not upon a liberal nationalism resembling 
that of new and aspiring nations abroad, but instead was built upon slavery and 
conservative principles of hierarchy, social order, and limited democracy.  In this 
formulation, the conservative Confederacy, not liberal nations in Europe, was the model 
to which other nations should aspire.  Further, these conservative southerners argued that 
the North, not the South, was shaped by the liberal ideologies of European nationalisms, 
and that the growing influence of these liberal ideas in the North was what had 
necessitated a separate southern nation.  Conservative southerners thus used international 
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contextualization to celebrate and extol the unique virtues of a conservative southern 
nation. 
Conservatism was a major force in southern politics throughout the antebellum 
and Civil War eras.  Like other Americans, southerners were influenced by the 
Enlightenment philosophies that had shaped the United States, and thus southerners, like 
their fellow countrymen, held republicanism as the ultimate form of government.  
Southern respect for the liberal institutions of the United States was always tempered, 
however, by conservative desires for such principles as a hierarchical social order and 
limited democracy.
1
  The necessity of defending slavery further fueled southern fears of 
the implications of such ideals as freedom and equality.
2
  Even during the early national 
period, conservative southerners sought to promote states’ rights and to limit the power of 
the national government, and they advocated for a vision of republicanism and of liberty 
based on this preference for local community over central government.  As the southern 
defense of slavery intensified in the antebellum period, conservative southerners folded 
slavery into their vision of the good society, emphasizing the importance of the protection 
of property to liberty and to republicanism, and even arguing that slavery allowed for a 
stronger, more advanced form of republicanism.
3
  Historians have identified the critical 
influence that southern conservatism and the defense of slavery had on the creation of the 
southern nation, even highlighting the ways in which southern nationalists believed their 
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slave-based nation would provide a new and improved model of nationhood.
4
  Such 
conservative discourse, as with larger southern debates over the meaning of nationhood, 
was not limited to domestic issues, however; even the most conservative of southerners 
understood nationhood and nation-building through an international context, using their 
conservative values to analyze the place of the new southern nation within the larger 
international community. 
The southern nationalists who analyzed the international context of the 
Confederacy through a conservative lens both resembled and differed from those 
southern nationalists using liberal comparisons.  Many influential southern periodicals, 
such as the Charleston Mercury and the Daily Richmond Examiner, printed both liberal 
and conservative analyses of the southern nation’s place within an international 
community of nations.  Other publications leaned strongly in one direction.  The 
Richmond Daily Dispatch was one of the leading proponents of the argument that the 
southern nation resembled aspiring nations abroad, while magazines, including the 
Southern Literary Messenger and, particularly, DeBow’s Review, almost exclusively 
argued that the South’s conservatism set it apart from other nations.  Southern analysts 
actively debated the meaning of southern nationhood within an international context, 
sometimes strategically deploying whichever comparisons seemed most useful, but also, 
at times, revealing deeply-held beliefs about the appropriate form of southern nationhood.   
The main reason why certain southerners embraced conservative analysis over 
liberal was that they interpreted foreign revolutions through a more conservative and 
critical lens, and thus they rejected more liberal comparisons that used foreign nations as 
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a positive point of comparison for the southern nation.  The southerners who crafted 
conservative analyses of the international context of the southern nation were responding 
to different themes in antebellum southern thought than were the southerners who 
endorsed more liberal comparisons.  While most antebellum southerners had watched the 
revolutions of 1848 with some wariness, liberal comparisons between the southern nation 
and new nations abroad nonetheless characterized nationalist movements in Europe 
primarily as seeking positive values such as republicanism, whereas conservative 
comparisons relied more on the southern heritage of suspicion of revolutions abroad.
5
  
Guided by their concerns about the chaos and violence created by revolutions in Europe, 
conservative southerners defined their new nation by its difference from, rather than 
similarity to, aspiring nations abroad, and claimed that the North, not the South, inherited 
the unchecked and harmful liberalism demonstrated by European nationalist movements.
6
  
These southern opinion-makers celebrated conservatism and slavery as the basis of 
southern national identity, arguing that limitations of freedom and democracy would 
strengthen the southern nation and would even purify nationalism of the excesses of 
liberalism found in nationalist movements in Europe.  In part because these conservatives 
believed that foreign nationalist movements deviated from what they saw as acceptable 
forms of nation-building, conservative southerners had never fully embraced nationalist 
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movements in Europe.  This suspicion of and antipathy toward aspiring nations abroad 
would form the basis for conservatives’ international comparisons that claimed that the 
Confederacy had little to nothing in common with the revolutions in Europe, and that the 
differences between the southern nation and aspiring European nations placed the 
southern nation in the position of superiority.  
In 1860 and 1861, as southerners seceded from the United States and undertook 
the process of creating a southern nation, conservative southerners, like their more liberal 
compatriots, turned to international comparisons to explain and make sense out of the 
differences between the North and the South and to justify the creation of an independent 
southern nation.  As they did so, southern nationalists who used conservative 
comparisons to justify secession agreed with their more liberal counterparts that the 
Confederacy upheld the true tradition of the American Revolution, and that northern 
liberalism had corrupted the principles of the American nation.  While admitting that the 
nation was founded with the intent of protecting rights and liberties, for example, an 
author in DeBow’s Review argued that the power of the government, as directed by 
northerners, had grown so strong as to abuse the rights it had been founded to protect.
7
  
Such arguments often grew out of conservative southern desire to preserve slavery; 
another writer for DeBow’s Review argued that northern devotion to equality of the races 
had betrayed the founders’ wisdom at rejecting such racial equality.
8
  To most southern 
opinion-makers, northern liberalism had corrupted the original American national 
principles. 
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While agreeing that the North had betrayed the original principles of the 
American republic, many southern nationalists also believed that southern conservatism 
had strengthened the early nation, and that secession and a southern nation would redeem 
and protect these beneficial and necessary conservative principles from northern 
liberalism.
9
  Southern conservatism, conservatives argued, had kept northern liberalism in 
check until the recent growth of northern power.  Without the stabilizing influence of 
conservatism, “the debased Yankee… dances with joy over the grave of his liberties” as 
the Daily Richmond Examiner explained.
10
  Secession was thus necessary to rescue the 
original principles of the United States from the northern violations thereof.
11
  This idea, 
useful in justifying the creation of an independent nation as it happened, remained 
popular throughout the war; as South Carolina conservative and Confederate 
Congressman Robert Barnwell Rhett said in an 1862 speech, “the great cause of free 
government [northerners] have thrown back, perhaps, for centuries, and have left its 
preservation, on this continent at least, alone to the Confederate States.”
12
  Because 
southern conservatism purified what northern liberalism had corrupted, southerners 
argued, they were justified in creating an independent southern nation. 
As conservatives made their case that northern liberalism betrayed the intent of 
the American Revolution, and that a conservative southern nation would save the true 
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American national principles, they turned to international context to bolster their claims.  
Failed, and excessively liberal, attempts at nation-building in Europe provided an 
example of the harm that conservative southern nationalists believed would occur if 
northern liberalism were not checked by southern conservatism.  Not only did the loss of 
conservatism lead to the destruction of the North and of the American nation, for 
example, but it also “reduced the Abolition states to the condition” of post-Revolutionary 
France, according to the Daily Richmond Examiner.
13
  Southern opinion-makers also 
turned to criticism of the revolutions of 1848 that had blamed the defeat of aspiring 
nations on excess liberalism in order to claim that unchecked northern liberalism would 
create similar harm in America.  Antebellum southern analysts had argued that red 
republicanism, mob violence, and various forces of liberalism had corrupted and 
destroyed nationalist movements in Europe, and conservative southerners during the 
Civil War agreed.
14
  To southern conservatives, liberalism was a dangerous force, both in 
the United States and in Europe.  Without conservatism to check this liberalism, these 
southern nationalists argued, the nation would decline to the chaos they had feared while 
watching revolutions in Europe; only a new, and more conservative, southern nation 
could prevent the spread of this chaos. 
 Conservatives expanded their comparisons of the excess liberalism of the North 
and the excess liberalism of nationalist movements in Europe in order to claim that the 
reason why the North threatened the South and betrayed the nation’s heritage was that 
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northerners had been corrupted by the same liberalism that had doomed revolutions 
abroad.  Rejecting liberal comparisons that explored northern abuses against the South by 
comparing the South to oppressed nations in Europe, conservative southerners instead 
blamed European nationalists for the harms that the North would perpetuate against the 
South.  In particular, conservative southerners blamed red republicans and other radical 
elements of European nationalist movements for spreading the ideas of abolitionism and 
what they called black republicanism.
15
  Southerners had been wary of red republicans 
during the revolutions of 1848, blaming these radicals for corrupting the revolutions.
16
  
As they evaluated what had corrupted the United States and thus necessitated southern 
secession, they turned once again to red republicanism, now equating that European 
political party with the new Republican Party in the North, as well as with any form of 
northern political ideology that conservatives saw as threatening.  This comparison was 
particularly popular through 1860 and early 1861, as southerners were beginning to 
conceive of the South as distinct from the North and were creating justifications for 
separating the South from the North.
17
  As John Tyler, Jr., Confederate secretary of war, 
wrote under the penname “Python,” the harms were the same “whether the Protean shape 
assumed be that of the ‘Roundhead,’ the ‘Sans-culotte,’ ‘Red Republican,’ or ‘Black 
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Republican.’”
18
  Because black republicanism, following in the footsteps of red 
republicanism, would usurp political power and endanger political rights, southern 
nationalists argued, the South was justified in creating a separate nation. 
While particularly useful in explaining why the South must break away from the 
northern-dominated United States, the equation of black republicanism with red 
republicanism and European liberalism continued throughout the war, as southerners 
used this comparison to explain the harms that northern and European liberalism caused, 
and that the Confederacy would avoid through conservatism.  South Carolina politician 
and diplomat William Henry Trescot expanded on the problems created by black 
republicans in emulation of red republicans, asserting that “the Black Republican Party of 
the United States is the same as the Red Republican Party of Europe. Butler combines the 
principles of Mazzini with the practices of Haynau. You are fighting against chartered 
privileges for the absolute tyranny of the mob.”
19
  Similarly, a journalist for the Daily 
Richmond Examiner declared that black republicans, like red republicans, had supposedly 
committed endless crimes in the name of liberty.
20
  The similarity of black republicanism 
and red republicanism constituted a serious threat in the minds of southern conservatives 
throughout the war, as well as created a powerful raison-d-être for the southern nation. 
Southern conservatives, like most southerners, understood issues of nation 
through an international context, and analyzed the harms that the North threatened 
against the South through international comparisons.  Instead of claiming a similar fight 
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against tyranny with aspiring nations in Europe, however, the southern nationalists who 
created conservative comparisons retained a fuller reliance on the critiques of the 
revolutions in Europe as corrupted by liberalism, and thus used nationalist movements 
abroad as a point of comparison with the North, rather than with the South.  In this 
analysis, the liberal nationalism exhibited abroad was not a way to escape northern 
tyranny, but instead was responsible for creating northern tyranny, through poisoning the 
political thought of the North.  For southern nationalists who viewed nationalist 
movements abroad as primarily characterized by dangerous ideals, conservatism was 
necessary to provide a bulwark against the dangerous liberal ideas that had spread from 
Europe to the North.  The ideological similarity between the North and nationalist 
movements in Europe, then, justified a separate, and more conservative, southern nation. 
 If conservative southerners believed that the liberal nationalist movements in 
Europe provided the inspiration for harmful northern doctrines, then logically, the South 
had more in common with the European regimes against which the nationalist 
movements had fought.  As they explored options for a new southern nation in the early 
days of the Confederacy, a few southern conservatives aligned themselves with the 
governments that had opposed the new and aspiring nations that frightened conservative 
southerners.  Looking to examples of monarchy and aristocracy in Europe, these most 
extreme of conservatives posited that the South should forgo democracy and 
republicanism altogether and adopt an aristocratic or even monarchical government. 
 Conservative southerners gave many reasons for supporting the creation of a 
monarchy or, particularly, of an aristocracy in the southern nation.  Southern 
conservatives had long been concerned with the implications of full democracy, and, 
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looking abroad, they believed that strict hierarchical forms of government would protect 
conservative political values by eliminating the political voice of the undesirable 
masses.
21
  The Southern Field and Fireside, for example, argued that the aristocratic 
nature of democracy in the South would protect against tyranny.
22
  An author for 
DeBow’s Review likewise asserted that “aristocracy is the only safeguard of liberty.”
23
  
More direly, another author in DeBow’s Review warned that a government conceived in 
too much democracy, without the stabilizing effect of aristocracy, would end in “anarchy, 
despotism, and ruin.”
24
  Given the potential consequences of too much democracy, some 
southern conservatives preferred to create a more limited form of government for their 
new nation. 
 The creation of a formal aristocracy seemed natural to many conservatives, who 
believed that the South already benefitted from many of the advantages of a hierarchical 
social structure.  The hierarchical nature of a slave society created what many southern 
conservatives saw as a natural aristocracy.  For example, a Scotchman living in Mobile 
characterized the South as a “republican aristocracy” as he made a case for a potential 
southern monarchy.
25
  DeBow’s Review claimed that a “permanent aristocracy, founded 
upon the natural diversity of races” gave the South a “vital strength and energy.”
26
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DeBow’s Review even went so far as to claim that southerners were “the most aristocratic 
people in the world,” because “pride of caste, color, and privilege, makes every white 
man an aristocrat in feeling.”
27
  The hierarchical racial structure of the South lent it the 
form of aristocracy, according to conservatives, which they believed only benefitted the 
South. 
 The benefits of aristocracy that the South enjoyed seemed eclipsed by the benefits 
enjoyed by formal aristocracies and monarchies abroad, as international context provided 
support for conservative southerners’ desire for aristocracy.  Observations of aristocracies 
and monarchies in Europe helped to convince some conservatives that the informal 
southern aristocracy should be made official.  DeBow’s Review looked to France’s many 
revolutions, and to the turmoil that still plagued the French nation, to argue that France’s 
attempts to eliminate aristocracy had ended in failure and chaos not once, but twice, 
proving the superiority of a formal aristocracy.
28
  The Little Rock Arkansas State Gazette 
went even further, claiming that France’s repeated failures to establish a republic were 
proof that republics were weak and that monarchy was the best form of government.  So 
convinced was this author of the benefits of monarchy that he expressed surprise that 
fellow southerners would not apply this principle in their own nation.
29
  Italy, which had 
gained national independence and unity under a monarch, likewise revealed the benefits 
of monarchy according to the Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, which claimed that 
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a monarchical government would benefit the South.
30
  Analysis of aspiring nations 
abroad proved to some conservative southerners that democracy was neither necessary 
nor desirable for the southern nation, and that more hierarchical forms of power would 
provide better governance for the Confederacy. 
 As they debated the relative merits of aristocracy and monarchy, not all 
conservatives were convinced that these systems of government should be implemented 
immediately.  Many southerners praised the benefits of aristocracy and monarchy both in 
theory and as enacted abroad, but argued that these more limited forms of government 
should be a last resort for the South.  For example, in writing to the editor of the Augusta 
Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, one southerner praised Great Britain’s monarchy for 
protecting property rights, suggesting that the South should create a similar government, 
but only if democracy failed to protect those rights.
31
  For the Scotchman in Mobile, 
although the South benefitted from its form as a republican aristocracy, monarchy was an 
option to be considered only as a last safeguard against emancipation.
32
  Likewise, the 
Macon Daily Telegraph endorsed monarchy only in response to British rumors that the 
South would create such a government, claiming that monarchy would be preferable to 
“Lincolndom,” but nonetheless admitting that rumors of the establishment of a southern 
monarchy were false.
33
  Even among those conservatives who supported aristocracy and 
monarchy, that support was often limited and qualified. 
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 Intensifying the debate over forms of government, other southern nationalists 
outright opposed the idea of monarchy or aristocracy.  The Augusta Daily 
Constitutionalist rebutted its fellow Augusta newspaper, the Augusta Daily Chronicle 
and Sentinel’s, endorsement of monarchy, arguing that northern abuses of the system, 
rather than the American system of government itself, required reform.
34
  Even while 
praising aristocracy, DeBow’s Review assured readers that “there is no danger that we 
shall run into monarchy.”
35
 And, of course, for the majority of southerners, republicanism 
was still the form of government to which they aspired. 
 As they debated the formation of a new southern nation, the most conservative of 
southerners found inspiration, albeit largely theoretical, in the more conservative forms of 
government they saw abroad.  The benefits of limited participation in government would 
supposedly preserve liberty and protect against tyranny, building off of what they saw as 
a southern heritage of racial aristocracy.  Ultimately, however, even these conservatives 
were not fully convinced that monarchy or aristocracy was the best form of government 
for the South. 
 International context helped southerners to explore different forms for the 
southern nation as they undertook the process of creating a new nation.  A southern 
nation, conservatives argued, should avoid the unrestrained liberalism that had spread 
from Europe to the North and caused the North to betray the original principles of the 
American nation.  While ultimately retaining the republican ideal, conservatives also 
suggested that monarchies and aristocracies in Europe provided potential models for a 
more conservative southern nation.  Through 1861, then, international context helped 
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conservative southerners to justify an independent southern nation, as well as to develop 
the political form of that new nation. 
 Analysis of the place of the new southern nation within the larger community of 
nations also helped conservatives to shape the national identity and mission they believed 
the Confederacy should pursue.  In particular, contrasting the Confederacy with new and 
defeated nations in Europe revealed to conservatives what, exactly, defined the 
Confederacy and set it apart as a conservative nation.  International context was thus 
critical in shaping conservatives’ sense of their own nationhood and desired national 
identity. 
 Slavery, of course, was the main institution that defined the Confederacy and 
distinguished the southern nation from other new and aspiring nations.  White supremacy 
was, as Confederate vice president Alexander Stephens famously put it, the “cornerstone” 
of the Confederacy.  The defense of slavery had been the major motivation for secession, 
and Confederates were clear that the preservation of slavery was one of their national 
missions.  Confederates were aware that slavery set them apart in a world increasingly 
turning toward emancipation, but they nonetheless centered slavery at the heart of their 
nation.
36
 
 Beyond slavery, conservative southerners, guided by their rejection of the excess 
liberalism of nationalist movements abroad and by their sense that conservatism was a 
necessary corrective against this liberalism, identified many conservative values that 
defined the Confederacy and distinguished the southern nation from other recent attempts 
at nation-building.  Conservative principles created a very different national identity for 
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the southern nation than that forged by the values of liberty and equality that underpinned 
nationalist movements in Europe.  By focusing on the values that they believed were 
consistent with slavery, conservative southern nationalists developed a conservative 
national identity and, ultimately, a sense that the conservative Confederacy represented a 
superior form of nationhood. 
 One of the main ideals on which conservative southerners sought to build their 
new nation was the limitation of liberty.  In contrast to their more liberal counterparts, 
who argued that the Confederacy, like aspiring nations abroad, sought to preserve liberty, 
conservatives used international comparisons to support their belief that the limitation of 
liberty was necessary for a strong southern nation.  These conservatives feared that an 
excess of liberty would lead to anarchy by putting the power of the government in the 
hands of people ill-suited for such power; in particular, slave-holding southerners feared 
the implications of liberty for a slave society.
37
  Using an international context to bolster 
their case for limited liberty, conservatives looked abroad to examples of failed 
nationalist movements to argue that excess liberty doomed attempts at nation-building.  
An author for DeBow’s Review lamented that the overthrow of law and order in the failed 
revolutions of 1848 had “paralyzed the constitutional party in the unfortunate struggle for 
rational liberty,” leading to harmful consequences.
38
  George Fitzhugh, an outspoken and 
widely-published advocate of slavery, declared that outside the South, “liberty was 
disintegrating into licentiousness, and ‘anarchy…’ stared us in the face” as he contrasted 
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the conservative southern nation with the revolutions of Europe.
39
  A. Jeffrey, a 
contributor to the Southern Literary Messenger, similarly bemoaned the “licentious 
liberty” that he attributed to European immigrants, who brought these ideas with them to 
the North.
40
  Conservative southerners believed that liberty was best in small doses, 
restricted to a “rational” level, and they used the chaos, violence, and failure of 
revolutions in Europe to support their case for limited liberty and to define the southern 
nation as a nation premised upon limited liberty. 
 Conservatives argued that the best way for the southern nation to limit liberty was 
through limited democracy and suffrage.
41
  As an author for DeBow’s Review explained, 
“we of the South must so modify our State institutions as to remove the people farther 
from the direct exercise of power” in order to ensure stability of government.
42
  J. 
Randolph Tucker, attorney general in Virginia and long-time defender of slavery, worried 
about the potential for buying votes in a democracy that was too free, likewise preferring 
a limited democracy.
43
  For southern conservatives, limitations on democracy were a 
necessary aspect of the southern nation. 
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Again disagreeing with the more liberal southern nationalists who claimed that 
the South sought the same value of self-government that motivated revolutions abroad, 
conservatives asserted that the example of the European nationalist movements proved 
that limited democracy should be a key characteristic of the Confederacy.  According to 
Georgia governor Joseph E. Brown, a careful study of the history of other nations 
revealed that self-government was doomed to failure if “all of every class white and 
black” were allowed to “indiscriminately… exercise political rights.”  He furthered that 
“the experiments made in France and in other enlightened countries, where domestic 
slavery is not tolerated, have shown that sufficient virtue and intelligence never exist to 
enable the people to perform the task, when the whole mass of people of every class are 
permitted to participate actively in the affairs of the State.”
 44
  Taking an equally dim 
view of the political capabilities of various Europeans, and utilizing the full racist rhetoric 
of his time, Mississippi doctor and pamphleteer William H. Holcombe questioned how 
“those who say that the French, the Italians or the Prussians, are not yet fit for freedom” 
would “thrust the splendid privilege of Anglo-Saxon superiority upon the semi-barbarous 
negro!,” exclaiming “what folly, what madness!”
45
  The Richmond Whig was more 
optimistic about the French nation, if not other European nations, asserting that France 
was more advanced than Italy, Austria, or Russia only because it had adopted a limited 
form of democracy.
46
  Not only their own domestic politics and political tendencies, but 
also their analysis of and comparisons with aspiring nations abroad, enhanced southern 
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conservatives’ argument that self-government was harmful to nations, and that limited 
liberty and democracy were critical national traits for the Confederacy. 
Besides protecting against the harms of unchecked democracy, another benefit of 
limited, rational liberty in the conservative mind was that it allowed for a more orderly 
society.  Social order, particularly a hierarchical social order based on racial inequality, 
was a primary value for southern conservatives.
47
  As A. Featherman wrote in DeBow’s 
Review, absolute equality led to chaos, and only through social dependence could social 
order could be achieved.  The revolutions of 1848 provided a case study of what to avoid 
for Featherman, who declared that in the wake of the revolution of 1848 in France, “a 
government instituted on the principle of ‘liberty, fraternity and equality’ became the 
stepping-stone… for the usurpation of imperial power.”
48
  South Carolina newspaperman 
and writer Leonidas W. Spratt concurred that slavery was a key principle of social order 
that would prevent the South from following the chaotic path of other revolutions.
49
  To 
southern conservatives, greater social order would protect the Confederacy from what 
they saw as the harmful consequences of too much freedom that had doomed attempts at 
nation-building in Europe.   
As conservatives analyzed new and aspiring nations abroad, they identified 
several key differences between the Confederacy and new and aspiring nations in Europe.  
The Confederacy’s emphasis on slavery, limited liberty and democracy, and social order 
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distinguished the southern nation from the failed attempts at nation-building in Europe.  
These values not only set the Confederacy apart from other new and hopeful nations, 
however; they also defined the identity of the southern nation.  By using the contrasts 
between the Confederacy and aspiring nations abroad to define southern national values, 
conservative southerners used international analysis to shape their vision of their national 
identity. 
 As conservatives strengthened their sense of their new national identity through 
international comparisons, they also sharpened their vision of the Confederacy’s 
international meaning and larger national mission.  To conservatives, the liberal 
underpinnings of European nationalist movements had led to anarchy, tyranny, and other 
undesirable outcomes.  Because the Confederacy rejected the liberal doctrines that had 
corrupted aspiring nations in Europe, however, the southern nation would supposedly 
avoid these evils.  The southern nation thus represented a superior national form 
according to conservative southerners.  Southern conservatives even went so far as to 
argue that southern nationalism purified the nationalism exhibited by new and aspiring 
European nations.  The conservative nationalism exhibited by the Confederacy 
supposedly represented the purest form of nationalism yet created, elevating the 
Confederacy to new global importance, not as the latest aspiring nation to emulate the 
ideals of liberal nationalism, but as the originator of a new political tradition. 
 Slavery, at the heart of southern identity and conservatism, was also at the center 
of conservative claims that the Confederacy represented a new and improved form of 
nationhood.  Slavery was one of the values and institutions that granted the Confederacy 
its conservative character, underpinned southern conservative politics, and, especially 
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through the days of nation-formation in 1861, helped shape the identity of the new nation.  
To conservative southerners, looking to define the Confederacy as distinct from and 
superior to liberal nations, slavery played a key role in forging the unique strengths and 
national mission of the southern nation.
50
 
 One of the ways that conservatives claimed that slavery strengthened the southern 
nation, and created a superior form of nationhood, was through granting protection and 
freedom to white citizens.  As conservative southerners anticipated an independent 
southern nation in 1860 and early 1861, they reassured themselves that a slave-based 
nation, unique among its peers, would provide protection for all whites.  As the 
Charleston Mercury argued, slavery protected white citizens from coarse labor, and thus 
was the underpinning of “free society in Europe and America.”
51
  DeBow’s Review 
declared in July of 1860 that should the South form an independent nation, the southern 
nation would be “peculiarly circumstanced, and advantages would be hers such as no 
nation has heretofore been favored with.”  Accordingly, a southern nation would usher in 
a new era in the history of the world.  This global importance would be based in large 
part on the South’s “perfect labor system,” which ensured that “liberty is the sole heritage 
of the white race.”
52
  The protection that slavery afforded white citizens would, according 
to southern conservatives, grant the southern nation a unique place among nations of the 
world. 
                                                 
50
 For analysis of southerners’ belief that slavery granted them a unique national mission, see Genovese, 
The Slaveholders’ Dilemma, 4-6, 12-13; Fleche, Revolution of 1861, 132-150; McCurry, Confederate 
Reckoning; Tate, Conservatism and Southern Intellectuals, 189, 219-245; Bonner, Mastering America, 
252-285. 
 
51
 “Pecuniary Effects of Secession at the South,” Charleston Mercury, March 26, 1861.  See also “National 
Characteristics,” 47. 
 
52
 “Our Country - Its Hopes and Fears,” DeBow’s Review 31.1 (July 1860):  84-5. 
 
 180
 Slavery would also enable the southern nation to fulfill its national mission in part 
because slavery supposedly stabilized society and the social order.  Slavery, according to 
DeBow’s Review, protected against the fanaticism that roiled Europe, and thus provided 
“a solution of all the disturbing problems, social, political, ethical, and economical, that 
are convulsing the bosom of modern society.”
53
  A. Featherman likewise argued that 
slavery protected against the failures experienced by the revolutionaries of 1848 by 
providing the “most perfect social system that can possibly be devised.”
54
  The Daily 
Richmond Examiner informed its readers that slavery was nothing less than the “divine 
law of social order” and would ensure the superiority of the southern nation.
55
  For 
conservatives who believed that an orderly society was a key national value, slavery was 
critical to building a strong nation that could stand out among, and stand above, its 
international peers. 
Slavery did not just protect the white race and preserve social order, however; to 
conservative southerners, it also did nothing less than preserve civilization.  Although 
much of the rest of the nineteenth century world was turning away from slavery, 
southerners nonetheless saw slavery as not only compatible with, but even necessary for, 
progress.
56
  If slavery was critical to the preservation of civilization, then it only stood to 
reason that a southern nation built on slavery would be the most civilized of new nations.  
William H. Holcombe argued that “African slavery is no retrograde movement, no 
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discord in the harmony of nature, no violation of elemental justice, no infraction of 
immutable laws, human or divine – but an integral link the grand progressive evolution of 
human society.”
57
  Colonel A. S. Atkinson of Georgia concurred that the current level of 
civilization could not be maintained if slavery were destroyed in the South, asserting that 
if slavery were ended, the South would follow the path of defeated and destroyed nations 
before it.
58
  To conservative southerners, slavery was not incompatible with progress – it 
was necessary for the same, and a southern nation based in slavery would actually be the 
most progressive of the nations of the world. 
 As the most civilized society, the slave South would also become the perfect 
model of a successful, virtuous nation according to southern conservatives.  A convention 
of South Carolinians informed their fellow southerners in January of 1861 that a united 
southern nation, based on slavery, would be “among the most important of the nations of 
the world… whose renown must spread throughout the civilized world.”
59
  As war began, 
the Richmond Daily Dispatch relied on a similar idea to bolster its readers’ faith in 
southern ability to win independence, arguing that “the whole history of mankind shows 
that the military power of nations has in every case been built up at the beginning, by the 
enslavement of conquered peoples.”
60
  DeBow’s Review declared that “history furnishes 
abundant proof that the institution of domestic slavery conduces to national strength; and 
the events of the day are about to confirm the lessons of history,” enthusing that “we of 
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the South are about to inaugurate a new civilization. We shall have new and original 
thought; negro slavery will be its great controlling and distinctive element.”
61
  As 
Confederates created their new nation, conservatives argued that slavery would not only 
give the new nation its strength, but would also ensure the perfection of the southern 
nation, and even of the concept of nationhood in general. 
 By protecting white citizens, ensuring an orderly society, advancing civilization, 
and perfecting the nation, conservatives argued, slavery would elevate the southern 
nation among all other nations.  Slavery did not only grant the southern nation an 
elevated position in the community of nations, however.  Conservative southerners also 
believed that even as it uniquely strengthened the southern nation, slavery also purified 
the same values that had driven nationalist movements in Europe.  Although they 
considered the idea of non-republican styles of government, ultimately even conservative 
southerners agreed that the southern nation should be a republic.  To these conservatives, 
however, republicanism was best served by conservative values, and was thus enhanced 
by slavery, rather than limited by slavery.  Conservatives argued that the southern nation 
was not only a model nation through its conservatism and slavery, but that it was also a 
model republican nation, one that purified the ideals that unrestrained liberalism had 
supposedly corrupted in nationalist movements abroad. 
 The idea that slavery, and therefore the southern nation, purified republicanism 
was popular throughout the existence of the Confederacy.  A writer for the Southern 
Literary Messenger claimed in January of 1861 that slavery preserved “peace” and 
“harmony” and prevented the “angry strifes which agitate and destroy other nations,” and 
                                                 
61
 “The Future of Our Confederation,” DeBow’s Review 6.1 (July 1861):  36.  See also Joseph E. Brown, 
“Governor’s Message,” Macon Daily Telegraph, November 15, 1861. 
 183
therefore a southern nation would have “the greatest opportunity ever vouchsafed to any 
people, of establishing free republican institutions.”
62
  Years later in 1864, Rev. William 
A. Hall of New Orleans declared that the southern nation, based on the superiority of the 
white race, “is the perfection of republican government.”
63
  Slavery elevated the southern 
nation not only by introducing an alternative set of national values, but also, according to 
conservative southerners, by purifying the very same values that had motivated 
nationalist movements abroad.
64
 
 A common basis to the claim that slavery purified republicanism was the 
argument that limited democracy, a major part of conservatives’ sense of national 
identity, and one of the strengths of the southern nation, also strengthened republicanism.  
The Daily Richmond Examiner blamed “direct democracy” for the degeneration of the 
American republic as controlled by the North, arguing that it ushered in tyranny and 
oppression, whereas “here in the South the presence of negro slavery has acted as a 
corrective.”
65
  In 1861, DeBow’s Review published Beverly Tucker’s Nashville 
Convention speech, in which Tucker had declared that “the institution of domestic 
slavery… gives stability to government, and renders universal suffrage and perfect 
freedom possible to those who are free.”
66
  At an 1861 Virginia Convention held to 
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debate secession, delegate James H. Cox agreed with fellow delegate Thomas S. 
Flournoy, former congressman and future colonel of the Confederate army, that slavery 
was “essential to the preservation of American freedom.”
67
  To Tucker, Cox, Flournoy, 
and other southern conservatives, limiting the freedom of slaves enhanced the freedom 
available to white citizens, creating a more perfect republic.  The southern nation thus 
represented the purest and strongest form of republican nationhood. 
 Through the early years of the war, as southerners forged a southern nation, 
conservatives argued that slavery would elevate the southern nation above all other 
nations.  Slavery would protect whites, preserve civilization, strengthen the nation, and 
even purify the republicanism that had motivated nationalist movements in Europe.  The 
southern nation was not just necessary for the protection of southerners, according to 
southern conservatives; it would also be the strongest and purest new nation in the 
international community of nations. 
Such comparisons were critical to conservatives’ efforts to justify secession and 
shape the identity of their new nation.  As the immediate demands of nation-formation 
shifted to the task of sustaining and defending that nation, however, southerners’ 
international comparisons began to shift.  For more liberal southerners, the fact that the 
rest of the world responded negatively to their comparisons between the southern nation 
and aspiring nations in Europe led them to intensify their manipulation of the ideals of 
southern nationalism and of liberal nationalism in order to preserve their comparisons.  
Conservative southerners responded differently to the lack of support from the rest of the 
world.  To conservatives, the southern nation was unique among nations, strengthened 
and set apart by its conservatism.  It made sense, then, that the rest of the world would 
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respond negatively to a nation premised on a different set of values.  Conservative 
comparisons during the war thus focused on explaining why international rejection of the 
South was not a problem. 
Through 1862, as the Confederacy settled in to the task of sustaining a nation and 
winning a war, conservatives began to popularize a new argument that directly contrasted 
the process of nation-formation in the South with the recent examples of nation-formation 
in Europe.  Conservatives who had previously argued that slavery and the southern nation 
purified republicanism now extended that argument to claim that secession and the act of 
creating a southern nation had purified and corrected the excesses that had characterized 
revolutions and nationalist movements in Europe.  Pointing to the supposed superiority of 
the southern revolution not only continued to bolster the legitimacy of the southern 
nation, but also allowed southerners to sidestep the lack of international approval by 
attempting to enhance the appearance of the Confederacy as a superior nation, even from 
its conception. 
For conservative southerners, the southern nation’s conservatism purified the 
negative liberalism that had characterized and shaped the revolutions and nationalist 
movements abroad.  As the Richmond Daily Dispatch explained in a February 1862 
article on events in Italy, the South “has of late discovered that its worst enemies in 
Europe are the insurrectionists, and its only friends the conservative classes,” asserting 
that “the Southern revolution, which is a conservative and constitutional… movement, 
which has for its object the protection of property and constitutional liberty, has of course 
no friends among those who make war upon property” and declaring that “under these 
circumstances, the future popular agitations of Europe can scarcely be expected to excite 
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any interest in the South.”
68
  For the Richmond Daily Dispatch’s writer, the southern 
revolution was set apart from European revolutions by its very conservatism, which also 
elevated the southern revolution into the position of superiority.  Similarly, George 
Fitzhugh blamed Locke’s principles of human equality for destroying government and 
stability in Europe, leading to the revolutions that had characterized the continent for the 
past several decades.  He contrasted the “Southern Revolution of 1861” with the earlier 
Lockean revolutions, characterizing the southern revolution as “reactionary and 
conservative… a solemn protest against the doctrines of natural liberty, human equality 
and the social contract.”
69
  This vision of the Confederacy as purifying revolution with its 
conservatism persisted throughout the war; in 1864, Rev. William A. Hall celebrated the 
formation of the Confederacy as the world’s first conservative revolution, calling the 
southern revolution the only true and pure revolution and arguing that the Confederacy 
marked the beginning of a new age of conservatism.
70
  To southern conservatives, the 
creation of the southern nation stood as an exemplar of conservatism in action, as well as 
a rebuke to the supposedly harmful liberalism that had driven nationalist movements in 
Europe. 
While celebrating the conservatism of the southern revolution, southern 
conservatives also reiterated the exact harms against which the conservative southern 
project in nation-building would protect.  These harms that a year before had justified 
secession were now used to defend that same act of secession in retrospect.  Anarchy and 
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mob violence were the most frequent evils produced by revolutions abroad that 
conservatives claimed that the southern revolution had avoided.  Thomas Howell Cobb, 
president of the provisional Southern Congress and a former congressman and governor 
of Georgia, argued that “the one remarkable characteristic of the revolution which 
distinguishes it from all others recorded in history” is that the southern revolution was 
based on conservatism, contrasting it with other revolutions whose “popular tendencies 
have too frequently degraded them into anarchy and discord.”
71
  In his inaugural address, 
Governor Zebulon Baird Vance of North Carolina celebrated that “mob violence, that 
dangerous offspring of revolution, has been equally repressed by the conservatism of our 
people.”
72
  The idea that the Confederacy was unique in its avoidance of violence 
persisted even throughout many long years of war, with the Confederate Congress still 
asserting in 1864 that the Confederacy “is a child of law instead of sedition, of right 
instead of violence, of deliberation instead of insurrection.  Its early life was attended by 
no anarchy, no rebellion, no suspension of authority, no social disorders, no lawless 
disturbances…  The utmost conservatism marked every proceeding and public act,” in 
contrast to the European revolutions that had not shown such conservatism.
73
  The 
supposedly conservative nature of the southern revolution furnished proof for southern 
conservatives that the southern nation, unlike aspiring nations in Europe, upheld the 
principles of conservatism rather than falling to the excesses of liberalism.  From its very 
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beginnings as a purified, conservative revolution, southern conservatives argued, the 
Confederacy had undertaken a unique national mission that set it apart from the inferior 
new and aspiring nations in Europe.   
In the later years of the war, as foreign aid and support continued to be withheld, 
conservative analyses of the South’s place within the international community shifted 
from defending the southern revolution to explaining why the South’s international 
isolation was not a problem.  In an exuberantly-punctuated statement, the Augusta Daily 
Constitutionalist lamented that “our social organization and our labor system are such as 
the world, in this enlightened (!) day, puts under the ban of its reprobation,” recognizing 
that “we stand almost alone as to our peculiar institutions” but arguing that the institution 
of slavery nonetheless created greater harmony and peace in the South than was found in 
other nations.
74
  In a similar statement, the Daily Richmond Examiner wrote that “we 
stand alone… for we have no faith in our European admirers,” but that while the South’s 
ideological isolation “is a bleak position,” it was “not an unhealthy one,” and that 
southerners “are content to keep aloof from the ‘spirit of progress’ which is making all 
over the world such a sad hotch-potch of true civilization.”
75
  The Confederacy may have 
stood alone among nations of the world, but to conservatives, that was acceptable, as the 
benefits of slavery simply ensured that the South stood alone at the top. 
In an attempt to further mitigate the lack of international support, additional 
analysis of the role of slavery within the Confederacy, and of the Confederacy within the 
world, directly criticized the European nations that had failed to support the South’s bid 
for national independence.  The Augusta Daily Constitutionalist declared that slavery 
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would not only strengthen the Confederacy and preserve republicanism, but also that, 
without slavery, southerners would become “the Spain and Italy, the hybrid of America, 
the lazaroni [sic] of the world,” dismissing these nations and their people as unfit for the 
international support that was granted to them but withheld from the Confederacy.
76
  The 
Index, Confederate propagandist Henry Hotze’s London newspaper, wrote that the North 
was like oppressive Russia and the South like patriotic, freedom-loving Poland, who had 
recently been defeated in a fight against Russian control.  Hotze made a critical exception 
to this comparison, however, in claiming that racial slavery in the South ensured that the 
Confederacy would be successful where Poland failed.
77
  Slavery, the heart of the 
southern experiment in nation-building, set the South apart from other aspiring nations.  
According to conservative southerners, this merely meant that the South was superior to 
nations based on more liberal principles, and therefore the lack of support from abroad 
could not threaten the southern national mission.  During the long years of war, 
international comparisons assured conservative southerners that the lack of international 
support was due to southern superiority rather than to any failures of the southern nation. 
 To southern conservatives, the Confederacy was justified and defined by its 
differences from, rather than similarities to, new and aspiring European nations.  
Conservative southerners were still guided by critiques of European nationalist 
movements as destroyed by excess liberalism, and thus they rejected liberal comparisons 
that claimed similarity between the South and aspiring nations abroad, arguing instead 
that the South improved upon and purified, rather than resembled, the model of these 
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aspiring European nations.  Southern conservatism, and its differences from the liberal 
ideals that the North had adopted from Europe, justified an independent southern nation 
according to conservatives’ international comparisons.  Analysis of the international 
context of the new southern nation helped southern conservatives to determine the form 
that their new government should take, and to identify the values that would define the 
southern nation.  These conservative values set the Confederacy apart from the more 
liberal new and aspiring European nations, supposedly strengthening the Confederacy 
and granting it a unique national mission.  This mission was carried out as southern 
conservative values, particularly slavery, created a new form of nation that conservatives 
argued both rejected and purified the liberal values that had fueled nationalist movements 
abroad.  Conservative southerners were clearly incorrect in their assessment that 
conservatism and slavery would create a stronger, better nation that purified the 
nationalism exhibited by aspiring nations elsewhere.  For conservative southerners during 
the Civil War, however, as for their more liberal counterparts, international analysis was 
critical to defining the Confederacy and its place within the world.
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